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Executive Summary
This dissertation is composed of three chapters. The first chapter explores the importance of previously
identified factors in explaining the variation in analysts’ earnings forecast error. As earnings forecasts are
the main input in determining price targets and consequently stock recommendations, much of the process
through which analysts process their input remains in a so-called “black box”. This study attempts to shed
light on these inputs. First, it reveals that forecast errors are stable over time, and analysts do not
efficiently integrate past information in their forecasts. Second, analysts do not factor in expectations
related to the macroeconomic conditions for the underlying forecast horizon. Analysts overreact
(underreact) to positive (negative) macroeconomic expectations on both GDP and consumer sentiment
index. Third, this study decomposes analysts’ forecast errors variance by observable characteristics and
fixed effects. Importantly, the analysis shows that there is an unobserved, time-invariant component
related to the firm-analyst dimension that explains much of the variance in the forecast errors. This
component is not yet captured by the existing observable characteristics which, at date, have a trifling
effect on their own in explaining the variation in analysts’ forecast error.
In the second chapter, I investigate the role of financial reporting frequency in analysts’ earnings
forecasts. I addresses two questions. First, does mandatory quarterly reporting benefit financial analysts in
decreasing their earnings forecast error and dispersion? Second, to what extent common accounting
standards increase the convergence of analysts’ information set for firms with different reporting
frequencies? I find little support to the claim that regulation forcing firms to issue more frequent financial
information benefits financial analysts. Compared to a control sample of semiannual reporting firms in the
European market, analysts issuing earnings forecasts for firms with mandatory quarterly frequency
experience higher forecast error and dispersion. When firms are mandated to report not only on a quarterly
frequency, but also under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), analysts’ both forecast error
and dispersion decrease. However, while IFRS does benefit analysts by increasing the quality of their
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information set in absolute terms, they do not wipe out the relative noise associated with mandatory
quarterly statements.
The third chapter focuses on how financial analysts adapt to the passage of regulations aiming at
limiting conflicts of interest in the investment banking industry. This last chapter investigates analysts’
price targets and recommendations, and unravels a new form of conflicts of interest. Specifically, it
investigates whether affiliated brokers issue unfavourable ratings on their clients’ competitors in the
product market (rivals). The findings document an important gap between ratings for affiliated and rival
firms. Specifically, brokers issue persistently higher ratings on firms with which they are affiliated
compared to their rivals. Importantly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the related financial regulations aiming
at curbing the conflicts of interests had no significant impact in reducing this gap. As such, affiliated
brokers continue to indirectly favour their clients. This form of conflict was devoid of adequate attention
in prior research. Furthermore, investors are unaware of the existence of such conflict in the short-run.
Key words: financial analysts, earnings forecasts error, reporting frequency, financial statements, price
targets, stock recommendations, Sarbanes-Oxley act, conflicts of interest, investment banking.
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1Introduction
In financial markets, investors generally rely on the experts - and particularly on financial analysts – to
obtain information on what the future may hold. Accurate predictions are paramount for dealing in a world
fraught with uncertainty, since they improve the decision making process and help optimizing resource
allocations. What equities should one invest in over the long run? Which sectors will outperform? How
will the market react to the next regulatory initiatives? The role of financial analysts is to provide investors
the answers to these, and other related topics. 0F1 Sell-side financial analysts have the expertise and resources
to value companies, research and issue professional reports on firms’ operations, and provide an
investment rating to their clients.
The research interest on financial analysts has grown exponentially over the last three decades. While
in the early years the academic literature tackled analysts’ expectations to investigate market efficiency, it
later explored the investment value of their output. Along this way, the spectrum of analysis has extended
from solely earnings forecasts to stock recommendations and, eventually, price targets. This work has
certainly increased our understanding on analysts’ relevance and how they operate in financial markets as
intrinsic agents.
Nevertheless, we still lack a great deal of knowledge in two particular areas. The first one relies on
analysts’ input in producing forecasts. Despite hundreds of studies, the academic research has made
limited breakthrough in what constitutes the analysts’ toolbox for valuing firms. What are the key
determinants of analysts’ forecast errors? Do analysts efficiently integrate past information in their
forecasts? The process through which analysts forecast earnings remains by and large a “black-box” and
warrants further investigation.
The second strand of research concerns the role of financial regulations on analysts’ output. As the
crisis of 2008 set back the financial industry in a state of ill-repute, financial regulators responded with an
unprecedented growth in reforms to increase confidence in capital markets. To illustrate, the number of
1 See, e.g., “14 Predictions for 2016 from the brightest minds in finance”, Bloomberg, November 20, 2015;
“Analysts' top sectors and stock picks for 2016”, CNBC, December 31, 2015.
2regulatory restrictions issued by the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission increased by 19% from
1997 to 2012.1F2 Financial regulations have expanded on a global scale and show no signs of abating. For
example, in 2014, financial regulators issued on average 155 alerts per day concerning worldwide updates,
policy notes, briefings and enforcement of financial rules2F3. These regulatory initiatives most likely
changed the way analysts interact with firms, mix private and public information, and conduct their
research. Do analysts issue more accurate forecasts? Do price targets and stock recommendations better
reflect stocks’ expected performance? How these regulations affect analysts’ role as intermediaries in
financial markets? Did they have unintended consequences?
This dissertation aims to contribute to these lines of inquiry. The first essay examines the determinants
of analysts’ forecast errors. In a variance decomposition model, this study checks to what extent the
determinants previously identified in the literature are important in the cross-section and time-series
variation of analysts’ forecast errors. The analysis reveals that the importance of the existing determinants
is dismal, and that forecast errors are rather stable over time. Firm and analyst fixed effects explain much
of the variance in analysts’ forecast errors, suggesting that there is an important, unobserved firm and
analyst related component in the forecast error, not yet captured by the existing variables. This time-
invariant component reveals that much of what constitutes analysts’ forecast error is currently left
unmeasured. As such, the inherent firm-analyst dimension plays a critical role in explaining the forecast
error. This first essay complements recent findings showing that private and public communication
between analyst and management constitutes one of the most valuable sources of information for the
earnings forecasts.
The second essay investigates whether financial analysts benefit from the mandatory quarterly
financial reporting in Europe. Specifically, do firms with mandated quarterly reports and semiannual
reports differ in terms of analysts’ annual earnings forecast error, dispersion and following? On one hand,
if mandated quarterly reports decrease information asymmetry, the quality of analysts’ information
2 Source: Mercatus Center, RegData, http://regdata.org.
3 The corresponding numbers for 2013 and 2012 were 103 and 68 respectively. Source: “The peak of regulatory
change may be some way off “, Thomson Reuters Regulatory Intelligence, March 16, 2015.
3environment should increase. On the other hand, forcing firms to issue financial statements too frequently
may constrain the management to focus extensively on the short-term performance in reporting noisy
information, and analysts should experience larger forecast errors for such firms. I find support for the
latter case. Specifically, mandatory quarterly reports are associated with greater forecast error and
dispersion. These results are consistent with recent evidence showing that mandated quarterly reporters
exhibit higher real activities manipulation compared to semiannual reporters. In a second step of the
analysis, I examine whether the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) increases the convergence of accounting information among firms with different reporting
frequencies. Consistent with extant evidence, analysts’ errors decrease significantly for the entire universe
of firms after IFRS. At the same time, the positive gap between quarterly and semiannual reporters in
terms of analysts’ forecast error and dispersion continues to exist. As such, while IFRS does benefit
analysts by decreasing forecast error and dispersion in absolute terms, they do not wipe out the pernicious
relative noise associated with mandatory quarterly statements.
The third essay examines how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX501) has affected analysts’ conflicts of
interest. While the focus of previous research is on the brokers’ positive bias for their clients, this study
investigates whether brokers are unfavorable towards their clients’ rivals in the product market. Two
questions are addressed. First, do brokers provide significantly lower ratings for rival than for affiliated
firms? Second, are investors aware of this form of conflicts? The results suggest that brokers comply with
the regulation and issue less optimistic ratings. Nevertheless, brokers continue to keep their clients on
significantly higher ratings than their clients’ rivals. In fact, brokers switched to a downward scale for
both affiliated and rival firms, maintaining the rating gap in the aftermath of the regulation. This gap is
identified in both price targets and stock recommendations. To go further, the study reveals that investors
are unaware of brokers’ negative bias on rival firms, both before and after the passage of SOX501. This
last essay uncovers a form of conflicts of interest in the investment banking industry that was not
addressed so far. To the extent that conflicts of interest were mitigated, it finds evidence that brokers
continue to favor their clients by following an alternative strategy without breaching the rules.
4Overall, these three essays shed light on what ultimately drives analysts’ forecast errors and how
regulations affect their output. This thesis also narrows the scope of the future research in what I believe it
remains an exciting and promising direction to better understand the behavior of these agents. In this
respect, important challenges await further investigation. What are the steps to forecast bottom-line
earnings and what information analysts factor in along the process? Does a common set of standards such
as IFRS facilitate this process?
In the next years, the academic research can contribute in several significant ways to bring us closer to
a better understanding of how financial analysts operate. First, we need to assess accuracy with more rigor
and much more exact measurement tools. Consider the questions at the beginning of this section. What
does the long run mean: two-year, five-year, ten-year, or an indefinite horizon? What does outperform
exactly stand for: beating the sector, or beating the market? As long as we do not develop tools to
quantitatively assess analysts’ accuracy, relative judgements will not help much. Second, the progress in
technology should undoubtedly facilitate our work in providing us with an array of available data
resources and measurement tools. Until recently, the bottom-line stock recommendations had the lion’s
share of attention in research. However, the last years provided a fruitful opportunity to investigate the
entire content of analysts’ reports through text analysis and tone measurement.  To better advance in our
collective knowledge, integrating these tools in our future research remains essential. Finally, I believe we
need as a community to increase our interest in interdisciplinary research. For example, parallel work in
cognitive biases and neuroscience could provide fruitful insights on whether, and how financial analysts
form and use their priors. As Tetlock and Brown (2015) state it: “Beliefs are hypotheses to be tested, not
treasures to be guarded.” 4F4 We ought to abide by the same principle in our profession.
4 Source: Tetlock, P. E., and D., Gardner. 2015. Superforecasting: The art and science of prediction. Crown
Publishers, New York, NY, p.127.
5Chapter 1: Decomposing Analysts’ Forecast Error: What are the Key
Factors?
(In collaboration with Michel Dubois and Žana Grigaliūniene)
Introduction
Over the last decades, the academic research on financial analysts has undoubtedly increased our
understanding on a broad swath of subjects related to these agents. Central to this literature is the notion
that financial analysts are important information intermediaries and investors react significantly to the
dissemination of their output (e.g., earnings forecasts, price targets and stock recommendations).
Moreover, financial analysts' earnings forecasts are used in stock valuation models to compute proxies for
the cost of capital in accounting and finance research. While much of the research focuses on the analysts’
output, little is known at date on the process through which they forecast earnings. The quality of analysts’
forecasts, e.g., the errors they are prone to, stems directly from the input they use in the process. As such,
knowing what determines these errors warrants further investigation. What are the key determinants of
analysts’ forecast errors? Do analysts persist in their errors? Are errors mostly driven by analysts’ bias
(i.e., ex-ante information), or firm-unrelated, unexpected changes in macroeconomic conditions (i.e. ex-
post information)? How can we come to a better understanding of what ultimately drives analysts to
commit these forecast errors? The goal of this chapter is to answer these questions.
We begin by reviewing the literature on analysts’ earnings forecasts over the 25 years and retain a list
of commonly identified determinants of forecast errors. Typically, these variables relate to the observable
factors at the time of the forecast, and pertain to four categories: forecast, analyst, firm, or institutionally
related characteristics. We extend the list of variables by two other factors. First, we compute the
unexpected changes in the future macroeconomic conditions at the time of the earnings forecasts.
Specifically, we compute the surprise over the same horizon in the aggregated output (i.e., the difference
between GDP forecasted and realized values) and consumer sentiment (i.e., the difference between
6Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index at the time of the earnings forecast and at the end of the year).
Since this information is observable ex-post, but predictable ex-ante, our motivation is to examine the
interplay between this type of information and the one available at the time of the earnings forecast.
Importantly, adding these factors sheds light on the degree to which analysts integrate firm-unrelated
information into their forecasts. Second, we add the prior forecast error to account for the dynamics of the
series.
In the first part of the analysis, we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and run a system GMM model to
quantitatively assess the magnitude of analysts’ forecast errors association with the set of variables
mentioned above. Two findings emerge from this exercise. First, the effect of prior forecast errors is rather
economically weak. Specifically, while analysts do persist in their errors by an estimate of 0.05%
(statistically significant at the 5% level), the dynamic remains low. Second, the unexpected changes in the
macroeconomic conditions are strongly associated with analysts’ earnings forecasts errors. This
association includes firm’s sensitivity to the macroeconomic conditions (i.e., either GDP or consumer
sentiment) and reveals that the more exposed the firm is to the economy, the more analysts overreact
(underreact) to optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts of the macroeconomic conditions. In economic terms,
one standard deviation in the GDP input factor for example is equivalent to an increase of 1.3 USD based
on the median per-share assets in our sample.
In the second step, we appraise the relative importance of each factor. We perform a variance
decomposition of analysts’ forecast errors and check to what extent these factors are important in the
cross-section and time-series variation of analysts’ forecast errors. We find that the importance of the
existing determinants is dismal. Specifically, the adjusted R-square from a baseline model with the entire
set of measurable variables is 2.4%. Confirming our previous findings, the time dimension is rather weak
in explaining the forecast error variance. Specifically, a model with both observable characteristics and
time fixed effects has an explanatory power of 4%., with the time dimension mostly orthogonal to these
variables.
7When we augment the baseline model with firm (analyst) fixed effects, the adjusted R-square is 34%
(19%), revealing that there is an important, unobserved firm and analyst related component in the forecast
error not yet captured by the existing variables. This time-invariant component shows that much of what
constitutes analysts’ forecast error is currently left unexplained. Importantly, when we add both firm and
analyst fixed effects adjusted R-square increases to 61%. This value is higher than the additive adjusted R-
squares from the two models with separate firm and analyst fixed effects, suggesting that the inherent
firm-analyst dimension plays a critical role in explaining the forecast error.
The main takeaway of this chapter is that the firm-analyst relationship is at the core of the process of
forecasting earnings. We build on the existing gap in the literature called by Schipper (1991), Ramnath,
Rock and Shane (2008), and Bradshaw (2011) in narrowing the scope of the “black-box” process through
which analysts forecast earnings. Our study complements the recent results in Soltes (2014) and Brown,
Call, Clement and Sharp (2015), among others, that show that private and public communication between
analyst and management constitutes one of the most valuable sources of information input for the
forecasts. Specifically, we quantitatively assess the relative importance of this relationship in an extended
array of factors.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides the literature review. Section 1.3
describes the data. In Section 1.4 we investigate the dynamics of earnings forecast error. Section 1.5
examines the variance decomposition of the error and Section 1.6 concludes.
Background and related literature
Prior research identifies a myriad of factors associated with analysts’ earnings forecasts errors.
However, it is important to note that these factors are, by construction, directly related to the timing of the
forecast; i.e., the ex-ante information available to the analyst at the forecast date. While we can currently
measure the analyst’s bias in terms of her available information set, two factors warrant further attention.
First, the literature is silent as to what extent analysts’ forecast error is associated with ex-post information
up until the forecast’s realization. To wit, how is the error related to the inherent analysts’ forecast ability,
8and to unexpected events unfolding after the forecast date? Second, the dynamic structure of the forecast
errors was little explored; i.e., to what extent current financial analysts’ earnings forecast errors related to
past earnings forecast errors? We lay out each of these factors below.
1.2.1. Bias in earnings forecasts
Several characteristics identified as significant in explaining analysts’ forecast error paved the way to a
multitude of studies that repeatedly used these characteristics in the last two decades of research in the
field. We classify these characteristics in four categories: analyst-, firm-, forecast- and institutional-
related.
1.2.1.1. Analyst characteristics
Starting with Clement (1999), a large body of literature documents analyst’s experience in producing
forecasts as one of the most important variable associated with earnings forecast error. Clement, Koonce
and Lopez (2007), Clement, Hales and Xue (2011), and Walter and Willis (2013) among others, find that
analyst’s experience in the financial analysis industry – computed as the number of years the analyst was
active in producing earnings forecasts – is negatively related to analyst’s error. In addition, Brown and
Mohd (2003), Chen and Martin (2011) and Hugon, Kumar and Lin (2015) document that analysts’
forecast error is indirectly associated with their firm-specific experience – computed as the number of
years the analyst was active in producing earnings forecast for the firm. The results of these studies
demonstrate that analysts improve their forecasting skills by practice.
Analyst’s portfolio complexity is another characteristic associated with forecast error. While the above
studies find a positive relation between the number of firms and industries followed by an analyst and her
forecast error, Call, Chen and Tong (2009) suggest that the analyst’s complexity task is also important.
Specifically, earnings forecast errors are smaller when accompanied by cash flow forecasts. Analysts’
resources are as well important in producing unbiased forecasts. Clement (1999), Brown (2001), and
Malloy (2005) among others find that working for a large size broker – measured as the number of
9analysts employed – is negatively associated with analysts’ forecast errors. In a nutshell, analysts’
informational advantages at large brokerage houses, as well as their specialization in covering the firm are
directly related to accurate forecasts.
1.2.1.2. Firm characteristics
Analysts issue forecasts based on their expectations on firm-related performance. Not surprisingly, a
good knowledge of firm characteristics is directly related to unbiased forecasts. Firm size is among the
main characteristics associated with analyst’s earnings forecast error. Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto
(2002), Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishan (1998), Land and Lundholm (1996), Barron, Kile and O’Keefe
(1999), Gul, Hutchinson and Lai (2013), Herman, Hope and Thomas (2008), Barron, Byard, Kile and
Riedl (2002),  Teoh and Wong (2002), and Simpson (2010) measure size as firm’s market capitalization
and find a negative association with forecast error. Lys, Gilbert and Soo (1995), Chen, Krishnan and Sami
(2015), and Espahbodi, Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2015) measure firm size as total assets and document a
similar relation. This finding could have two interpretations. First, large firms are likely to be held by
large institutional investors – and thus brokerage houses – which drives analysts to behold more
information on those firms. Second, since large firms are covered by more analysts – as information
production costs are lower – the informational advantage flows to the entire set of followers. In line with
this hypothesis, Alford and Berger (1999), Chen and Martin (2011), Mikhail, Walter and Willis (1997),
and Becchetti, Ciciretti and Giovanelli (2013) argue that the number of analysts following a firm is
negatively associated with the earnings forecast error.
The forecast error is also deemed to rely on the complexity of firm’s operations. For example, Barron
et al. (2002) and Kross and Suk (2012) find that firm’s research and development expenses are directly
associated with analysts’ forecast error. In addition, He and Tian (2013) show that firms covered by a
larger number of analysts invest less in long-term innovative projects. Chen et al. (2015) argue that
forecast error is positively related to firm’s intangible assets, proxied by the goodwill balance on total
assets. Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001), Teoh and Wong (2002), Hugon et al. (2015) find that
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firm’s total accruals are directly associated with analysts’ forecast error, since the former are difficult to
predict. Firm’s sales are as well important inputs in accurately predicting earnings. Datta, Iskandar-Datta
and Sharma (2011) find that firm’s industry-related market share is negatively related to analysts’ forecast
error. On the other hand, the error increases with firm’s international diversification (Duru and Reeb,
2002) and with the number of reported business segments (Herman et al., 2008).
Another strand of literature controls for analysts’ bias by including firm’s market-to-book ratio. Barron
et al. (2002), and Espahbodi et al. (2015) find that analysts’ forecast error is negatively associated with
firm’s market-to-book ratio, arguing that high-growth companies have more information available due to a
greater number of analysts following. At the same time, Chen and Martin (2011) argue that analysts’
forecast error is positively associated with firm’s market-to-book ratio.
The recent literature explores the informational role of firm’s accounting numbers in relation with
macroeconomic conditions, which are an important determinant of corporate earnings. Firms’ cyclicality
is an important feature in empirical studies exploring earnings forecasts. Assuming that some firms are
more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions, it is important to investigate discrepancies in earnings
forecasts for firms that exhibit cyclical characteristics. Hann, Ogneva and Sapriza (2012) find that analysts
under-react to bad macroeconomic news at the aggregate level, and this relationship varies with firms’
characteristics. Specifically, the authors sort firms into groups according their size and exposure to
macroeconomic shocks, and document that analysts under-react less for smaller and less cyclical firms.
Hugon et al. (2015) also suggest that financial analysts underreact to macroeconomic news. They also find
that analysts working for brokers that issue more accurate macroeconomic forecasts issue also more
accurate earnings forecasts. Hutton, Lee and Shu (2012) explore the information advantage of both
management and financial analysts’ earnings forecasts focusing on firm’s cyclicality. Their results point
out that financial analysts’ information advantage is stronger when firms vary with macroeconomic
factors.
As the GDP growth is related to market sentiment, the firm’s sensitivity to macroeconomic activity can
also be measured by its exposure to the market sentiment. As such, similar to GDP growth, financial
11
analysts are likely inefficient in incorporating changes in market sentiment in their earnings forecasts. In
line with this conjecture, Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) find that market sentiment, measured by the
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, and GDP growth are positively related to financial analysts’
forecast errors. Livnat and Petrovits (2008) find that upward forecast revisions to extreme good news are
not statistically different during low and high sentiment periods, suggesting that analysts are generally
optimistic and do not follow sentiment in revising their forecasts. In a nutshell, although firm’s earnings
depend on both firm’s fundamentals and macroeconomic conditions, financial analysts tend to
underweight information that is not firm specific.
1.2.1.3. Forecast characteristics
While previous literature finds that individual analyst and firm characteristics are associated with
earnings forecast error, it also suggests that the interrelation among these characteristics is not innocuous
for accurately predicting firm’s earnings. Mikhail et al. (1997), Brown and Mohd (2003), Clement et al.
(2011), and Becchetti et al. (2013) among others, find that the frequency of analyst’s revisions in the
underlying firm’s forecast is negatively related with forecast error, suggesting that analysts update – and
improve – their forecasts as new information is available. On the contrary, earnings forecast errors are
associated with the forecast horizon, i.e. the distance between the forecast release date and the fiscal year
end; see, e.g., Agrawal, Chadna and Chen (2006); Chen and Martin (2011); Duru and Reeb (2002). More
recently, Baum, Bowers and Mohanram (2015) show that analysts’ forecast timing in competing for the
same stock coverage is important in providing accurate forecasts. Specifically, the authors compute the
leader-follower ratio based on Cooper, Day and Lewis (2001) and find that information leadership is
positively correlated with forecast error.
Financial analysts’ incentives in gaining underwriting mandates at investment banks and their conflicts
of interest have been explored extensively in the literature. Malmendier and Shantikumar (2014) show that
affiliated analysts do not distort earnings forecasts, as opposed to recommendations, since they are
disseminated predominantly to large institutional investors. At the same time, Malloy (2005) argue that
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forecast error is smaller for affiliated analysts employed by banks serving as lead underwriter for the
firm’s initial public offering. Similarly, Chen and Martin (2011) find that bank-affiliated analysts gain an
informational advantage with lending relationship. Specifically, the forecast error decreases after a loan
initiation with the affiliated bank.
1.2.1.4. Institutional environment
As firms do not operate in an isolated environment, their performance and the underlying analysts’
forecasts are prone to institutional changes.  Several studies investigate how regulating analysts’
dissemination of private information affects their forecast errors. For instance, Kross and Suk (2012) find
that Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) is associated with more forecast revisions and higher forecast
errors. To wit, RegFD levels the playing field by requiring firms to disclose information to all interested
parties instead of a small number of analysts. Agrawal et al. (2006) also show that in the aftermath of
RegFD, analysts’ forecast errors are higher, suggesting a reduction in selective guidance.
In an attempt to restore confidence in public US markets, the was enacted in July 2002. According to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requirements, public firms have to disclose auditors’ internal control
reports. Kim, Song and Zhang (2009) suggest that analysts’ forecast error decrease in the aftermath of
these reports’ release. Consequently, effective internal controls improve the quality of analysts’ earnings
forecasts.
1.2.2. Unexpected changes in macroeconomic factors
Prior literature shows that analysts’ forecast errors are associated with several biases. However, little is
known on analysts’ ability to integrate expectations at the macroeconomic level. To the extent that
analysts fail to account for this information, one can expect that forecast errors are related to unexpected
changes in macroeconomic variables.
There are at least two reasons why financial analysts should integrate in their forecasts expectations at
the aggregate level of the economy. First, macroeconomic forecasts translate the extent to which
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individual firms are expected to evolve as an aggregate. 5F1 The more cyclical the firm, the more these
forecasts are likely to serve as an important input for the analysts’ forecasts. Linking earnings forecast
with macroeconomic forecasts, Hann et al. (2012) investigate whether the two sets of forecasts reflect
macroeconomic information. The authors regress each forecast on the counterpart’s forecast revisions that
reflects the unexpected component in macroeconomic news. They find that both sets of forecasts contain a
common component of the macroeconomic conditions.
Second, macroeconomic forecasts are likely to be less biased and more objective than individual firms’
forecasts. To illustrate, Hann et al. (2012) support previous findings in Darrough and Russell (2002) that
top-down forecasters are less optimistic compared to the bottom-up forecasters, because the former have
less economic incentives concerns6F2.
A handful of studies link macroeconomic indicators and sentiment in explaining variation in
forecast errors. Qian (2009) shows that market sentiment (proxied by S&P100 index put-call ratio and
CBOE equity put-call ratio) has a significant impact on average forecast errors. Specifically, optimism in
firm-level earnings forecasts rises with sentiment when extra-reward concerns dominate and decreases or
even disappears when reputation concerns dominate. At the same time, macroeconomic conditions
represented by GDP growth have no effect on forecast errors. These results suggest that the
macroeconomic information on GDP growth has been already subsumed in earnings forecasts. Milani
(2011) finds that market sentiment predicts future economic activity, with sentiment shocks explaining to
a large extent the US output fluctuations at business cycle horizons. This relationship between sentiment
and future economic activity suggests using both forces in explaining analysts’ ability to incorporate their
unexpected components in earnings forecasts.
1 While prior research explores how economic forces affect aggregate earnings forecasts (see, e.g., Daniel and Mande, 1994),
recent studies explore the reverse causality; see, e.g., Basu, Markov and Shivakumar (2010), and Konchitchki and Patatoukas
(2014).
2 Bottom-up forecasters follow individual companies and issue earnings forecasts, recommendations and price targets, whereas
top-down forecasters or market strategists predict earnings of various company aggregates (i.e. S&P500 or DJIA).
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1.2.3. Forecast error dynamics
Several studies explore the dynamics of analysts’ forecast errors. In terms of explanatory power,
Brown (2001) argues that past analyst-firm forecast error (i.e., one period lag) explains current analyst-
firm forecast error as well as a more complex model incorporating analyst characteristics. In terms of
direction, if financial analysts’ efficiently integrate past information in their current forecasts (i.e., they
learn from past forecasts), then the relation between past and current forecast error should be strictly
negative. Alternatively, if there is a persistence effect, the relation between past and current forecast error
should be strictly positive. The empirical evidence pertains to the latter case. To illustrate, Ali, Klein and
Rosenfeld (1992), Nutt, Easterwood and Easterwood (1999), Clement et al. (2007) and Call et al. (2009)
find a significant positive relation between past and current analysts’ forecast errors.
From the perspective of obtaining unbiased estimators for past forecast error, the above studies do not
fully account for the dynamic panel data structure of the series. Specifically, the models are estimated
either with OLS or by imposing a within-group transformation for fixed effects, which do not eliminate
the dynamic panel bias, i.e. the autoregressive structure of the forecast error in this case; see, e.g.,
Roodman (2009). One way to overcome this bias is to use the Arrelano-Bond estimation method based on
the generalized method of moments (GMM). In light of the recent developments in estimating dynamic
panel data models, it remains an empirical question whether analysts persist in their forecast errors, and if
yes, to what extent.
Data and sample selection
We use I/B/E/S US detail file to collect individual analyst annual earnings forecasts and realized
earnings for the period January 1997 to December 2014. We start the sample in 1997 to have sufficient
data in terms of macroeconomic forecasts and realized values. Financial firms and utilities (SIG codes 01
and 11 respectively) are excluded. We retain firms with fiscal year ending in December 31st to align fiscal
with calendar years for which we have macroeconomic forecasts. Imposing this criterion ensures cross-
15
sectional comparisons.F3 The timing of the earnings forecasts is depicted in Figure 1.1. We first retain
earnings forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year issued after the release dates of the prior fiscal year
realized earnings and the corresponding GDP. This condition imposes that information on prior earnings
and macroeconomic output is available to all analysts at the same time. Second, we restrict the forecasts to
the period that spams before the release of the first fiscal quarter realized earnings or GDP. The above
timeframe of annual forecasts provides a sufficient period of computing unexpected macroeconomic
changes starting from the annual earnings forecast’s issue until the end of the year.
Furthermore, we retain the last available forecast in the above timeframe per firm-analyst-year and
drop forecasts issued by team analysts. We work with unadjusted data and use adjustment factors to allow
time-series comparisons. We also transform all data in US dollars and require non-missing data on firm’s
price and accounting information from CRSP and Compustat. Finally, we retain the firms for which we
can compute the one-year lag forecast error and winsorize the dependent variable at 1% on both tails.
Table 1.A.1 provides details on the sample selection process.
[Insert Figure 1.1 about here]
To identify analysts’ conflicts of interest, we use SDC to extract lead and co-managers for IPO, SEO,
debt issues and M&A deals in the last three years from the forecast’s announce date. We link the data to
I/B/E/S by the firm’s parent’s CUSIP and hand matching of brokers’ names. Macroeconomic data comes
from two sources. First, we extract quarterly and annual GDP growth and the corresponding consensus
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) available at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia.8F4 Second, to account for expected and realized consumer sentiment at the end of the year, we
use the monthly Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) available at the University of Michigan.9F5
3 Forecasts corresponding to firms with fiscal year end in December 31st represent 82% of the initial sample. Moreover, imposing
this filter does not change the distribution of observations by industries during each fiscal quarter.
4 Available at https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/data-
files/ngdp.
5 Available at http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/tables.html
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The role of the forecast error components
In this section, we investigate quantitatively the importance of the existing determinants of analysts’
forecast error.
1.4.1. Model specification
We use the following autoregressive panel model.

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(1)
where Y = {GDP; CSI}, subscripts a, i, t, T stand for analyst, firm, date of the forecast and the fiscal year
end respectively,
,
a i are firm-analyst fixed effects, and , , , , ,   a i t a i a i t is the decomposition of the error
term.
The dependent variable is the analyst’s forecast error computed as
, , , ,
1( )
a i t a i t
T T T T
i iFERROR Forecast Actual TAS
  , i.e. the difference between the analyst’s forecast and actual
earnings, scaled by total assets per share at the beginning of the fiscal year.10F6 By construction, a positive
(negative) value of the forecast error implies an optimistic (less optimistic) forecast.
In line with the breakdown of the forecast error in Section 2, Eq. (1) splits the dependent variable in
three measurable variables: the past error
, , 1( )a i tFERROR , the unexpected change in macroeconomic
conditions 
,
( ) Y Yi t tDecile UCH , and bias , ,( )a i tBias . We detail the construction of each component below.
1.4.1.1. Past forecast error
We include the last year’s forecast error per firm-analyst to account for the dynamic structure of the
forecast error series. If analysts learn from (are persistent in) their past errors, then b1 should be
significantly negative (positive).
6 In unreported analysis we use alternatively price as deflator instead of assets per share. The results, available upon request, do
not change.
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1.4.1.2. Unexpected changes in macroeconomic variables
The magnitude of the relation between forecast error and unexpected changes in macroeconomic
variables should depend on the magnitude of the underlying firm’s sensitivity to macroeconomic
conditions. We capture the firm’s sensitivity to GDP (i.e., macroeconomic output) and CSI (i.e., sentiment
to macroeconomic conditions) with the parameters  GDP and  CSI respectively. For each firm-year in Eq.
(1), we use 16-prior quarters of available data to compute the current firm’s exposure (see, e.g., DeFranco,
Kothari and Verdi, 2009) and estimate the following model.
, ,
           Y Yi q i i q i q q i qROA Y Y DNEG (2)
where subscript q corresponds to the quarter of the year t when the forecast on firm i is issued (i.e. no later
than Q3). ∆Y denotes the absolute change in the macroeconomic growth from q-1 to q, and Y is defined
previously.
The dependent variable in Eq. (2) is the firm’s absolute change in return on assets from q-1 to q.
, , ,
i q i q i qROA IBT TA , where IBT and TA denote income before extraordinary items and total assets
respectively. DNEG is a dummy variable that equals one if 1  q qY Y .11F7 Finally, to limit the error in
variable bias, we form deciles based on the values of  Yi .12F
8,
13F
9
We measure the unexpected change in macroeconomic variables as follows.
,
 GDP GDPt q t tSPF gUCH (3)
,
 CSI CSI CSIt m t tg gUCH (4)
In Eq. (3), SPFq,t represents the SPF forecast for GDP growth in year t issued in quarter q. We retain
the most recent SPF annual forecast available at the time of the earnings forecast announce date; 14F10 GDPtg
7 The slope of Y is not statistically different if we do not include the interaction term.
8 Since we are interested in the magnitude, rather than the sign, of the firm’s exposure to macroeconomic aggregates, we work
with absolute values. Results are not sensitive to this choice.
9 While our objective is to capture firm’s sensitivity to these aggregates by the betas, we consider also the R-square of Eq. (2) as a
measure for the firm’s correlation with the aggregate (see, e.g., Hugon et al., 2015). As such, we consider the two measures
simultaneously by constructing a 10 x 10 matrix based on the deciles of the two series. The results are robust to this alternative.
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stands for annual percentage GDP growth in year t. In Eq. (4),
,
CSI
m tg denotes the CSI percentage change
between the month m and the end of the year. Similar to the GDP measure, we retain the most recent CSI
monthly value available at the time of the earnings forecast announce date; CSItg represents the annual CSI
percentage change in year t. The signed unexpected error on macroeconomic conditions implies the
following interpretation of b2. A positive value denotes analyst’s overreaction to optimistic
macroeconomic predictions (i.e., when UCH > 0), or alternatively underreaction to pessimistic
macroeconomic predictions (i.e., when UCH < 0). A negative value denotes analyst’s underreaction to
optimistic macroeconomic predictions, and alternatively overreaction to pessimistic macroeconomic
predictions. In all the above, the analysts fail to integrate in their current earnings forecast the unexpected
changes in macroeconomic conditions by the end of the fiscal year. Contrarily, if b2 is not statistically
different form zero, the earnings forecasts already contain this information and analysts are efficient in
processing the current macroeconomic predictions.
For robustness, we consider two additional measures for aggregated earnings. The first is the
COMPUSTAT universe of firms at quarter q, computed as the cumulative product between the firms’
income before extraordinary items and the number of outstanding shares, divided by the sum of the firms’
total assets. The second is the I/B/E/S universe of firms at quarter q, computed as the cumulative product
between the firms’ EPS (i.e street earnings) and the number of outstanding shares, divided by the sum of
the firms’ total assets. For the latter measure, we impose minimum 12 (instead of 16)-prior quarters due to
missing data. Both measures are similar to GDP and CSI.
1.4.1.3. Bias
To control for the analyst’s bias, we consider a list of variables measured at the different dimensions of
our unit of observation (i.e., analyst-firm-time). For analyst characteristics, we consider analyst’s general
and firm experience, the size of analyst’s employer (in terms of the number of active analysts in the last
10 By construction, the earnings forecasts are issued no later than the first month of Q2 (i.e. April) in our sample. As such, the
corresponding SPF forecast for year t is issued either in Q2, Q1, or Q4 of the prior year.
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365 days), and the analyst’s portfolio complexity in terms of the number of firms and number of 2-digit
SIG codes industries followed in the last 365 days from the earnings forecast’s announce date. For firm
characteristics, we consider firm’s market capitalization, number of analysts following the firm, firm’s
goodwill balance (as percentage of total assets), R&D expense (as percentage of total operating expenses),
total accruals, and firm’s market-to-book ratio.15F11 We retain forecast age, the frequency of the analyst-firm
forecasts in the last 365 days, the leader-follower ratio and an indicator variable for conflicts of interests
as characteristics of firm-analyst dimension. Finally, to account for the regulatory environment, we
consider two indicator variables for the passage of RegFD and SOX respectively.
1.4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the dependent variable, the variables corresponding to bias
and the unexpected changes in macroeconomic conditions. The forecast error is on median closer to zero
for the entire sample, and ranges from -17% to 36% (percentage as of per-share total assets). In terms of
analyst characteristics, the average analyst in our sample has a general (firm-related) experience of 9 (5)
years, while the most mature analysts are active for 33 (31) years. Analysts range from specialists
(following one firm or industry) to generalists (following a maximum of 203 firms or 11 industries).
However, the average analyst portfolio is constituted of 17 firms and two industries, in line with the idea
that analysts rather specialize by industry. In our sample, the brokerage houses employ on median 44
analysts, with the largest ones having 370 active analysts during the year.
Concerning the firm characteristics, the average firm in our sample is followed by 17 analysts during
the year and has a market capitalization of 2’281 million USD. The sample is skewed towards firms with
low ratio of R&D expenses and goodwill balance, with mean values of 0.07% and 0.11% respectively.
The mean (median) total accruals represents -0.07% (-0.06%) of total assets. In line with previous studies,
this negative value reflects the firms’ amortization and depreciation. For example, Bradshaw, Richardson
11 In unreported results, we also include the HHI of the firm’s sales by business segments (Source : Compustat Segment files).
Since we lack data to compute this measure for around 20% of the observations and our findings do not change qualitatively in
the restricted sample, we present the results without this variable.
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and Sloan (2008) find a mean (median) value for the same variable of -0.07% (-0.04%). In terms of
current market valuation, the firms in our sample have a median market-to-book ratio of two.
The annual frequency of earnings forecasts per firm-analyst ranges from one to 96. On average, an
analyst issues five annual forecasts for one firm over the year. In terms of horizon, analysts issue forecasts
at an average distance of 292 days to the end of the fiscal year. A leader-follower ratio greater than one
reveals that analysts are rather leaders, i.e. they issue earnings forecasts ahead and at large distance in time
compared to their peers. The sample statistics is highly skewed with a mean of the ratio of 2.9 and a
median of 0.8 with an interquartile range of 1.72.
Similar to earnings forecast errors, the macroeconomic error corresponding to both GDP and CSI
growth is on average zero over the sample timeframe. We observe that, in terms of magnitude, the
unexpected change (i.e., the error) in GDP growth is around four-fold smaller than the one corresponding
to the CSI change. Not surprisingly, consumers are less efficient at grasping the macroeconomic state than
professional GDP forecasters.
[Insert Table 1.1 about here]
In Table 1.2 we present the sample correlations by characteristics class. Panel A reports the correlation
of the variables related to analyst characteristics. We note that forecast errors decrease with both measures
of analyst experience. While firm and general experience are highly correlated, the magnitude of the
correlation between the forecast error series with the former is almost three-fold higher than with the
latter. The error is positively related with the analyst’s portfolio complexity in terms of number of
industries followed. Conversely, the forecast error decreases with broker size, in line with the idea that
larger brokers provide more informational resources for analysts. In Panel B, the forecast error is
negatively correlated with both firm size and analyst following. In line with Bhushan (1989), we observe
that the two latter variables are strongly correlated, showing that larger firms are covered by more analysts
than smaller firms; see Brennan and Hughes (1991). We include in the firm characteristics class the firm’s
exposure to macroeconomic variables, i.e., to GDP and CSI. As this variable is computed with the
information available to the analyst at the time of her forecast, we are interested to see how it relates to her
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earnings forecast accuracy. We observe that analysts’ forecast error is correlated with firm’s exposure to
macroeconomic variables, suggesting that firms that are more exposed to macroeconomic fluctuations
(i.e., both cyclical and countercyclical firms) are more difficult to forecast.
[Insert Table 1.2 about here]
Panels C and D display two interesting characteristics for our sample. First, there is virtually zero
correlation between earnings forecast error and conflicts of interest. This finding is in line with the
conjecture that analysts are not prone to bias earnings forecasts that are disseminated to more sophisticated
investors, as opposed to recommendations ; see, e.g., Malmendier and Shantikumar (2014). Second,
forecast errors are negatively correlated with the passage of SOX and RegFD. There is strong evidence of
a decrease in analysts’ optimism in earnings forecasts – one of the objective of the above laws. Finally, we
draw the correlation of earnings forecast error with the macroeconomic errors in Panel E. There is a
positive correlation between unexpected changes in both GDP and CSI measures and earnings forecasts.
This finding demonstrates that analysts do not efficiently integrate the current macroeconomic
expectations when they forecast earnings. Specifically, analysts overreact (underreact) to optimistic
(pessimistic) current macroeconomic expectations.
1.4.3. Dynamic panel data estimators
At this stage of the analysis, we are interested to check whether the dynamics of the forecast error
series imposes a bias in estimating the parameters corresponding to each of our independent variables. To
do so, we estimate Eq. (1) with GMM for dynamic panel data; see, e.g., Arellano and Bond (1991) and
Arellano and Bover (1995). This technique became increasingly popular in the last years, as it allows to
obtain unbiased estimators under the assumptions of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within
individuals (i.e., earnings forecast by an analyst a on a firm i), together with the use of fixed effects; see,
e.g., Blundell and Bond (1998), and Roodman (2009).
To avoid multicollinearity and instrument over-identification, we reduce the set of individual variables
by eliminating GEXP, NFOLLOW, and REGFD. These variables are highly correlated with FEXP, SIZE
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and SOX respectively, and their correlation with forecast error is weaker than the latter three. Note also
that due to the inclusion of year dummies, SOX is dropped from the model. We return to the entire set of
variables in examining their contribution when decomposing the earnings’ forecast variance in the
following section.
[Insert Table 1.3 about here]
Table 1.3 provides the results. In line with previous studies, pooled OLS specifications in column (1)
and (2) show that analysts are persistent in their errors; see, e.g., Brown (2001). The corresponding
coefficient b1 is equal to 0.17 and statistically significant at the 1% level. However, this estimation
procedure gives a coefficient b1 that is upward biased; see Nickell (1981). The opposite happens in column
(3) when the analyst-firm fixed effect is introduced. The coefficient b1 (equal to -0.19) is downward
biased. In column (4), the GMM estimation shows a positive association between current and past forecast
error. The coefficient b1 equals 0.05, it is unbiased and statistically significant at the 5% level. 16F12 As such,
we argue that the past earnings forecast error is not the essential factor at play in explaining the current
analysts’ errors.
Irrespective of the specification, there is a significant positive association between analysts’ forecast
error and unexpected changes in macroeconomic conditions. Since we multiply the latter variable by
firm’s exposure to macroeconomic conditions, the interpretation of this positive association is the
following. The more exposed the firm is to the economy, the more analysts overreact (underreact) to
optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts of the macroeconomic conditions. In economic terms, one standard
deviation of the unexpected change in GDP (CSI) x firm’s current exposure to GDP (CSI) is equivalent to
an increase of 0.06% (0.15%) in analysts’ earnings forecast error, or 1.3 (3.2) USD based on the median of
20.3 USD total assets per share in our sample. For comparison, a similar analysis yields to a five cents
impact corresponding to prior forecast error17F13.
12 See, e.g., Roodman (2009) for a detailed comparing analysis among the above estimations.
13 When the exposure of the firm is computed with respect to aggregate earnings, we find similar results. They are available upon
request.
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Brown (2001) argues that the past earnings forecast error explain the current earnings forecast error
inasmuch as a more complex model including firm and analyst characteristics. In light of this conjecture,
we run Eq. (1) only with prior forecast error as the right-hand side variable and compare the adjusted R-
square in the first three specifications. The adjusted R-square is 2.8% in the simple model. It almost
doubles when adding the remaining determinants with year dummies. Moreover, the value almost triples
when we add up firm-analyst fixed effects. Taking into consideration the weak magnitude of the prior
forecast error, it appears that the dynamics of the series is not the main factor in explaining the current
forecast error. On the other hand, the firm-analyst relationship seems to be a core factor. However, it
remains unclear what is the individual importance of each existing determinant, and their relative
contribution as a whole in explaining the forecast error.
Variance decomposition of analysts’ forecast error
To understand the variation in analysts’ forecast error corresponding to each factor, we estimate the
following model.
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where n is the number of variables identified in Model (1), and , ,  a i t denote analyst, firm, and year
fixed effects.
Our objective is to identify to what extent the existing factors capture the variation in forecast error. As
we noted in the previous section that the dynamics of the series is weak, we focus the analysis on the static
specification. We begin by performing the analysis of variance of forecast error per each factor and fixed
effect respectively in Eq. (5). Next, we turn to the relative importance of each determinant in the whole
model.18F14
14 Since the baseline sample contains 8’163 analysts, it is infeasible to perform the variance decomposition on the entire panel. To
solve this problem, we randomly split the sample to 5% and perform the analysis on this subsample. We repeat the process 100
times and average the results to minimize sampling error; see, e.g., Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) for a similar approach.
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1.5.1. One-way analysis
We report the adjusted R-square of the model for each factor in Table 1.4. The first observation from
the one-way analysis of variance reveals that the existing determinants have a dismally low contribution in
explaining individually the variation in earnings forecast errors. Among the 21 characteristics in Panels A
to E, we find that the strongest ones are related to firm characteristics. To illustrate, firm’s size (number of
analysts following) explain as much as 1.4% (respectively 0.97%) of the total variance in earnings forecast
errors. Firm’s exposure to macroeconomic conditions in GDP (consumer sentiment) follows and explains
0.97% (respectively 0.45%) of the variation. The third strongest variable is SOX, with a ratio of total
variation explained of 0.51%.
[Insert Table 1.4 about here]
The second observation we draw from Table 1.4 is that firm (analyst) fixed effects explain individually
33% (17%) of the variance in forecast errors. On the other hand, year fixed effects fall well short in
explaining the forecast error variance. Indeed, compared to the firm and analyst fixed effects, year fixed
effects explain individually 2% of variation. As the dynamics of the earnings forecast error appears rather
low and the errors seem stable over time, this low ratio is not surprising. As such, analysts’ earnings
forecast error varies more between- as opposed to within- the firm-analyst dimension. In other words, the
error varies more across firm-analyst pairs than within firm-analyst pairs over time.  Figure 1.2 visualizes
graphically the comparison of the adjusted R-square among the entire set of factors.
[Insert Figure1. 2 about here]
1.5.2. Multivariate analysis
Table 1.5 reports the results on the variance decomposition for the entire set of factors in model (5). To
grasp the relative importance of each factor, we proceed as follows. We compute for each estimate the
fraction of the total Type III partial sum of squares as the partial sum of squares of the respective factor
divided by the aggregated partial sum of squares of all the factors plus the residual in the model.
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In column (1), we observe that the existing determinants of the forecast error explain together 2.37% of
the variance. Importantly, the analysis confirms the pattern observed in the prior sub-section, where
almost half of the above section is represented by the firm size factor (1.18%). In addition to the variables
related to bias, the unexpected changes in macroeconomic conditions (multiplied by firm’s exposure)
explain 0.14% in the variance of the earnings forecast error. When we augment specification (1) with firm
fixed effects, the adjusted R-square spikes to 34%. Compared to the one-way model with firm fixed
effects, that has an adjusted R-square of 33%, this finding suggest that the observable characteristics have
an important firm-related component, since their importance diminishes with the introduction of firm
fixed effects. The same remark holds when we augment specification (1) with analyst fixed effects.
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the analyst-related unobserved factor is now 19%, almost half of
the one with firm fixed effects.
[Insert Table 1.5 about here]
In column (4), we add time fixed effects to the observable factors. In line with the previous findings,
we observe that the time dimension is rather weak in explaining the earnings forecast error variance, and
the model has an explanatory power of 4%. At the same time, the observable characteristics are mostly
orthogonal to the year fixed effects, since their importance does not change significantly compared to
column (1).
Taken together, these results reveal that there is an important, unobserved firm and analyst related
component in the forecast error not yet captured by the existing variables. This time-invariant component
suggests that much of what constitutes analysts’ earnings forecast error is still left unexplained currently.
To go further, in column (5) we add both firm and analyst fixed effects to the baseline model from column
(1). This last specification has an adjusted R-square of 61%. Importantly, the explanatory power of the
model with both firm and analyst fixed effects is higher than these models combined (i.e., 53% when
considering the one-way analysis). Not only this model has the highest explanatory power, but shows that
the inherent firm-analyst dimension, over and above the firm and analyst individual dimensions, plays a
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key role in explaining the forecast error. We provide the graphical comparison of these models in Figure
1.3.
[Insert Figure 1.3 about here]
There are at least three implications to this finding. The first one is that the public and private
communication channels between analysts and management is potentially one of the most valuable
sources of information for forecasting earnings. For example, Soltes (2014) shows that over and above
firm-related news, private communication with management is key for the analysts in forming their
forecasts. Moreover, Brown et al. (2015) argue that analysts’ private communication with management is
a more useful input than analysts’ own research. The second implication - and closely related to the first -
is that the global regulatory wave trying to limit the spreading of private communication might have
leveled the playing field among analysts and investors, but at the same time might have deprive the
markets of adjusting to new information more timely. The third implication is related to Hilary and Hsu
(2013) who find that analysts displaying “more consistent forecast errors have greater ability to affect
prices, and that this effect is larger than that of stated accuracy”. Since earnings forecast accuracy strongly
depends on the firm-analyst couple, and is time invariant, what really matters for forecast is its
consistency.
Conclusions
This chapter investigates the determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast errors. First, we reveal that
forecast errors are stable over time, with weak dynamics throughout our sample period of 17 years.
Specifically, prior earnings forecast errors are weak determinants of current earnings forecast errors, and
analysts do not seem to efficiently integrate past information in their forecasts.
Second, we find that analysts do not factor in expectations related to the macroeconomic conditions for
the underlying forecast horizon. Analysts overreact (underreact) to positive (negative) macroeconomic
expectations on both GDP and consumer sentiment index. This ex-post information (i.e., unexpected
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changes in macroeconomic conditions) is quantitatively as important as the ex-ante information available
at the time of the forecasts (i.e., analysts’ bias).
Third, we decompose analysts’ earnings forecast errors variance by observable characteristics and
fixed effects. Importantly, we find that there is an unobserved, time-invariant component related to the
firm-analyst dimension that explains much of the variance in the earnings forecast errors. This component
is not yet captured by the existing observable characteristics which, at date, have a trifling effect on their
own in explaining the variation in analysts’ forecast error.
As earnings forecasts are the main input in determining price targets and consequently stock
recommendations, much of the process through which analysts process their input remains in a so-called
“black box”. This study attempts to shed light on these inputs. While we show that the firm-analyst
relationship is at the core of the variation in forecast errors, we expect the process through which analysts
forecast earnings to gain additional currency from academic research in the next years. Particularly, future
work on this area should bring us closer to a more complete understanding on the sources, and the
measurement of this relationship.
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Appendix
Table 1.A.1: Sample selection
This table presents the sample construction. All control variables are defined in Table 1.A.2.
Description Observations
Initial sample 346,861
Less
EPS forecasts released after the Q1 EPS announcement date or Q1 realized GDP release
date (123,066)
EPS forecasts excluded by I/B/E/S due to inconsistency with the majority rule of EPS
computation (9,379)
Multiple analysts per EPS forecast/firm/broker/date (10)
Multiple brokers per EPS forecast/firm/analyst/date (139)
Multiple EPS forecasts per firm/analyst/broker/date (672)
Multiple EPS forecasts per firm/analyst/broker/year (keep the most recent) (53,505)
Team analysts (1,224)
EPS forecast and actual values with no adjustment factors available (197)
Records with no correponding data in CRSP/COMPUSTAT (3,336)
Records with no correponding exchange rate data (43)
Unavailable data on control variables:
SIZE (104)
R&D & TACC (1,311)
MTB (13,822)
 ( ), ( ) GDP CSIDec Dec (30,902)
Baseline sample 109,151
Available data on prior year forecast error 43,243
No. firms 2,284
No. analysts 4,788
No.years 17
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Table 1.A.2: Variables definition and source
Variable Name Definition Source
, ,FERRORa i t
Forecast error Difference between analysts a’s annual EPS forecast issued for firm i during
the fiscal year t and the actual annual EPS, scaled by firm i’s total assets per
share at the beginning of fiscal year t.
I/B/E/S
CRSP/COMPUSTAT
,ActualEPSi t
Realized earnings per
share
Realized annual earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t. I/B/E/S
, ,ForecastEPSa i t
Forecasted earnings per
share
Forecasted annual earnings per share by analyst a for firm i for fiscal year t. I/B/E/S
TASi t,
Per-share total assets Total assets divided by the number of common shares of firm i at the
beginning of fiscal year t.
COMPUSTAT
TAi t,
Total assets Total assets of firm i for fiscal year t. COMPUSTAT
, , -1FERRORa i t
Lagged forecast error Annual EPS forecast error of analyst a for firm i in the previous fiscal year. I/B/E/S
CRSP/COMPUSTAT
, ,FEXPa i t
Firm experience Number of years (including t) for which analyst a provides annual EPS
forecasts for firm i in the database.
I/B/E/S
,GEXPa t
General experience Number of years (including t) for which analyst a provides annual EPS
forecasts in the database.
I/B/E/S
,NFIRMSa t
Portfolio complexity:
firms
Number of firms followed by analyst a in the last 12 months from the EPS
announce date.
I/B/E/S
,NINDa t
Portfolio complexity:
industries
Number of two-digit SIG codes industries followed by analyst a in the last
12 months from the EPS announce date.
I/B/E/S
,BSIZEa t
Broker size Number of analysts working for analyst’s a broker in the last 12 months
from the EPS forecast announce date.
I/B/E/S
,NFOLLOWi t
Firm coverage Number of analysts issuing annual EPS forecasts for firm i in the last 12
months from the EPS forecast announce date.
I/B/E/S
,SIZEi t
Market capitalization Natural logarithm of firm i market capitalization at the beginning of fiscal
year t.
CRSP/COMPUSTAT
R&Di,t
Research & development
expense
Percentage of R&D expense in total operating expenses for firm i at the
beginning of fiscal year t.
COMPUSTAT
,GDWi t
Goodwill Percentage of goodwill in total assets for firm i at the beginning of fiscal
year t.
COMPUSTAT
,TACCi t
Total accruals Income before extraordinary items minus total cash flow from operations
scaled by total assets for firm i at the beginning of fiscal year t.
COMPUSTAT
,MTBi t
Market-to-book Market-to-book ratio for firm i at the beginning of fiscal year t. CRSP/COMPUSTAT
(continued)
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Table 1.A.2
(continued)
Variable Name Definition Source

,
( ) GDPi tDec
Firm’s sensitivity to GDP Decile beta of the regression of quarterly change in return on assets for firm i
on the quarterly change in realized GDP growth, run over the last 16 quarters
from the EPS forecast announce date.
COMPUSTAT,
Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia

,
( ) CSIi tDec
Firm’s sensitivity to
sentiment
Decile beta of the regression of quarterly change in return on assets for firm i
on the quarterly change in Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) growth, run over
the last 16 quarters from the EPS forecast announce date.
COMPUSTAT,
Michigan Consumer
Sentiment Index
,ROAi q
Return on assets Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets for firm i at the
beginning of fiscal quarter q.
COMPUSTAT
,IBTi q
Income before
extraordinary items
Income before extraordinary items for firm i at the beginning of fiscal quarter
q.
COMPUSTAT
DNEGq
Negative growth in GDP
(CSI)
Dummy variable equal to one if the GDP (CSI) growth in quarter q is smaller
than the GDP (CSI) growth in the previous quarter, zero otherwise.
Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia
, ,FREQa i t
Forecast frequency Number of annual EPS forecasts analyst a issues for firm i in the last 12
months from the EPS forecast announce date.
I/B/E/S
, ,FAGEa i t
Number of days between the day of the EPS forecast provided by analyst a for
firm i and the end of the fiscal year t.
I/B/E/S
, ,LFRa i t
Leader-follower ratio Ratio between the cumulative sum of the days between the current forecast
and the two most recent preceding forecasts by different analysts on firm i and
the cumulative sum of the days between the current forecast and the next two
forecasts by different analysts on firm i.
I/B/E/S
, ,CIa i t
Conflicts of interest Dummy variable equal to one if the analyst a’s employer had an investment
business deal (IPO, SEO, M&A or debt raising) with firm i in the last three
years from the EPS forecast announce date, zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
SDC
SOXt
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Dummy variable equal to one if the EPS forecast is issued after the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
REGFDt
Regulation Fair Disclosure Dummy variable equal to one if the EPS forecast is issued after the passage of
Regulation Fair Disclosure, zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
, ,FAGEa i t
Number of days between the day of the EPS forecast provided by analyst a for
firm i and the end of the fiscal year t.
I/B/E/S
GDP
i t
UCH
,
Unexpected change in
GDP growth
Difference between the latest SPF GDP forecast growth available before the
EPS forecast announce date and the realized GDP growth in year t.
Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia
CSI
i t
UCH
,
Unexpected change in
sentiment
Difference between the latest CSI growth available before the EPS forecast
announce date and the CSI growth in year t.
Michigan Consumer
Sentiment Index
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the dependent and control variables. To preserve space, we do not report
the binary and discrete series here. All variables are defined in Table 1.A.2.
Variable Min. Mean Median Max. St. Dev.
FERROR -0.173 0.008 0.001 0.360 0.050
Analyst characteristics
FEXP 1 4.690 4 31 3.600
GEXP 1 8.536 7 33 5.665
NFIRM 1 17.140 16 203 9.694
NIND 1 2.362 2 11 1.462
BSIZE 1 63.657 44 370 60.249
Firm characteristics
NFOLLOW 1 16.700 15 56 10.314
SIZE 14.864 21.548 21.484 26.961 1.719
R&D 0 0.071 0 0.999 0.153
GDW 0 0.114 0.050 0.810 0.148
TACC -0.998 -0.066 -0.055 0.905 0.089
MTB 0.267 3.471 2.195 46.857 4.765
Forecast characteristics
FREQ 1 5.397 5 96 3.187
FAGE 246 291.860 292 337 25.339
LFR 0.012 2.861 0.843 66 7.546
Unexpected changes in macroeconomic variables
GDPUCH
-0.036 -0.002 -0.002 0.042 0.014
CSIUCH
-0.156 0.006 0.002 0.171 0.060
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Table 1.2: Sample correlations
This table presents sample correlation for analyst’s forecast error and control variable within each class of characteristics. In each panel, the lower-side (upper-side)
of the matrix diagonal denotes Pearson (Spearman) correlations. * represents significance at the 5% level or better. All variables are defined in Table 1.A.2.
Panel A. Analyst characteristics
FERROR FEXP GEXP NFIRM NIND BSIZE
FERROR 1 -0.0226* -0.0102* -0.0016 0.0260* -0.0272*
FEXP -0.0389* 1 0.6273* 0.2943* 0.0570* 0.0806*
GEXP -0.0160* 0.6116* 1 0.3910* 0.1427* 0.0754*
NFIRM -0.0094* 0.2093* 0.2899* 1 0.2825* 0.1003*
NIND 0.0329* 0.0331* 0.1221* 0.3452* 1 -0.1051*
BSIZE -0.0341* 0.0766* 0.0605* 0.0252* -0.1184* 1
Panel B. Firm characteristics
FERROR NFOLLOW SIZE R&D GDW TACC MTB ( ) GDPDec ( ) CSIDec
FERROR 1 -0.0634* -0.0828* -0.0309* -0.0591* 0.0663* -0.0271* 0.0173* 0.0526*
NFOLLOW -0.0794* 1 0.7331* -0.0754* -0.0101* -0.1214* 0.0247* -0.0592* -0.1040*
SIZE -0.1184* 0.6910* 1 -0.0253* 0.1210* 0.0640* 0.1962* -0.1703* -0.1895*
R&D 0.0039 -0.0582* -0.0987* 1 0.0651* 0.0861* 0.3364* 0.1598* 0.1641*
GDW -0.0251* -0.0540* 0.0676* -0.0756* 1 0.1529* -0.0481* -0.1188* -0.2258*
TACC 0.0154* -0.0759* 0.0886* -0.0147* 0.0837* 1 0.0492* -0.1186* -0.1094*
MTB 0.0149* -0.0128* 0.1029* 0.2338* -0.0805* -0.0162* 1 0.0866* 0.1018*
( ) GDPDec 0.0533* -0.0458* -0.1692* 0.2307* -0.1243* -0.1380* 0.1068* 1 0.4213*
( ) CSIDec 0.0815* -0.0954* -0.1841* 0.2087* -0.1978* -0.1354* 0.1114* 0.4213* 1
Panel C. Forecast characteristics
FERROR FREQ FAGE LFR CI
FERROR 1 -0.0120* -0.0323* 0.0188* 0.001
FREQ -0.0355* 1 -0.2000* 0.0517* 0.0495*
FAGE -0.0195* -0.2321* 1 -0.2786* -0.0334*
LFR 0.0119* -0.0377* 0.0005 1 0.0246*
CI 0.004 0.0491* -0.0338* 0.0131* 1
Panel D. Institutional environment Panel E. Unexpected changes in macroeconomic variables
FERROR SOX REGFD FERROR
GDPUCH CSIUCH
FERROR 1 -0.1071* -0.0507* FERROR 1 0.0230* 0.0143*
SOX -0.0713* 1 0.7684*
GDPUCH 0.0047 1 0.2763*
REGFD -0.0364* 0.7684* 1
CSIUCH 0.0295* 0.2210* 1
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Table 1.3: Regression results
This table presents the results of regressions examining analysts’ forecast error (multiplied by 100). Specifications
(1) and (2) include firm-analyst fixed effects. Specification (4) is estimated based on Arrelano-Bond system GMM
with firm-analyst fixed effects. The last two rows denote the p-value of a test for first- and second-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial
correlation. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm-analyst level. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1.A.2.
Pooled
OLS
Firm-Analyst
FE
GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FERRORt-1 0.1716*** 0.1701*** -0.1903*** 0.0529**
(0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0169) (0.0229)
FEXP -0.0120*** 0.0079 -0.0077
(0.0045) (0.0871) (0.0047)
NFIRM -0.0020 0.0027 -0.0032
(0.0023) (0.0077) (0.0023)
NIND 0.0046 -0.0079 0.0164
(0.0176) (0.0461) (0.0177)
BSIZE -0.0016*** 0.0004 -0.0015***
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0003)
SIZE -0.2271*** 0.8368*** -0.2168***
(0.0166) (0.0895) (0.0195)
R&D -0.5695 2.5773 -1.2127***
(0.3480) (2.2872) (0.3543)
GDW 0.3666** 0.5999 0.2949*
(0.1696) (0.5930) (0.1749)
TACC 1.8553*** 2.7953*** 1.5854***
(0.4643) (0.6196) (0.4691)
MTB 0.0120 -0.0467** -0.0045
(0.0091) (0.0196) (0.0094)
FREQ -0.0082 -0.0091 -0.0065
(0.0058) (0.0105) (0.0060)
FAGE -0.0064*** -0.0016 -0.0049***
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008)
LFR 0.0014 -0.0008 0.0002
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0027)
CI 0.1363* -0.0124 0.1084
(0.0741) (0.1168) (0.0727)

,
( ) GDPGDP i tUCH Dec 0.8297** 1.5316*** 0.7264**
(0.4058) (0.4333) (0.3674)

,
( ) CSICSI i tUCH Dec 0.5018*** 0.2456* 0.4423***
(0.1184) (0.1369) (0.1133)
Const. 0.4698*** 7.7090*** -17.1474*** 7.1237***
(0.0206) (0.4977) (2.3028) (0.5413)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 43,423 43,423 43,423 43,423
Adj. R-sq. 2.8% 6.4% 9.4%
p-val. Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.00
p-val. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.21
39
Table 1.4: Analysts’ forecast error variance decomposition (one-way)
This table presents the variance decomposition of analysts’ forecast error per each observable variable and fixed
effects separately. * denotes statistical significance of the factor at the 5% level or better. All variables are defined in
Table 1.A.2.
Variable Adj. R-sq.
Panel A. Analyst characteristics
FEXP* 0.15%
BSIZE* 0.12%
NIND* 0.11%
GEXP* 0.02%
NFIRM* 0.01%
Panel B. Firm characteristics
SIZE* 1.40%
( ) CSIDec * 0.97%
NFOLLOW* 0.63%
( ) GDPDec * 0.45%
GDW* 0.06%
TACC* 0.02%
MTB* 0.00%
R&D 0.00%
Panel C. Forecast characteristics
FREQ* 0.12%
FAGE* 0.04%
CI 0.00%
LFR* 0.00%
Panel D. Institutional environment
SOX* 0.51%
REGFD* 0.13%
Panel E. Unexpected changes in macroeconomic variables
CSIUCH * 0.09%
GDPUCH 0.00%
Panel F. Fixed effects
Firm FE* 32.85%
Analyst FE* 17.42%
Year FE* 2.15%
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Table 1.5: Variance decomposition by observable characteristics and fixed effects
This table reports the variance decomposition of analysts’ forecast error for the entire set of observable
characteristics and fixed effects. We compute the Type III partial sum of squares for each variable and then
normalize each estimate by the sum across all factors plus the residual. For example, in model (2), 33.73% of the
variance in forecast error is captured by unobservable firm fixed effects. * denotes statistical significance of the
factor at the 5% level or better. All variables are defined in Table 1.A.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FEXP 0.01%* 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%* 0.01%
NFIRM 0.01%* 0.00% 0.02% 0.02%* 0.01%
NIND 0.04%* 0.00% 0.02% 0.03%* 0.01%
BSIZE 0.04%* 0.00% 0.01% 0.04%* 0.01%
SIZE 1.18%* 0.37%* 0.26%* 1.25%* 0.14%*
R&D 0.01%* 0.00% 0.06% 0.01%* 0.05%
GDW 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01%
TACC 0.05%* 0.19%* 0.06% 0.02%* 0.08%
MTB 0.07%* 0.05%* 0.06%* 0.06%* 0.04%
FREQ 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
FAGE 0.17%* 0.01%* 0.06% 0.14%* 0.01%
LFR 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
SOX 0.38%* 0.29%* 0.08% 0.07%* 0.07%*
CI 0.01%* 0.00% 0.02% 0.01%* 0.01%

,
( ) GDPGDP i tUCH Dec 0.03%* 0.04%* 0.05% 0.00% 0.05%*

,
( ) CSICSI i tUCH Dec 0.11%* 0.00%* 0.06% 0.06%* 0.01%
All observables 2.09% 0.95% 0.80% 1.71% 0.51%
Firm FE 33.73%* 57.32%
Analyst FE 60.09% 31.45%
Year FE 1.63%*
Adj. R-sq. 2.37% 33.74% 19.01% 3.98% 60.88%
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Figure 1.1: Timing of EPS forecast
This figure depicts the interval period considered for the EPS forecasts in the analysis. FYE denotes the fiscal year
end for year t.
Figure 1.2: Variance decomposition by observable characteristics and fixed effects (one-way)
This figure reports the adjusted R-square from a variance decomposition model of analysts’ forecast error on each
observable and fixed effect separately. All variables are defined in Table 1.A.2.
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Figure 1.3: Variance decomposition by observable characteristics and fixed effects
This figure presents the percentage of analysts’ forecast error variance decomposition in a model including the entire
set of observable characteristics and fixed effects. We compute the Type III partial sum of squares for all observable
characteristics and each fixed effect and then normalize each estimate by the sum across all factors plus the residual,
so that we force each column to sum to 100%. The red line represents the adjusted R-square relative to each
specification. All variables are defined in Table 1.A.2.
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Chapter 2: Quality versus Quantity: The Role of Reporting Frequency on
Financial Analysts’ Information Environment
Introduction
The wide range of financial scandals that emerged in the last decades have set the grounds for a
sweeping demand for more information. While disclosure and transparency became the prevalent tone in
financial regulation, the real consequences of disclosure regulation remains largely unexplored. Firms
listed on the European markets have to follow a mandatory quarterly or semiannual reporting frequency,
depending on each country’s requirement. More recently, arguing that more frequent information would
level the playing field among investors, the European countries enacted the disclosure of interim
management statements in 2004 for firms that were not already reporting on a quarterly basis. In
November 2013, in stark contrast with its initial objective, the European Commission abolished the
requirement to release quarterly information on the grounds that too frequent release of financial
statements throughout the fiscal year conducts to management short-termism.
This study investigates whether, and to what extent, financial analysts - a pivotal group of users of
financial statements - benefit from the mandatory quarterly financial reporting in Europe. Specifically, I
address two questions. First, do firms with mandated quarterly reports and semiannual reports differ in
terms of analysts’ annual earnings forecast, dispersion and following? Second, to what extent the
mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) increases the convergence of
accounting information among firms with different reporting frequency regimes?
On one hand, if mandated quarterly reports decrease information asymmetry among the users of
financial statements, the quality of analysts’ information environment should increase after the first and
third quarter earnings releases, since more information becomes available for these firms. On the other
hand, forcing firms to issue financial statements too frequently may constrain the management to focus
extensively on the short-term, at the expense of long term performance. Consequently, the required
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additional reports may bring more noise than information, and analysts should experience larger earnings
forecast errors and higher disagreement for such firms. I find support for the latter case. Among 14
European countries, the difference in the annual earnings forecast error (dispersion) between mandatory
quarterly and semiannual reporting firms is from 0.70 (0.41) percentage points (pp) to 1.52 (0.43) pp
(statistically significant at 5% and 1% (1%) level respectively).
In terms of analyst following, during the last fiscal quarter, mandatory quarterly reporting is associated
with more analyst coverage. To illustrate, during the last three months of the year, quarterly reporting
firms are followed by 19% more analysts than semiannual reporting firms (difference statistically
significant at 5% level). Importantly, analysts are likely to increase coverage on quarterly mandatory
reporters as long as these firms operate in a strong enforcement regime and thus credibly commit to more
frequent mandatory disclosure. However, while mandatory quarterly reports attract more analyst
following, they are nevertheless associated with greater forecast error and dispersion. These results are
consistent with Ernstberger, Link and Vogler (2011) who show that, for a similar sample of European
firms, mandated quarterly reporters exhibit higher real activities manipulation compared to semiannual
reporters in years in which a firm just meets, or beats past years’ earnings or the zero benchmark.
Assessing the efficiency of mandatory quarterly disclosure in isolation is tenuous because one needs to
account for the concomitant regulatory reforms addressed to achieve financial convergence. Specifically,
the adoption of IFRS in 2005 mandates a common accounting framework for the European listed firms,
while leaving the issue of the reporting frequency at the national discretion (IAS 34.1). As such, I go one
step further and check whether financial analysts account for the adoption of IFRS under different
reporting frequency. The interaction between mandated IFRS and several frequency reporting regimes
provides a natural framework to investigate the relative importance of accounting standards.
Two key findings emerge from this analysis. First, consistent with extant evidence, analysts’ errors
decrease significantly for the entire universe of firms and throughout all quarters of the fiscal year after the
mandated IFRS. Importantly, once they report under IFRS, firms with mandated quarterly financial
statements experience a decrease (an increase) in the forecast error and dispersion (analyst coverage). For
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example, analysts improve their forecast accuracy by 0.48 pp (p-value < 0.05), and by 0.72 pp (p-value =
0.00) in the first, and respectively the fourth quarter. Second, the positive difference between quarterly and
semiannual reporters in terms of analysts’ forecast error and dispersion continues to exist under the
mandatory IFRS. From the perspective of analysts’ information set, these results suggest that mandated
common accounting standards dominate mandated quarterly reporting. These results are robust to several
specifications and after controlling for firm differences in the quality of institutional and accounting
environment. As such, while IFRS does benefit analysts by decreasing (increasing) forecast error and
dispersion (coverage) in absolute terms, they do not wipe out the pernicious relative noise associated with
mandatory quarterly statements.
This paper contributes to three streams of research. First, it increases our understanding of what types
of disclosure firms should provide, and which ones are useful and credible. This subject is highlighted by
Dumontier and Raffournier (2002) as it remains largely unexplored at the European level. Second, I add to
the debate on whether accounting standards play a beneficial role in “stabilizing expectations” in financial
markets when information is incomplete; see Healy and Palepu (2001); Leuz and Wysocki (2008). Third,
this study answers to Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008) call for more empirical research on the effects of
institutional and regulatory environment on analysts’ output.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the milestones in the
financial harmonization process in Europe. Section 2.3 presents the literature review and the hypotheses
development. In Section 2.4 I provide the details on the methodology. Section 2.5 outlays and discusses
the results. Section 2.6 provides the robustness tests and Section 2.7 concludes.
The harmonization process of financial reporting in Europe
2.2.1. The historical context
In mid-2000, the European Commission set the grounds for a common financial reporting strategy,
with the major goal to enhance the comparability of companies’ financial statements:
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“To achieve this objective, the Union requires common financial reporting standards – standards that
are transparent, fully understood, properly audited and effectively enforced. Only with such standards will
there be potential to allow the EU securities markets to grow from its present level of around half the size
of the US capital markets. [..] Similarly, periodic financial reporting also has a crucial role to ensure
transparency, provide safeguards for investors and contribute to the overall stability of markets.”
(European Commission, 2000)
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here]
In the pressure to whittle down corporate differences in financial reporting, the next years followed
with the adoption of several directives. In 2001, the Commission required semiannual reports to be
published within no more than four months after the end of the six-month period.19F1 IFRS were formally
passed into law in 2002 with mandatory adoption for all European listed companies with accounting
periods starting on or after January 1st, 2005.20F2 One year later, the Market Abuse directive was enacted to
prohibit the use of inside information and disclosure of such information to privileged parties. 21F3 In 2004,
the Transparency Directive mandated interim management statements for all companies starting from
January 20, 2007. More specifically, all companies that were not publishing already quarterly financial
statements (i.e., all semiannual reporting companies), were mandated to publish during the first and third
fiscal quarter a management statement containing “an explanation of the material events and transactions
that have taken place in the (six-month) period and their impact on the financial position”, as well as “a
general description of the financial position and performance”.  Additionally, the directive required that
annual financial statements remained publicly available for at least five years and reduced the timeliness
of semiannual financial reports to two months after the end of the six-month period22F4. Figure 2.1 details the
timeline of the harmonization process described above.
1 See Directive 2001/34/EC, Article 72.
2 See Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002.
3 See Directive 2003/6/EC.
4 See Directive 2004/109/EC, Articles 4, 5 and 6.
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2.2.2. Recent developments
Countries such as the UK and Denmark, with a tradition in semiannual reporting, drastically disfavor
mandating more frequent financial reporting, arguing that these may impose unnecessary administrative
burdens for companies and may short-term manager myopia over long-term firm performance. 23F5 As such,
the political debate at the European level over a common reporting frequency converged into a
compromise of interim management statements requirement for all Member States starting with 2007. In
2010, the Commission conducted a series of public consultations on the effectiveness of such requirement,
whose conclusions were included one year later into a proposal for amending the Transparency Directive.
In stark contrast with the initial goal of increasing frequency reporting among all European listed firms,
the proposal affirms the need for investors to refocus on long-term, rather than short-term firm
performance, and suggests abandoning the quest of harmonization in terms of quarterly reporting. 24F6
Finally, in November 2013, these new amendments were adopted with required implementation by
November 2015:
“Those obligations [to publish interim management statements or quarterly financial reports] encourage
short-term performance and discourage long-term investment. In order to encourage sustainable value
creation and long-term oriented investment strategy, it is essential to reduce short-term pressure on issuers
and give investors an incentive to adopt a longer term vision. The requirement to publish interim
management statements should therefore be abolished. Member States should not be allowed to impose in
their national legislation the requirement to publish periodic financial information on a more frequent
basis than annual financial reports and half-yearly financial reports.” (European Commission, 2013)
These recent amendments not only abolish any type of mandatory quarterly reporting, but also extend
the period of publishing the semiannual financial statements from two to three months “to provide more
flexibility”. On the other hand, annual financial statements have to remain available to the public for an
extended period of at least ten years. The harmonization process of financial reporting does not stop
however with these measures. According to the above Directive, by January 1st, 2020, annual financial
5 See, e.g., the Kay Review (2012).
6 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2004/109/EC.
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statements will be prepared in a single electronic reporting format to make “reporting easier and facilitate
accessibility, analysis and comparability”.25F7
Literature review and hypotheses development
2.3.1. Mandatory interim financial statements
The quality of the financial reporting environment is a prerequisite for firms to disclose relevant, timely
and sufficient information. On one hand, the users of financial statements should benefit from increased
reporting frequency in better disseminating a firm’s current and future prospects. Moreover, a frequent
reporting regime should impose greater discipline on the firm’s investment by curbing incentives to invest
in negative net present value projects (Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra and Venugopalan, 2014). On the other hand,
as long as the costs to prepare and disclose such information are high, the quality of reporting may diverge
from this benefit (Wagenhofer, 2014). Current evidence pertaining to each approach indicates that this
subject warrants further investigation.26F8 Fu, Kraft and Zhang (2012) show that higher reporting frequency
reduces information asymmetry and the cost of equity.  Consistent with this conjecture, Botosan and
Harris (2000) find that firms with quarterly segment disclosures are associated with more analysts
following.
Rahman, Tay, Ong and Cai (2007) document that quarterly reporting is associated with analyst
following, but also with higher price volatility. There is evidence that the quality of such disclosure is also
important. Specifically, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms with more informative disclosure
policies have larger analyst following, more accurate and less dispersed earnings forecasts. The authors
argue that although firms that disclose more information have a larger pool of potential investors, direct
contact with the company remains a primary source of information for analysts. DeFond, Hung and
Trezevant (2007) suggest that earnings announcements are more informative in countries with higher
earnings quality. They also show that firms with more frequent interim reports have less informative
7 See Directive 2013/109/EC, Amendment (4) and paragraph (26).
8 See Healy and Palepu (2001), Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010) and Leuz and Wysocki (2008) for detailed reviews and
suggestions for future research on financial reporting.
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annual earnings announcements, since the earnings information is likely to be already impounded in
prices.
From the perspective of regulating the frequency of financial disclosure, Brown and Pinello (2007)
document that mandated quarterly reporting provides managers with more opportunities to manage
earnings upward, compared to annual independent audited financial statements. At the same time,
management decreases the magnitude of downward guidance during the fiscal year. Likewise, Mendenhall
and Nichols (1988) show that managers delay bad news to the end of the year. Notably, the authors find
that analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts are higher in the fourth quarter than in the first three quarters of
the fiscal year. Butler, Kraft and Weiss (2007) investigate the earnings timeliness conditional on the firm’s
reporting frequency. They analyze US firms that either disclose voluntarily quarterly reports or are
mandated by the SEC to do so and find little evidence in the timeliness between semiannual and quarterly
reporters.
While empirical research on the above topic is abundant in US, a handful of studies try to pin down the
effects of interim financial reporting in Europe.  In a comparative study, Mensah and Werner (2008) find
that quarterly reporting in the US and Canada accentuates stock price volatility compared to markets in the
UK and Australia. Cuijpers and Peek (2010) conjecture that voluntary increases in reporting frequency in
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK decrease information asymmetry among investors, increase share
liquidity and stimulate trading.  Similarly, Alves and Teixeira Dos Santos (2008) test the incremental
information content of Portuguese firms between 1994 and 2004 and document both price and trading
reactions to unaudited first and third quarter. This evidence holds both before and after 1999, when
quarterly reports became mandatory. In addition, audited mandatory quarterly statements spur more
significant price reactions than the unaudited ones, consistent with the view that market accounts not only
for the amount, but also for the quality of the information released. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) find
that financial reporting frequency for 15 European countries between 1989 and 2005 is associated with
higher payout, suggesting that firms with more frequent reporting are more likely to forego
overinvestment and return cash to shareholders.
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Based on the recent regulatory reforms, Link (2012) examines to what extent European firms required
to report quarterly financial statements would switch to semiannual reporting, provided such requirement
would be abolished. The author contends that, with the exception of firms listed in Greece and Italy, the
majority of firms would follow a semiannual reporting regime, if free to choose the reporting interval. At
the same time, Ernstberger et al. (2011) find that quarterly reporters exhibit higher level of managers’ use
of real activities manipulation than semiannual reporters. These results support the view that frequent
financial reporting leads managers to focus on short-term performance at the expense of long-term
performance; see, e.g., Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005). There is also evidence that financial analysts
attach a great importance to earnings figures, while their interpretation of accounting data is rather
perfunctory (Dumontier and Raffournier, 2002). At date, however, no study investigates the impact of the
frequency reporting on analysts’ information dissemination in Europe. The question of whether increased
reporting frequency benefits financial intermediaries is all the more important in light of the ongoing
process of regulatory reforms. The first null hypothesis is stated as follows.
Hypothesis 2.1. The quality of analysts’ information environment is not associated with mandatory
quarterly financial statements.
The evidence gathered so far suggests that high frequency reporting is not a necessary and sufficient
condition for high quality information. At the same time, assessing the efficiency of mandatory quarterly
disclosure in isolation is tenuous in light of the concomitant regulatory reforms to achieve financial
convergence in Europe. Specifically, the adoption of IFRS in 2005 mandates a common accounting
framework for the European listed firms, irrespective of their reporting frequency.
2.3.2. Mandatory IFRS adoption
The current literature on the IFRS adoption argues that firms reduce their information asymmetry,
improve their information quality, and enhance their transparency and comparability; see, e.g., Barth,
Landsman and Lang (2008), Landsman, Maydew and Thornock (2012), Hung and Subramanyam (2007),
Barth, Landsman, Lang and Williams (2012), Brochet, Jagolinzer and Riedl (2013).  These benefits fall
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also on financial analysts. Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim (2013) find that after IFRS adoption, earnings
forecast accuracy and the quality of firms’ information environment increase significantly for mandatory
adopters in 46 countries. Moreover, the effect is stronger for analysts with portfolios that move from local
(or multiple GAAP) to IFRS. Tan, Wang and Welker (2011) argue that IFRS adoption attracts more
foreign analysts and improves foreign analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. Jiao, Koning, Mertens and
Roosenboom (2012) document an increase in earnings forecast accuracy and analyst agreement after the
switch to IFRS in 19 European countries. The inclusion of more relevant information enables analysts not
only to provide more timely estimates, but also to increasingly form similar earnings expectations. Indeed,
Dargenidou and McLeay (2010) indicate that cross-country variation with earnings forecasts becomes
immaterial under the mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe. Indeed, analysts’ forecast errors increase as
long as a firm uses atypical accounting method choices compared to its peers (Bradshaw, Miller and
Serafeim, 2009). From this perspective, the use of a common set of standards should imply greater
comparability and higher analysts’ accuracy.
In spite of worldwide political efforts to provide globalized financial markets with a single set of
accounting standards, uneven implementation among countries curtails the ability to assess the quality of
such standards. Specifically, a large body of literature suggests that IFRS adoption conducts to capital
market benefits conditional on legal enforcement and corporate incentives for transparency; see, e.g.,
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008), Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013), Ball, Robin and Wu (2003),
Soderstrom and Sun (2007). Indeed, Filip and Raffournier (2013) suggest that despite common accounting
standards, value relevance of earnings in Europe continues to depend heavily on country characteristics.
The properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts are similarly prone to differences in institutional
backgrounds. Preiato, Brown and Tarca (2013) compare several enforcement indicators in 37 countries
that mandate IFRS. The authors find that legal and accounting enforcement are associated with greater
analysts’ accuracy and less dispersion. Likewise, Byard, Li and Yu (2011) and Bae, Tan and Welker
(2008) show that mandated IFRS decreases analysts’ forecast error and dispersion in countries with both
strong legal enforcement and domestic accounting standards that differed significantly from IFRS. Using a
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sample of German firms, Glaum, Baetge, Grothe and Oberdorster (2013) separate the effects of changes in
disclosure quality from other effects of IFRS introduction to test the changes in analysts’ accuracy. They
find that increased quality of company disclosure contributes to increased forecast accuracy.
The interaction between mandated IFRS and several frequency reporting regimes in Europe provides a
natural framework to investigate to what extent common reporting frequency and common accounting
standards dominate one another.  As such, I check whether financial analysts account for the adoption of
IFRS under different frequency reporting. Specifically, I hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 2.2. The effect of IFRS on the quality of analysts’ information environment is unrelated to
firms’ reporting frequency.
Examining the interaction between mandated IFRS and the reporting frequency is important for at least
three reasons. First, it is unclear to what extent the frequency of accounting information is conditional on
the accounting standards used to communicate this information. Second, to properly assess the effects of
IFRS on analyst’s accuracy, the amount (i.e., the frequency) of information released by the firm has to be
constant. Third, the process through which financial reporting and disclosure regulations are designed and
implemented in Europe lacks of substantive research to properly assess its current efficiency. The two
hypotheses fill this gap by building on the dynamics of such regulations.
Data and methodology
2.4.1. Sample construction
I start by collecting annual earnings forecasts and realized earnings from IBES International Historical
Detail files for fiscal years ending between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2010 for all non-financial
firms listed in 16 European countries. I choose the above timeframe for three reasons.  First, the
implementation of European financial convergence by the formal adoption of the Euro and the financial
harmonization process begins in early 2000. Second, it allows me to account for a majority of countries
that, before or starting 2000, mandate quarterly financial statements. Third, it provides a wide-ranging
window around 2005 to analyze the effects of the mandatory IFRS adoption. The initial list of countries
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consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and UK. These countries were at the core of the
Lamfalussy process initiated in 2000 for harmonizing the financial service industry in the EU. I include
Norway since it is a member of the European Economic Area and participates in the EU’s internal market.
Accounting standards, earnings reporting frequency, fiscal year end date, total assets and the number of
outstanding shares are from Worldscope. I match IBES and Worldscope data via firm’s IBES ticker and
fiscal year. The Worldscope fields are displayed in the Table 2.A.2. I follow Tan et. al (2011) to classify
firms under the IFRS or local accounting standard regime. Concerning the earnings reporting frequency
field, Worldscope mentions that “if there is no data on this field, a quarterly reporting frequency can be
assumed”. For these missing observations, I extract also the frequency reporting field on a quarterly
format, and identify mismatches where the available reporting frequency in this field is either semiannual
or annual. Therefore, I assume a quarterly reporting frequency only when the Worldscope earnings
reporting frequency field extracted in quarterly format reports as such.
To identify the country frequency reporting regime, I use various sources at each Member State level.
Quarterly reporting may be mandated by the national securities market regulatory authority, by the
securities market operator, or for different markets segments within a listing exchange. Specifically, all
firms listed in Greece, Finland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, and only firms listed in the
Prime market segment in Austria and Germany are required to issue quarterly financial reports. 27F9 I obtain
the constituents of these market segments from Worldscope. The rest of the countries - Belgium,
Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, and UK - follow a semiannual reporting regime.28F10
Several data adjustments and filters are performed. First, I replace 31 EPS actual values by
restatements available in IBES. Analysts’ EPS forecasts excluded by IBES due to differences in the
analyst’s and the underlying firm’s accounting methods are discarded. Also, I use the IBES currency
9 Note that Italy, Spain and Norway abolished the requirement of quarterly financial statements once they adopted the
Transparency Directive in 2009, 2007 and 2008 respectively. Nevertheless, the majority of firms did not switch to a semiannual
regime and continued to follow voluntarily quarterly financial reporting.
10 See Link (2012) for a detailed overview of each country’s interim disclosure regulation and the corresponding securities and
stock market regulators.
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exchange rate file to translate all values in EUR. Following Payne and Thomas (2003) and Baber and
Kang (2002), I use the IBES unadjusted files and account for stock splits to obtain adjusted data
accordingly. Acker and Duck (2009) report inconsistencies in the earnings announcement dates between
Thomson Reuters’s IBES and Worldscope database. In the same line, I identify differences in the fiscal
year end date between these two databases for four firms in my sample, and I drop the corresponding
observations. Next, I eliminate firms that cross-list in US (sponsored ADRs)29F11 (330) and in more than one
country in a fiscal year (7). Due to inconsistency, I drop firms that are based in more than one country in a
fiscal year according to IBES (28), as well as firms that report on a semiannual basis in mandatory
quarterly reporting regimes (26). I next eliminate firms that report under US GAAP (74). To control for
self-selection bias, I eliminate firms that voluntarily report under IFRS before 2005 (453), as well as firms
in semiannual reporting countries that voluntarily report on a quarterly basis (334). Finally, I require that a
firm appears in the sample at least one fiscal year both before and after IFRS and run my analysis on
earnings forecasts released during the last two months of each fiscal quarter. Table 2.A.1 provides the
details on the final sample selection.
Table 2.1 depicts the distribution of firm-year observations by country. Overall, the final sample
consists of 10’931 firm-years with 30% (70%) of the observations under mandatory quarterly
(semiannual) reporting frequency.12
[Insert Table 2.1 about here]
2.4.2. Empirical design
The focus of my analysis is to investigate to what extent financial analysts benefit from increased
reporting frequency and harmonization of accounting standards. For each firm, I use three proxies for
analysts’ information environment. First, for each firm-analyst-year-quarter, I compute analysts forecast
11 I use BNY-Mellon and JPMorgan ADR online databases and match firms by their US ISIN and underlying ISIN respectively.
12 There are two potential concerns for which results may be driven by the sample of UK firms. First, they represent 47% of the
sample observations. Second, since a large amount of financial analysts are most likely located in UK and cover several European
countries, the forecast error for UK firms can be smaller provided their geographical proximity. In subsequent tests, I eliminate
these firms. Although the sample size reduces considerably, the inferences do not change.
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error (FError) as
a,i,q,t i,t i,tForecastEPS - ActualEPS APS , where ForecastEPS is analyst a’s annual
earnings forecast for firm i for the fiscal year t issued during the current quarter q, ActualEPS is firm’s
actual annual earnings, and APS are firm’s total assets per share at the beginning of the fiscal year; see
Qian (2009)31F13. Second, for each firm-year-quarter, I measure analysts’ forecast dispersion (Disp) as
 , , , i,tsd ForecastEPS APSa i q t , where sd(ForecastEPS) is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings
forecasts for firm i for the fiscal year t issued during the current quarter q. For ease of exposition, I
multiply both FError and Disp by 100 and finally winsorize both measures at 1% at both tails. To measure
the gradual impact of the information released via interim reports during the fiscal year, I compute FError
and Disp at the end of each quarter q (last two months) of the fiscal year, i.e., when the information related
to the previous quarter has been already made public. Specifically, I retain the first forecast for an analyst-
firm pair issued in each period. Figure 2.2 illustrates the construction of the forecast error over the fiscal
year. Third, for each firm-year-quarter, I calculate the number of analysts following the firm (LogFollow)
as the log of the total number of analysts that cover the firm during the entire fiscal quarter q.
[Insert Figure 2.2 about here]
To test my hypotheses, I use the following model.
, , , 0 1 2 , 3 , , , , ,           a i q t i i t i i t a i t a i tInfoEnv QTR IFRS QTR IFRS Controls (1)
where subscripts a, i, q, t denote analyst, firm, fiscal quarter and year respectively.
The dependent variable InfoEnv is FError, Disp, or LogFollow. The magnitude of the mandatory
quarterly reporting is estimated by QTRi. This variable equals one (zero) if firm i publishes mandatory
quarterly (semiannual) financial statements in fiscal year t. IFRSi,t equals one if firm i follows mandatory
IFRS in fiscal year t and zero otherwise.32F14 This variable captures the difference in analysts’ information
set between the post and pre period of mandatory IFRS adoption. In line with previous studies, I control
for a series of analysts and firm characteristics. Specifically, I add analyst’s general and firm specific
13 The results remain qualitatively unchanged when I use alternative deflators such as absolute actual earnings and stock price at
the beginning of the fiscal year.
14 While the vast majority of the firms in my sample adopt mandatorily IFRS starting from 2005, a small number of firms delay
the adoption for 2006 and 2007. As such, I add the subscript i for the sake of precision.
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experience, the number of firms, industries and countries covered by the analyst during the last twelve
months, forecast age, broker size, and firm size; see, e.g., Clement (1999), Bolliger (2004) and Sonney
(2009). Since the country’s interim financial reporting regime is likely to be associated with institutional
characteristics, I control for the level of enforcement, the audit quality (Brown, Preiato and Tarca, 2014) 33F15
and the distance between the local accounting standards and IFRS (Bae et al., 2008). 34F16 Table 2.A.2
describes the construction of the variables.
I also use an alternative specification where I include country-industry and time fixed effects to control
for the time trend and time-invariant heterogeneity within-country across industries, within-industries
across countries and across industries-countries. Since QTRi does not change over time for a given
country-industry pair, it gets subsumed by the country-industry fixed effects. Similarly, the year fixed
effects capture the IFRSi,t dummy variable.  As such, the two indicators are dropped out from Eq. (1) in
this alternative specification. 35F17
To identify the presence of a fixed effect, I cluster standard errors by one and alternatively more
dimensions and compare the standard errors of the estimates; see Gow, Ormazabl and Taylor (2010),
Petersen (2009), Gormley and Matsa (2014). Additionally, I assess the magnitude of the correlation
between each dimension with the observed covariates. The organization of the dataset is based on the
assumption that country characteristics are central to the interpretation of my results. Indeed, since firms
are country invariant, the mandatory quarterly reporting regime is fundamentally associated with the
country dimension. As such, I control for any other country feature potentially correlated and form pairs
15 ENFBPT and AUDBPT variables are available for 2002, 2005 and 2008. To insure enough variation in the index during my
timeframe period, I distribute the firm-year observations among the values of 2002 (years <2004), 2005 (years between 2004 and
2006) and 2008 (years>2006). The inferences do not change if I alternatively change the scale to values of 2002 (years<2005),
2005 (year=2005) and 2008 (years>2005).
16 While the first two variables vary by country-year, the latter varies only by country, thus it gets dropped when I simultaneously
introduce it into Eq (1). To control for this variable, I later split the sample firms between low and high distance to IFRS.
17 See Jayaraman and Verdi (2014) for a similar empirical design.
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by industry to account for the time invariant sector characteristics. In both specifications, standard errors
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country-industry level.18
In Eq. (1), 1 captures the effect of publishing mandatory quarterly statements across firms in the pre
IFRS period, while 2 represents the time series change with the adoption of IFRS for the semiannual
reporting firms. In both equations, the coefficient for the second-level interaction, 3 , captures the
difference in the analysts’ information set across mandatory quarterly and semiannual reporters in the time
series effect of mandatory IFRS adoption. According to the first null hypothesis, there should be no
difference in analysts’ information set between firms with mandatory quarterly and semiannual reports
1( 0).  In line with the second hypothesis, the mandatory IFRS adoption should have no impact on the
difference in analysts’ information set between quarterly and semiannual reporters.  Hence, 3 should be
zero.
Results
2.5.1. Univariate results
Table 2.2, Panel A reports the annual distribution of the firms in the sample according to their reporting
frequency. As mentioned in the previous section, the proportion of mandatory quarterly and semiannual
reporting firms is on average one to two thirds during the sample period. Since I require firms to be
present in the sample before and after IFRS, the number of firms is generally constant throughout the
entire period. In line with previous literature, I identify an increasing trend in the number of earnings
forecasts. To illustrate, the earnings forecasts increase by 50% from 2000 to 2010. During the fiscal year,
the average analyst issues 21 forecasts, while the average firm receives 103 forecasts.
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables. The average analyst experience with
issuing earnings forecasts is ten years, while the average specific experience with a firm is three years. Not
18 Barth and Israeli (2013) point out to a similar cross-country research design where the choice of the variable used to cluster
standard errors leads to different statistical inferences. While using, as the authors suggest, the most conservative method to
account for the dependency in the data, my inferences are not sensitive to this choice.
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surprisingly, these numbers are higher compared to prior studies since I use a more recent time period. 37F19
On a one-year basis, the average analyst covers 13 firms in three industries and two countries. The
coverage universe increases slightly compared to studies on earlier periods. For example, on the same
basis, an analyst follows seven firms in two industries and two countries during the 1994-2004; see
Bolliger (2004). This is a consequence of the increased portfolio complexity, coverage and data
availability in recent years. Generally, the forecasts are issued around the seventh month in the fiscal year
(i.e., on a distance of 161 days from the fiscal year end). The mean (median) of the analysts employed at
the broker level is 110 (53), confirming the skewed distribution of the brokers’ size, where a small number
of brokers employ a large number of analysts.
[Insert Table 2.2 about here]
The quality of analysts’ information environment by reporting frequency is depicted in Table 2.3. I
identify a consistent decrease in both forecast error and dispersion for mandatory quarterly and semiannual
reporters throughout the fiscal year. For both types of reporters, analysts have the highest (lowest) error
during the first (last) half of the fiscal quarter. To illustrate, the average forecast error for mandatory
quarterly (semiannual) reporting firms decreases by 47% (34%) between the first and the last fiscal quarter
during the entire period. Similar to previous findings, analysts’ error is an increasing function of the
forecast horizon. The average forecast dispersion for mandatory quarterly (semiannual) reporting firms is
the highest in the second quarter and decreases by 9% (7%) by the end of the year.
The gap in forecast error and dispersion between quarterly and semiannual reporting firms is
significantly positive (p-value = 0.00) during each quarter. This initial finding suggests that the mandatory
quarterly reports are likely to bring more noise in analysts’ information set compared to semiannual
financial statements. The difference in both measures is also economically significant. To wit, the
magnitude of the gap in forecast error goes from 1.3% in Q1 to 0.42% in Q4. Likewise, the difference in
analysts’ disagreement for quarterly and semiannual firms is between 0.33% in third quarter to 0.45% in
the first quarter. Importantly, the positive difference in forecast error between quarterly and semiannual
19 Sonney (2009) and Bolliger (2004) find an average general (firm) experience of four (two) and respectively two (two) years
using a sample period from 1990 to 1999, and from 1994 to 2004 respectively.
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reporters decreases considerably along the fiscal year. For example, during the entire period, the gap in
forecast error declines by 68% between the start and the end of the year (i.e., 1.3% in the first quarter,
0.8% in the second quarter, 0.7% in the third quarter and 0.4% in the fourth quarter). Similarly, the
difference in forecast dispersion decreases as the year end approaches. Consequently, the closer the year
end, the smaller the difference in analysts’ information set between quarterly and semiannual reporters.
The evidence so far suggests that, while higher reporting frequency is associated with more noisy
information, the information set increases consistently towards the end of the year; see Elton, Gruber and
Gultekin (1984). Not surprisingly, quarterly reporting firms are followed by more analysts than
semiannual firms over the fiscal year (i.e., in three of the four fiscal quarters). Taken together, these first
results suggest that, while analysts are more likely to follow firms with more frequent disclosure, they do
not manage to provide more accurate, or to agree more, on their forecasts along the fiscal year for
quarterly reporting firms (compared to semiannual reporters).
Consistent with extant evidence, the mandatory introduction of IFRS in 2005 decreases analysts’
forecast error and dispersion significantly for the entire universe of firms and throughout the four quarters
of the fiscal year. To illustrate, for firms reporting semiannually, the forecast error decreases with 0.62 pp
(p-value = 0.00) in the first quarter, and with 0.71 pp (p-value = 0.00) in the fourth quarter. Importantly,
firms with quarterly reports also experience a drop in their forecast error and dispersion. Accordingly,
analysts’ forecast dispersion decreases with 0.27 pp (p-value = 0.00), and 0.39 pp (p-value = 0.00) in the
first, and respectively the fourth quarter. The mandatory adoption of IFRS attracts more analysts following
the firms in the post period. With the exception of the second and fourth quarter for quarterly reporting
firms, the number of analysts covering the entire set of firms increases with IFRS over the fiscal year.
[Insert Table 2.3 about here]
Figure 2.3 displays graphically the above findings. Panel A depicts a clear delineation in the forecast
errors for quarterly reporting firms from the first to fourth quarter. As documented above, the closer the
fiscal year start (end), the higher (lower) the difference in forecast error. The same trend is visible for
semiannual reporters, although at a smaller scale. In line with this trend, Panel B suggests that the
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dispersion in analysts’ forecast is greater for quarterly reporting firms than the one for semiannual
reporting firms over the entire period. Panel C exhibits a slight positive difference in the number of
analysts following the quarterly and semiannual reporting firms. The mandated IFRS in 2005 decreases
both forecast error and dispersion in absolute terms for quarterly and semiannual reporters. Unlike
analysts’ dispersion that drops significantly from 2005, absolute forecast errors seem to start decreasing
before 2005, most likely in anticipation of the common standards adoption by a majority of analysts. In
terms of analyst following, mandated quarterly reporters exhibit a continuous increasing trend in all
quarters overt the sample period, while the coverage of semiannual reporters increases slightly from 2008.
[Insert Figure 2.3 about here]
2.5.2. Multivariate results
Table 2.4 presents the results of the baseline model. In Panel A, under the local accounting standards,
the forecast error for firms mandated to issue quarterly reporting is significantly higher than the one for
semiannual reporting firms. To illustrate, the forecast error for mandatory quarterly reporters is with 1.52
pp higher (p-value = 0.01) than the one for firms reporting semiannually during the first quarter. The
average association of forecast error and mandatory frequent reporting (QTR) is positive during all four
quarters of the fiscal year and decreases in both statistical and economic significance throughout the year.
For example, the gap decreases from 1.52 pp (significant at 1%) to 0.44 pp (significant at 10%). This
decreasing trend throughout the year pertains to previous evidence on a key time-property of quarterly
earnings; i.e., the auto-regressive coefficients are positive for the first three lags and exhibit exponential
decay; see, e.g., Ragan and Sloan (1998), Bernard and Thomas (1990). According to these authors, stock
prices fail to reflect the extent to which firms’ earnings series differ from a seasonal random walk. My
results suggest that financial analysts succumb as well to this naïve expectations hypothesis. Indeed, the
extensive use of managers' fiscal-year expectations when formulating interim cost estimates may drive the
higher forecast errors and dispersion for quarterly reporting firms especially at the beginning of the year.
This conjecture is further supported by Ernstberger et al. (2011), showing that in years in which a firm just
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meets or beats past years’ earnings or the zero benchmark, mandated quarterly reporters exhibit higher real
activities manipulation compared to semiannual reporters in Europe.
Panel B brings more evidence to this conjecture. Indeed, analysts’ forecast dispersion is significantly
higher for quarterly mandatory reporters than for semiannual reporters in three out of the four fiscal years.
To wit, the difference in analysts’ disagreement is 0.43 pp (0.31 pp) in the first (third) quarter. Similar to
forecast error, the gap decreases in statistical significance and magnitude throughout the fiscal year. Panel
C reports the results of Eq. (1) where the dependent variable is analyst following. The QTR estimator is
not different from zero during the first three quarters, and it becomes significantly positive during the last
fiscal quarter. This finding suggests that mandatory quarterly reporting is associated with more analysts
following at the end of the fiscal year. For example, during the last three months of the year, quarterly
reporting firms are followed by 19% more analysts than semiannual reporting firms. Taken together, the
results on QTR estimated coefficient in the three panels reject the first hypothesis. While mandatory
quarterly reports attract more analysts following throughout the end of the year, they are nevertheless
associated with greater forecast error and dispersion throughout the entire fiscal year. I additionally test
whether the higher forecast errors, dispersion and analysts following associated with quarterly reporters in
Europe before IFRS persist after 2005. The p-value of the F-test in the second to last row in Table 2.4 is
close to zero, confirming the persistence of the gap in the post period.
In line with a large body of evidence, the mandated IFRS is associated with a decrease in analysts’
forecast error and dispersion significant at 1% level in all quarters. Importantly, analysts experience an
increased accuracy and agreement for both semiannual and quarterly reporters. To wit, the IFRS estimated
coefficient in Panel A (B) indicates that the average forecast error (dispersion) for semiannual reporting
firms decreases by 0.60 (0.30) pp (significant at 1% level) on average over the fiscal year. The
corresponding effect for mandated quarterly reporters is a decrease in forecast error (dispersion) by 0.86
(0.32) pp on average during the year. According to the last row in Table 2.4, this effect is highly
significant over each fiscal quarter. The adoption of IFRS is also associated with more analysts following,
but only during the first quarter of the year (difference significant at 1%).
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[Insert Table 2.4 about here]
I further assess the impact of IFRS on the difference in analysts’ information environment between
quarterly and semiannual reporters documented above. The estimated coefficient of QTRxIFRS is not
significant over the entire fiscal year for all three proxies. Both specification (1) and (2) support the
argument that the convergence of accounting standards in Europe did not change the relative noisy
information associated with high frequency reporting. Indeed, the positive difference in the gap of
analysts’ forecast error and dispersion for quarterly and semiannual reporting firms is not different from
zero (Panel A and B). In addition, the adoption of common standards does not change the difference in
analysts following between quarterly and semiannual firms (Panel C). Therefore, I do not reject the second
hypothesis. These results suggest that, although IFRS increases the quality of analysts’ information set in
absolute terms, the relative noise associated with mandated quarterly reporting firms persists irrespective
of the accounting standard followed.
2.5.3. Differences in the mandated quarterly reporting
The previous results indicate that the quality of analyst’s information environment increases on average
for both mandatory quarterly and semiannual firms after the adoption of IFRS. Indeed, if the information
asymmetry is high, then quarterly financial statements would increase the quality of analysts’ information
set at least to the one for semiannual firms. Consequently, the distinction between different levels of
institutional quality is important.
Table 2.5 lists the six proxies I use for institutional differences for financial reporting. The first two
measure the degree of accounting enforcement activity and the quality of public company auditors’
working environment assessed by independent enforcement bodies. Brown, Preiato and Tarca (2014)
construct the two measures based on surveys at different cut-off dates, and show that they have more
explanatory power than the traditional legal enforcement proxies. Additionally, the advantage of using
these indexes is that they allow for within country-time variation in the level of institutional setting. The
next three proxies are time-invariant country enforcement indexes from Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013)
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and Jackson and Roe (2009) respectively. The last proxy is the distance of firm’s local accounting
standards to IFRS (Bae, Tan and Welker, 2008). I split the sample of firms in those listed in country-years
above (below) the annual median levels of each proxy and run the baseline model simultaneously.
2.5.3.1. Different enforcement levels
Table 2.5, Panels A to E provide the results of the estimations using two country-time variant and three
time-invariant country variant enforcement proxies. 38F20 Two insights emerge from this exercise. First, the
higher analysts’ forecast error and dispersion for quarterly reporting firms documented above persist under
both strong and weak enforcement regimes and analysts do not differentiate between the two. This finding
is in line with the baseline results where the same proxy for enforcement is not different from zero,
confirming that the adoption of IFRS decreases analysts’ forecast error only in countries with strong
enforcement regimes.
Second, the difference in enforcement regimes in terms of analysts following is statistically significant
for all enforcement proxies. Specifically, mandatory quarterly reporting firms are followed by
significantly more (less) analysts than semiannual ones in strong (weak) enforcement regimes. This
finding suggests that analysts are willing to invest more resources in increasing their coverage for
quarterly reporting firms conditional on the quality of the information disclosed. For example, during the
fourth quarter, the number of analysts following quarterly reporting firms is 27% higher (15% smaller) in
strong (weak) enforcement countries (significant at 1% level) in Panel A. In addition, while the IFRS
estimator is not different in strong and weak enforcement regimes for forecast error and dispersion, it is
statistically different for analyst following.
In Panel C, the number of analyst following after IFRS is 21% higher (13% lower) in countries that
have simultaneously (not) changed their enforcement of financial reporting with the mandated IFRS
adoption (significant at 1% level). Importantly, the QTRxIFRS estimator is significantly negative
(positive) in strong (weak) enforcement countries in all panels.
20 To conserve space, I report the results of the last quarter (i.e. Q4) in all panels. Results are qualitatively similar for the first three
fiscal quarters.
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In a nutshell, before IFRS, mandatory quarterly reporting in Europe is associated with more analysts
following as long as these countries have strong enforcement regimes. After IFRS, analysts increase their
coverage for semiannual reporters, suggesting that under strong enforcement regimes, analysts expect
more informational advantage from mandatory common accounting standards. Importantly, while
mandating quarterly reporting seems to attract more (less) analyst coverage in strong (weak) enforcement
regimes, analysts’ forecast error and dispersion are higher for this type of firms irrespective of the
enforcement regime.
[Insert Table 2.5 about here]
2.5.3.2. Distance to IFRS
Byard et al. (2011) show that the distance between firm’s local accounting standards and IFRS is
important in depicting the change in the quality of analysts’ information environment with the adoption of
IFRS. Table 2.5, Panel F reports the results of the simultaneous regression of low and high distance to
IFRS samples. Similar to enforcement proxies, the higher forecast error and dispersion associated with
quarterly reporting firms is not related to the firm’s distance to IFRS.
On the other hand, the distance to IFRS matters in terms of analysts following. Specifically, before
IFRS, analysts cover significantly more (less) quarterly reporting firms when firm’s local accounting
standards are low (high) distance to IFRS. To illustrate, during the last quarter, analysts following for
quarterly reporting firms is 37% higher when firm’s accounting standard is similar to IFRS (significant at
1% level). This finding is relevant to assessing the degree of interaction between the amount of
information released by firms via interim reports and the quality of accounting standards used to
communicate this information. Specifically, analysts are willing to allocate resources to cover more firms
with quarterly reports as long as the accounting standards used by these firms do not depart too much from
the most familiar accounting principles of the analysts. On average, firms with semiannual reports are
followed by 21% (15%) more (less) analysts when firm’s local accounting standard distance to IFRS is
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low (high). In line with previous research, analysts following increases with the mandated IFRS only when
firms’ local accounting standards are close to IFRS.
Robustness tests
2.6.1. Matching sample
The empirical design so far allows me to assess the exogenous relative role of quarterly frequency
reporting. Specifically, to avoid a potential self-selection bias, I consider in the main analysis only firms
that report quarterly under a mandatory requirement to do so. However, quarterly mandated reporters and
semiannual firms may vary in a bundle of characteristics. I run the following matching test. For each
earnings forecast issued for a mandatory quarterly reporting firm, I identify the closest semiannual
reporting firm during the same fiscal year in the same 2-digit SIG code in terms of firm size. Additionally,
I require that the total assets ratio of the control to the treated firm is at least 50% (Yip and Young, 2012).
I also require that the forecasts are issued by the same analyst. Table 2.6, Panel A reports the results.
Overall, the findings to not change under this alternative test design.
[Insert Table 2.6 about here]
2.6.2. Transparency Directive
A potential concern with the interpretation of my results is the adoption of the Transparency Directive
in 2007, which requires semiannual firms to report additional interim management statements in the first
and third quarter. Prior research suggests that this measure increases investor attention and firms’ news
dissemination (Boulland, Degeorge and Ginglinger, 2014). As such, the effect of the IFRS adoption of the
decreased forecast error and dispersion for semiannual reporting firms might be in fact attributable to this
above directive. To check whether this is the case, I run Eq. (1) on a reduced period of time, i.e. from 2002
to 2007. This six-year window is generally used in several empirical studies to test the effect of mandated
IFRS in 2005. The results are reported in Table 2.6, Panel B. The findings are similar to the ones of the
baseline sample.
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2.6.3. Mandatory versus voluntary samples
In the main analysis, I find that mandatory quarterly reporting is associated with more forecast error
and dispersion, and that the mandatory adoption of IFRS increases significantly analysts’ forecast
accuracy and agreement. The construction of the baseline sample provides an opportunity to analyze the
association between analysts’ information environment and reporting frequency in several settings.
Specifically, under the frequency reporting regime and the accounting standard followed, I can classify
firms in a two-by-two framework depending on whether they report mandatorily or voluntarily on a
quarterly basis and/or under IFRS. I therefore check whether the two above results hold in another sample.
By keeping fixed the mandatory IFRS adoption, I test whether I obtain the same results by using a
sample of voluntary (instead of mandatory) quarterly and semiannual reporting firms. The results are
provided in Table 2.7, Panel A. Analysts’ forecast error is by 1% higher for voluntary quarterly reporting
firms than for semiannual reporters in the first fiscal quarter (significant at 5% level). This finding is
consistent with the view that firms choosing to report more frequently are likely to have higher
information asymmetries especially at the beginning of the year. However, during the rest of the fiscal
year, analysts do not distinct between voluntary quarterly and semiannual reporters in terms of forecast
error and dispersion. Compared with the baseline results on mandatory quarterly reporters, these results
suggest that voluntary quarterly reporting is not likely to noisy information input for analysts. Moreover,
when firms decide to voluntarily report more frequently, analysts following is significantly higher than for
semiannual firms. In line with the results on the main sample, mandatory IFRS adoption decreases
significantly analysts’ forecast error and dispersion. The difference between the gap in mandatory versus
semiannual reporting firms before and after IFRS is not different from zero. Taken together, these findings
reveal that when firms deliberately choose to report more frequent financial statements, the quality of
analysts’ information setting does not decrease. Conversely, the mandatory requirement itself of
publishing more frequent financial statements throughout the year is associated with higher analysts’
forecast error and dispersion.
[Insert Table 2.7 about here]
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By keeping fixed the mandatory quarterly reporting, I test whether I find similar results by using a
sample of voluntary (instead of mandatory) IFRS adoption firms. Panel B reports the results. The presence
of mandatory quarterly firms (compared with semiannual reporters) is associated with a decreasing
positive difference in forecast error from 2.1% in first quarter (significant at 5% level) to 0.7% in the third
quarter (significant at 10% level). Importantly, there is no significant difference in analysts’ information
set when firms report voluntarily under IFRS. This result can be associated with previous findings on
insignificant impact in terms of firm’s information quality with a “label adoption” (i.e., signaling higher
financial reporting quality without a corresponding cost to do so). The results in Panel B need to be
considered however with caution, since the sample of firms is small.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of the European financial harmonization process on the quality of
analysts’ information environment. First, I check whether mandatory quarterly reporting benefits financial
analysts. Second, I assess the interaction between financial reporting frequency and accounting standards.
The results of this study are summarized as follows. First, I find little support to the claim that
regulation forcing firms to issue more frequent information benefits financial analysts. When firms are
mandated to report on a quarterly basis, analysts’ forecast error and dispersion are higher compared to a
control sample of semiannual reporting firms. Mandatory quarterly reporting is associated with more
analysts following as long as firms are located in strong enforcement regimes and their local accounting
standards are closer to IFRS. Second, analysts’ forecast error and dispersion decrease significantly when
firms mandated to report quarterly financial statements are, in addition, mandated to report under IFRS.
From the perspective of analysts’ output, this result suggests that accounting standards dominate reporting
frequency. However, in relative terms, the pernicious effect of mandating more frequent reporting
continues to exist under IFRS. Specifically, the positive gap in both forecast error and dispersion between
quarterly and semiannual reporters does not change with the mandatory IFRS regime. In a nutshell, while
IFRS does benefit analysts by increasing the quality of analysts’ information set in absolute terms, they do
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not wipe out the relative noise associated with mandatory quarterly statements. These results hold under a
series of different specifications and after controlling for alternative measures of firms’ institutional
environment and accounting quality.
This paper has implications for policymakers and contributes to the assessment of the recent regulatory
initiatives in Europe. Examining the interaction between mandated IFRS and the reporting frequency is
important, since, at date, it is unclear to what extent the frequency of accounting information is conditional
on the accounting standards used to communicate this information. In the context of transient laws, the
process through which disclosure regulations are created and implemented deserves more careful
empirical support and investigation. This paper aims to contribute towards a more substantive body of
research to properly address the efficiency of such regulations. Further empirical research in this respect
should shed more light on whether, and under what institutional design, disclosure regulation is likely to
benefit both preparers and users of financial statements.
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Appendix
Table 2.A.1: Sample selection
This table describes the sample selection process and the filters applied to the sample of firms used in the baseline
analysis.
Description Firms
Starting sample: Worldscope + IBES, 2000-2010 5'143
Minus
Firms with different fiscal year end date in Worldscope and IBES (4)
Missing data on control variables (354)
Cross-listed firms in US (sponsored ADRs) (330)
Firms listed in more than one country in a fiscal year (7)
Firms headquartered in more than one country in a fiscal year (28)
Semiannual reporting firms in mandatory quarterly reporting countries (26)
Firms following USGAAP (75)
Voluntary IFRS reporters (453)
Voluntary quarterly reporters (334)
Firms with no observations both before and after IFRS (2'004)
Firms with no observations during the last two months of the fiscal quarter (2)
Final sample 1'526
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Table 2.A.2: Variables definition and source
This table provides the list of variables used in the models.
Panel A. Variables construction
Variable Definition Source
, , ,FErrora i q t Absolute difference between  analysts a’s annual EPS forecast issued in quarter q for firm i
and fiscal year t and the actual annual EPS, scaled by firm i’s total assets per share in fiscal
year t.
I/B/E/S
Worldscope
, ,Dispi q t Standard deviation of EPS forecasts issued in quarter q for firm i, scaled by firm i’s total assets
per share in fiscal year t.
I/B/E/S
Worldscope
, ,LogFollowi q t Logarithm of the number of analysts issuing at least one EPS forecast for firm i during quarter
q of fiscal year t.
I/B/E/S
Worldscope
,ActualEPSi t Realized annual earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t. I/B/E/S
, , ,ForecastEPSa i q t Forecasted annual earnings per share by analyst a for firm i issued in quarter q for fiscal year t. I/B/E/S
,APSi t Total assets per share of firm i for fiscal year t. Worldscope
,TAi t Total assets of firm i for fiscal year t. Worldscope
,Sharesi t Number of common shares outstanding of firm i for fiscal year t. Worldscope
QTRi Dummy variable equal to one if firm i is a mandatory QTR reporter, zero otherwise. Worldscope
,IFRSi t Dummy variable equal to one if firm i follows mandatory adoption of IFRS during fiscal year
t, zero otherwise.
Worldscope
,GEXPat Number of years since analyst a provides annual EPS forecasts in the database. I/B/E/S
, ,FEXPa i t Number of years since analyst a provides annual EPS forecasts for firm i in the database. I/B/E/S
,NFIRMSat
Number of firms followed by analyst a in fiscal year t. I/B/E/S
,NINDa t Number of two-digit SIG codes industries followed by analyst a in fiscal year t. I/B/E/S
,NCTRat Number of countries followed by analyst a in fiscal year t. I/B/E/S
, ,FAGEa i t Number of days between the day of the EPS forecast provided by analyst a for firm i and the
end of the fiscal year t.
I/B/E/S
,BSIZEat Logarithm of the number of analysts working for analyst’s a broker in fiscal year t. I/B/E/S
,FSIZEi t Total assets of firm i for fiscal year t in EUR mil. Worldscope
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(continued)
Table 2.A.2
(continued)
Variable Definition Source
,ENFBPTi t Accounting enforcement activity in country of firm in fiscal year t. Brown, Preiato, Tarca(2014)
,AUDBPTi t Quality of the auditors’ working environment in country of firm in fiscal year t. Brown, Preiato, Tarca(2014)
ENFCHLi Indicator variable equal to one if firm i is listed in a country that adopted changes in
enforcement of financial reporting  with the mandated IFRS, zero otherwise.
Christensen, Hail and
Leuz (2013)
BUDGETi Public enforcement intensity based on securities regulators’ budget/GPD level in country
where firm i is listed.
Jackson and Roe (2009)
STAFFi Public enforcement intensity based on securities regulators’ staff/population level in country
where firm i is listed.
Jackson and Roe (2009)
IFRSDISTi Distance between the local accounting standard followed by firm i and IFRS. Bae, Tan, Welker (2008)
Panel B. Worldscope data
Item Field
Accounting standard followed WC07536
Common shares outstanding WC05301
Date of fiscal period end WC05350
Earnings reporting frequency WC05200,WC05200A
Ibes ticker IBTKR
ISIN WC06008
Total assets WC02999
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Table 2.1: Distribution of firm-year observations by country
This table presents the number of firm-years observations by country associated to a mandatory quarterly (Panel A) or
semiannual (Panel B) reporting frequency regime. A firm-year observation is classified as mandatory quarterly
(semiannual) if the country in which the firm is listed in the corresponding year requires the disclosure of financial
statements on a quarterly (semiannual) basis.
Country Firm-years %
Panel A. Mandatory quarterly reporters 30%
Finland 683 6.2%
Germany (Prime Standard) 158 1.4%
Greece 353 3.2%
Italy 68 0.6%
Norway 456 4.2%
Portugal 113 1.0%
Spain 381 3.5%
Sweden 1'060 9.7%
Panel B. Semi-annual reporters 70%
Belgium 247 2.3%
Denmark 61 0.6%
France 1'695 15.5%
Germany (without Prime Standard) 28 0.3%
Ireland 141 1.3%
Netherlands 400 3.7%
United Kingdom 5'087 46.5%
Total 10'931 100%
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the dataset. Panel A describes the annual distribution of the firms by their
reporting frequency, analysts, and earnings forecasts. Panel B describes the summary statistics of the control variables.
The number of firms in the entire sample differs from the sum of quarterly and semiannual firms since two firms in Spain
are reporting quarterly (semiannually) before (after) adopting the Transparency Directive in 2007. QTR (SAN) reporters
denote the firms reporting under the mandatory quarterly (semiannual) regime. Control variables are defined in Table
2.A.2.
Panel A. Sample distribution
Year QTR reporters SAN reporters No. analysts No. firms No. forecasts
2000 209 565 2'291 774 10'416
2001 287 576 2'347 863 11'568
2002 344 608 2'322 952 13'176
2003 343 644 2'167 987 14'573
2004 386 720 2'155 1'106 15'476
2005 382 759 2'184 1'141 14'869
2006 373 829 2'391 1'202 16'220
2007 302 810 2'231 1'112 14'574
2008 225 784 2'190 1'009 15'423
2009 208 712 2'052 920 15'867
2010 210 655 2'109 865 15'582
2000-2010 448 1'080 7'523 1'526 157'744
Panel B. Control variables summary p25 Mean Median p75
General experience (years) 5 10.09 10 15
Firm experience (years) 0 3.08 2 4
Number of firms followed 7 12.56 11 16
Number of industries followed 2 3.36 3 4
Number of countries followed 1 2.32 2 3
Broker size 23 110.31 53 157
Firm size (EUR mil.) 0.31 3.86 0.99 2.90
Forecast age (days) 93 160.62 142 235
Accounting enforcement 9 15.55 16 22
Audit quality 17 23.61 25 32
Enforcement indicator 0 0.58 1 1
Budget 28'851 55'117 45'937 80'902
Staff 7.19 13.72 13.76 19.04
IFRS distance 1 7.39 10 12
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Table 2.3: Summary of analysts’ information environment by reporting frequency
This table presents the average annual forecast error, average forecast dispersion and average analyst following during each fiscal quarter by reporting frequency. Q1
to Q4 refers to the financial statements corresponding to quarter one to four. QTR (SAN) reporters denote the firms reporting under the mandatory quarterly
(semiannual) regime. FError is the absolute difference between the analyst’s annual earnings forecast and the actual annual earnings, deflated by firm’s total assets
per share. Disp is the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts, deflated by firm’s total assets per share. In each quarter, I retain the first annual earnings
forecast for each firm-analyst pair issued in the last two months. LogFollow is the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm during the entire fiscal
quarter. *** denote statistical significance at 1 percent (two-tailed t test).
FError Disp LogFollow
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2000-2010
QTR 3.40 3.01 2.32 1.79 1.14 1.27 1.12 1.16 1.99 1.77 1.76 1.82
SAN 2.07 2.17 1.66 1.37 0.69 0.87 0.78 0.81 1.88 1.62 1.81 1.61
QTR-SAN 1.33*** 0.84*** 0.66*** 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.10*** 0.15*** -0.05*** 0.21***
Pre IFRS
QTR 3.98 3.49 2.68 2.11 1.29 1.43 1.28 1.35 1.92 1.78 1.74 1.81
SAN 2.42 2.53 1.99 1.75 0.85 1.01 0.97 1.04 1.77 1.60 1.78 1.55
QTR-SAN 1.56*** 0.95*** 0.70*** 0.36*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.15*** 0.18*** -0.04*** 0.26***
Post IFRS
QTR 2.92 2.58 1.99 1.47 1.02 1.13 0.97 0.95 2.04 1.77 1.78 1.82
SAN 1.80 1.85 1.39 1.04 0.57 0.75 0.64 0.62 1.97 1.64 1.84 1.66
QTR-SAN 1.12*** 0.74*** 0.61*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.08*** 0.13*** -0.06*** 0.17***
Post-Pre IFRS
QTR -1.06*** -0.90*** -0.69*** -0.64*** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.39*** 0.13*** -0.01 0.04*** 0.01
SAN -0.62*** -0.68*** -0.60*** -0.71*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.33*** -0.42*** 0.20*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.11***
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Table 2.4: Baseline results
This table presents the results of Eq. (1). Q1 to Q4 refers to fiscal quarter one to four. FError is the absolute difference
between the analyst’s annual earnings forecast and the actual annual earnings, deflated by firm’s total assets per share.
Disp is the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts, deflated by firm’s total assets per share. In each quarter, I
retain the first annual earnings forecast for each firm-analyst pair issued in the last two months. LogFollow is the
logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm during the entire fiscal quarter. All control variables are defined in
Table 2.A.2. Robust standard errors (in italics) are clustered at country-industry level. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
Panel A. Dependent variable: FError
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
QTR (i) 1.519*** 1.032** 0.701** 0.435*
0.518 0.457 0.333 0.251
IFRS (ii) -0.476** -0.576*** -0.608*** -0.715***
0.188 0.189 0.147 0.131
QTRxIFRS (iii) -0.566 -0.336 -0.145 0.029 -0.496 -0.297 -0.206 -0.053
0.471 0.383 0.275 0.222 0.431 0.354 0.286 0.208
GEXP -0.014** -0.011* -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.007 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004
FEXP -0.051*** -0.071*** -0.054*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.050*** -0.041*** -0.023***
0.013 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.006
LNBSIZE -0.079** -0.081** -0.112*** -0.067* -0.088*** -0.088** -0.105*** -0.059*
0.038 0.041 0.034 0.034 0.031 0.037 0.034 0.031
NFIRMS 0.005 0.014** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.007** -0.003 0.000
0.007 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001
NIND -0.056 -0.083** -0.039 -0.032 -0.023 -0.005 -0.003 0.008
0.046 0.040 0.031 0.023 0.025 0.022 0.02 0.013
NCTR -0.031 -0.064** -0.007 -0.005 -0.019 -0.052*** -0.011 -0.009
0.026 0.030 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.013
FSIZE -0.058*** -0.033** -0.035*** -0.020** -0.059*** -0.023 -0.034*** -0.014
0.012 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.015 0.018 0.012 0.011
FAGE 0.002 0.005** 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.002
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
ENFBPT 0.006 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.046* 0.023 0.027
0.027 0.024 0.017 0.013 0.032 0.027 0.016 0.018
Constant 2.661** 2.146*** 2.327*** 2.022*** 3.116*** 2.243*** 2.589*** 2.163***
1.120 0.605 0.471 0.290 1.107 0.518 0.478 0.282
Obs. 27'374 28'277 36'990 29'644 27'374 28'277 36'990 29'644
Adj. R-sq. 6.6% 4.0% 4.1% 3.3% 3.3% 2.6% 2.6% 1.9%
Country-Industry FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-val (i) + (iii) = 0 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
p-val (ii) + (iii) = 0 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(continued)
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Table 2.4
(continued)
Panel B. Dependent variable: Disp
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
QTR (i) 0.430** 0.408** 0.309* 0.243
0.166 0.166 0.171 0.158
IFRS (ii) -0.255*** -0.239*** -0.313*** -0.383***
0.080 0.085 0.078 0.088
QTRxIFRS (iii) -0.020 -0.069 -0.002 0.014 -0.007 -0.042 0.044 0.069
0.123 0.143 0.138 0.137 0.111 0.135 0.141 0.117
FSIZE -0.011** -0.011** -0.011*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.012*** -0.001
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.008
ENFBPT -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 0.003 0.013 0.012 0.005
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.010
Constant 0.918*** 1.082*** 1.014*** 1.201*** 0.932*** 1.107*** 0.964*** 1.148***
0.193 0.192 0.183 0.172 0.126 0.152 0.131 0.152
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 25'566 25'757 34'219 26'895 25'566 25'757 34'219 26'895
Adj. R-sq. 7.3% 3.8% 4.0% 3.8% 2.0% 1.3% 2.6% 1.8%
Country-Industry FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-val (i) + (iii) = 0 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
p-val (ii) + (iii) = 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Panel C. Dependent variable: LogFollow
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
QTR (i) 0.063 0.105 -0.110 0.194**
0.086 0.093 0.088 0.087
IFRS (ii) 0.194*** 0.042 0.073 0.099
0.065 0.093 0.074 0.078
QTRxIFRS (iii) -0.028 -0.002 0.024 -0.041 0.056 0.057 0.116** 0.045
0.073 0.097 0.081 0.090 0.060 0.070 0.057 0.067
FSIZE 0.035*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.043*** 0.020* 0.033*** 0.025**
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.01
ENFBPT -0.012** -0.009* -0.010* -0.007 0.006 0.016* 0.013* 0.015**
0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007
Constant 1.825*** 1.674*** 1.854*** 1.581*** 1.500*** 1.351*** 1.466*** 1.293***
0.107 0.112 0.114 0.115 0.081 0.144 0.112 0.122
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 33'906 36'956 49'147 37'735 33'906 36'956 49'147 37'735
Adj. R-sq. 14.6% 9.9% 9.2% 10.0% 12.4% 6.7% 9.6% 7.9%
Country-Industry FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-val (i) + (iii) = 0 0.67 0.09 0.22 0.05
p-val (ii) + (iii) = 0 0.00 0.36 0.04 0.26
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Table 2.5: Differences in country institutional regimes
This table reports the simultaneous results of Eq. (1) under different enforcement regimes. In Panel A (B), ENFBPT (AUDBPT) depicts the degree of accounting
enforcement activity (quality of public company auditors’ working environment) (Brown, Preiato and Tarca 2014, 19). Strong (Weak) denotes observations where
the firm-year index is greater (smaller) than the annual median value. In Panel C, ENFCHL is an indicator of simultaneous changes in enforcement of financial
reporting around the mandatory IFRS adoption (Christensen, Hail and Leuz 2013, 153). Yes (No) denotes observations where the country of listing have made (have
not made) substantive changes in enforcement. In Panel D (E), BUDGET (STAFF) denotes the level of public enforcement intensity based on securities regulators’
budget/GDP (staff/population) level (Jackson and Roe, 2009, 214-215). Strong (Weak) denotes observations where the country index is greater (smaller) than the
median value. In Panel F, IFRSDIST reports the distance between the country’s local accounting standards and IFRS (Bae, Tan and Welker 2008, 601-602). Low
(High) denotes observations where the index is lower (higher) than the median distance value. FError is the absolute difference between the analyst’s annual
earnings forecast and the actual annual earnings, deflated by firm’s total assets per share. Disp is the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts, deflated by
firm’s total assets per share. I retain the first annual earnings forecast for each firm-analyst pair issued in the last two months of the quarter. LogFollow is the
logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm during the entire fiscal quarter. All control variables are defined in Table 2.A.2. Robust standard errors (in
italics) are clustered at country-industry level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
Variable of interest FError Disp LogFollow
Panel A. ENFBPT Strong Weak p-valS - W  = 0 Strong Weak
p-val
S - W  = 0 Strong Weak
p-val
S - W  = 0
QTR 0.343*** 0.505*** 0.74 0.277*** 0.111* 0.66 0.268*** -0.145*** 0.00
0.062 0.105 0.031 0.065 0.016 0.026
IFRS -0.698*** -0.196 0.05 -0.381*** -0.606*** 0.36 0.123*** -0.540*** 0.00
0.041 0.183 0.022 0.118 0.011 0.045
QTRxIFRS 0.197** -0.423** 0.19 0.110** 0.135 0.94 -0.085*** 0.562*** 0.00
0.092 0.192 0.048 0.124 0.025 0.047
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 20'942 8'702 18'754 8'141 26'960 10'775
Adj. R-sq. 3.9% 2.2% 3.4% 2.2% 10.2% 15.4%
Panel B. AUDBPT Strong Weak p-valS - W = 0 Strong Weak
p-val
S - W  = 0 Strong Weak
p-val
S - W  = 0
QTR 0.336*** 0.431*** 0.86 0.398*** 0.046 0.35 0.297*** -0.067** 0.02
0.052 0.100 0.028 0.058 0.014 0.027
IFRS -0.727*** -0.163 0.01 -0.399*** -0.460*** 0.76 0.115*** -0.206*** 0.06
0.043 0.116 0.024 0.067 0.011 0.031
QTRxIFRS 0.152** -0.458*** 0.20 0.041 0.041 1.00 -0.077*** 0.279*** 0.09
0.074 0.137 0.041 0.081 0.020 0.037
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 23'385 6'259 21'086 5'809 30'024 7'711
Adj. R-sq. 4.3% 1.7% 4.8% 3.3% 13.5% 2.1%
(continued)
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Variable of interest FError Disp LogFollow
Panel C. ENFCHL Yes No p-valY - N  = 0 Yes No
p-val
Y - N  = 0 Yes No
p-val
Y - N  = 0
QTR 0.253*** 0.379*** 0.81 0.255*** 0.397*** 0.65 0.403*** 0.022 0.01
0.071 0.060 0.037 0.035 0.018 0.017
IFRS -0.764*** -0.549*** 0.35 -0.454*** -0.353*** 0.53 0.214*** -0.134*** 0.00
0.053 0.063 0.029 0.036 0.013 0.017
QTRxIFRS 0.106 -0.057 0.71 0.074 -0.073 0.56 -0.226*** 0.205*** 0.00
0.094 0.086 0.052 0.050 0.024 0.024
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 16'193 13'451 14'423 12'472 20'804 16'931
Adj. R-sq. 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.13
Panel D. BUGET Strong Weak p-valS - W  = 0 Strong Weak
p-val
S - W  = 0 Strong Weak
p-val
S - W  = 0
QTR -0.02 0.499*** 0.37 0.177*** 0.437*** 0.43 0.272*** 0.047*** 0.10
0.073 0.064 0.039 0.036 0.020 0.016
IFRS -0.767*** -0.516*** 0.28 -0.454*** -0.353*** 0.52 0.235*** -0.164*** 0.00
0.050 0.068 0.027 0.039 0.013 0.017
QTRxIFRS 0.095 -0.041 0.77 0.067 -0.042 0.68 -0.201*** 0.222*** 0.00
0.093 0.091 0.051 0.052 0.026 0.023
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 15'848 13'796 14'041 12'854 19'680 18'055
Adj. R-sq. 3.5% 3.3% 3.3% 3.6% 11.6% 7.4%
Panel E. STAFF Strong Weak p-valS - W  = 0 Strong Weak
p-val
S - W  = 0 Strong Weak
p-val
S - W  = 0
QTR 0.220*** 0.391*** 0.74 0.262*** 0.373*** 0.71 0.366*** 0.033* 0.01
0.067 0.064 0.035 0.037 0.016 0.017
IFRS -0.740*** -0.511*** 0.34 -0.449*** -0.336*** 0.48 0.217*** -0.160*** 0.00
0.051 0.066 0.028 0.039 0.013 0.018
QTRxIFRS 0.149* -0.132 0.53 0.095** -0.099* 0.43 -0.255*** 0.235*** 0.00
0.088 0.091 0.048 0.054 0.023 0.025
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 17'446 12'198 15'491 11'404 21'939 15'796
Adj. R-sq. 3.7% 3.1% 3.6% 3.4% 11.5% 10.0%
(continued)
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Table 2.5
(continued)
Variable of interest FError Disp LogFollow
Panel F. IFRSDIST Low High p-valL - H  = 0 Low High
p-val
L - H  = 0 Low High
p-val
L - H  = 0
QTR 0.501*** 0.209*** 0.59 0.336*** 0.359*** 0.94 0.374*** 0.028 0.01
0.065 0.063 0.036 0.035 0.017 0.017
IFRS -0.736*** -0.587*** 0.52 -0.472*** -0.341*** 0.40 0.211*** -0.153*** 0.00
0.051 0.063 0.029 0.036 0.013 0.017
QTRxIFRS -0.07 0.055 0.79 0.049 -0.068 0.63 -0.103*** 0.099*** 0.10
0.088 0.088 0.050 0.051 0.023 0.024
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 17'657 11'987 15'719 11'176 24'270 10'896
Adj. R-sq. 4.0% 3.4% 3.9% 5.0% 15.1% 20.7%
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Table 2.6: Robustness results
This table reports the baseline model estimates under several robustness tests. In Panel A, I match each mandatory quarterly reporting firm with a semiannual
reporting firm. For each mandatory quarterly reporting firm, I identify the closest semiannual reporting firm in terms of size (total assets ratio of the control to
treatment firm is at least 50%) if the two firms are in the same 2-digit SIG code during the same fiscal year.  For forecast error, I require in addition that the two
firms are followed by the same analyst. In Panel B, I restrict the timeframe analysis to 2002 – 2007. Q1 to Q4 refers to fiscal quarter one to four. FError is the
absolute difference between the analyst’s annual earnings forecast and the actual annual earnings, deflated by firm’s total assets per share. Disp is the standard
deviation of annual earnings forecasts, deflated by firm’s total assets per share. In each quarter, I retain the first annual earnings forecast for each firm-analyst pair
issued in the last two months. LogFollow is the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm during the entire fiscal quarter. All control variables are
defined in Table 2.A.2. Robust standard errors (in italics) are clustered at country-industry level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
respectively.
Ferror Disp LogFollow
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Panel A. Matching sample
QTR (i) 1.431* 1.401** 0.959** 0.451 0.597*** 0.500*** 0.475*** 0.340* 0.188** 0.108 -0.011 0.249***
0.754 0.615 0.465 0.361 0.16 0.182 0.165 0.19 0.094 0.11 0.095 0.092
IFRS (ii) -0.617** -0.368 -0.492** -0.811*** -0.223*** -0.218** -0.277*** -0.381*** 0.252** 0.108 0.099 0.156*
0.307 0.263 0.219 0.235 0.077 0.108 0.08 0.122 0.107 0.135 0.079 0.09
QTRxIFRS (iii) -0.591 -0.644 -0.385 0.129 -0.079 -0.114 -0.083 -0.038 -0.136 -0.076 -0.047 -0.115
0.651 0.561 0.448 0.34 0.121 0.15 0.138 0.153 0.114 0.134 0.085 0.097
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 7'084 6'664 7'523 6'938 13'699 14'745 17'326 15'618 20'883 23'865 28'685 24'700
Adj. R-sq. 6.3% 4.1% 4.3% 3.0% 7.5% 2.5% 3.8% 2.9% 14.7% 5.7% 4.9% 6.2%
p-val (i) + (iii) = 0 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.60 0.74 0.48 0.20
p-val (ii) + (iii) = 0 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.49 0.25 0.44
Panel B. Restricted timeframe (2002 - 2007)
QTR (i) 1.282*** 1.029** 0.631** 0.371 0.393** 0.444*** 0.245 0.188 0.132 0.119 -0.089 0.188**
0.473 0.437 0.305 0.235 0.183 0.168 0.175 0.180 0.084 0.093 0.099 0.092
IFRS (ii) -0.631*** -0.609*** -0.651*** -0.631*** -0.366*** -0.239** -0.409*** -0.351*** 0.154*** -0.002 0.021 -0.003
0.179 0.185 0.165 0.144 0.092 0.104 0.073 0.111 0.046 0.079 0.071 0.067
QTRxIFRS (iii) -0.099 -0.077 0.123 0.193 0.140 -0.016 0.210 0.069 -0.207*** -0.088 -0.039 -0.014
0.382 0.340 0.258 0.199 0.145 0.167 0.135 0.165 0.061 0.083 0.078 0.078
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 15'271 16'341 21'283 16'835 14'198 14'830 19'602 15'109 18'752 21'247 27'809 21'080
Adj. R-sq. 6.4% 4.3% 4.0% 2.7% 8.3% 4.1% 4.1% 2.8% 15.8% 13.3% 11.8% 12.8%
p-val (i) + (iii) = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.34 0.63 0.11 0.03
p-val (ii) + (iii) = 0 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.27 0.02 0.70 0.70
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Table 2.7: Voluntary versus mandatory quarterly and IFRS reporting
This table presents the results of Eq. (1) for different samples of firms. In Panel A, the sample of firms consists of semiannual and voluntary quarterly reporters that mandatorily
adopt IFRS. In Panel B, the sample of firms consists of semiannual and mandatory quarterly reporters that voluntarily report under IFRS. to Q4 refers to fiscal quarter one to four.
N denotes the number of firms in the sample. FError is the absolute difference between the analyst’s annual earnings forecast and the actual annual earnings, deflated by firm’s
total assets per share. Disp is the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts, deflated by firm’s total assets per share. In each quarter, I retain the first annual earnings forecast
for each firm-analyst pair issued in the last two months. LogFollow is the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm during the entire fiscal quarter. All control
variables are defined in Table 2.A.2. Robust standard errors (in italics) are clustered at country-industry level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent
respectively.
Ferror Disp LogFollow
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Panel A. Voluntary QTR - Mandatory IFRS (N = 1,190)
QTR (i) 1.019** 0.471 0.374 0.259 0.259 0.198 0.149 0.195 0.379*** 0.509*** 0.258** 0.194**
0.493 0.330 0.275 0.274 0.181 0.135 0.133 0.165 0.114 0.126 0.118 0.087
IFRS (ii) -0.443*** -0.615*** -0.604*** -0.708*** -0.219** -0.230*** -0.322*** -0.356*** 0.253*** 0.059 0.111 0.099
0.148 0.177 0.147 0.132 0.083 0.081 0.082 0.085 0.060 0.096 0.083 0.078
QTRxIFRS (iii) -0.970* -0.180 -0.178 -0.109 -0.052 -0.002 0.037 0.001 -0.125 -0.190 -0.083 -0.041
0.504 0.436 0.326 0.321 0.211 0.234 0.192 0.224 0.132 0.149 0.106 0.090
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 20'744 21'246 30'208 22'394 19'337 19'131 27'978 20'139 25'268 27'696 40'314 37'735
Adj. R-sq. 3.4% 3.0% 3.1% 3.3% 4.0% 2.0% 3.0% 3.6% 4.9% 6.9% 3.4% 10.0%
p-val (i) + (iii) =
0 0.86 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.03 0.24 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05
p-val (ii) + (iii) =
0 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.26 0.20 0.81 0.26
Panel B. Mandatory QTR - Voluntary IFRS (N = 59)
QTR (i) 2.066** 1.372** 0.688* 0.496 0.568** 0.262 0.337* 0.185 0.190 0.190 0.000 0.243
0.950 0.656 0.400 0.445 0.209 0.192 0.197 0.277 0.227 0.163 0.215 0.249
IFRS (ii) 0.272 -0.152 -0.246 0.158 0.200 0.242 0.181 -0.185 0.308* 0.023 0.106 -0.131
0.788 0.403 0.246 0.245 0.162 0.203 0.186 0.256 0.177 0.153 0.110 0.133
QTRxIFRS (iii) -0.940 -1.024 -0.268 -0.415 -0.318 -0.360** -0.194 -0.051 -0.490** -0.140 -0.166 -0.009
1.075 0.688 0.388 0.410 0.201 0.157 0.168 0.265 0.216 0.182 0.152 0.197
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1'356 2'002 2'580 2'355 1'298 1'927 2'510 2'264 1'702 2'616 3'408 3'124
Adj. R-sq. 14.4% 11.0% 9.2% 5.9% 24.6% 13.5% 10.3% 4.9% 21.4% 25.3% 26.2% 26.1%
p-val (i) + (iii) =
0 0.05 0.38 0.07 0.81 0.01 0.58 0.36 0.46 0.01 0.71 0.25 0.09
p-val (ii) + (iii) =
0 0.51 0.07 0.13 0.54 0.57 0.48 0.95 0.18 0.18 0.37 0.61 0.26
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Figure 2.1: Milestones in the reporting harmonization process in Europe
This figure depicts the main legislative steps to create a common set of accounting standards and frequency reporting for all European public listed firms.
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Figure 2.2: Annual forecast error cut-off dates during the fiscal year
This figure illustrates the four periods of the fiscal year in which the annual forecast error is computed. In each quarter, I retain the first annual earnings forecast for
each firm-analyst pair issued in the last two months. Q1 to Q4 refers to the financial statements corresponding to quarter one to four. SAN1 refers to the financial
statements corresponding to the first six months of the fiscal year.
Figure 2.3: Analysts’ annual information environment
These graphs present the average annual forecast error (Panel A), forecast dispersion (Panel B) and number of analyst following during each quarter of the fiscal
year by type of reporting frequency regime. FError is the absolute difference between the analyst’s annual earnings forecast and the actual annual earnings, deflated
by firm’s total assets per share. Disp is the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts, deflated by firm’s total assets per share. In each quarter, I retain the first
annual earnings forecast for each firm-analyst pair issued in the last two months. LogFollow is the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm during the
entire fiscal quarter. QTR (SAN) reporters denote the firms reporting under the mandatory quarterly (semiannual) regime.
Panel A. FError
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Figure 2.3
(continued)
Panel B. Disp
Panel C. LogFollow
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
QTR reporters
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
SAN reporters
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
QTR reporters
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
SAN reporters
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
92
93
Chapter 3: Hype My Stock or Harm My Rivals? Another View on Analysts’
Conflicts of Interest
(In collaboration with Michel Dubois)
Introduction
In an attempt to whittle down conflicts of interest, a wave of regulatory initiatives emerged in recent
years and brought investment banks to the fore. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in 2002 to
restore investors’ confidence in the U.S. stock market. More specifically, Section 501(a) of the act relates
to the codes of conduct for securities analysts and requires the disclosure of conflicts of interest. NASD
(now FINRA) Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 427 and the Global Research Settlement Act (Global Settlement
hereafter) followed shortly to address analysts conflicts of interest related to the research and investment
banking departments.39F1
The ongoing debate on the real effects of these regulations has triggered widespread attention of both
academics and professionals. However, mainstream research has been essentially inward looking into the
direct effect of the law on the over-optimism bias for affiliated firms. Moreover, the current research has
not incorporated yet a salient point, i.e. the alternative path that affiliated brokers might have followed to
continue favoring their clients. Specifically, affiliated brokers could alter their rating policy by issuing
more unfavorable recommendations for their client firms’ rivals. As such, these clients could still benefit
from the discrimination of their rivals within a purely legal environment.2
1 We refer hereafter generically to SOX for the more complex and widespread regulatory initiatives that surged around its
enactment.
2 Evidence based on anecdotal accounts is pertaining to our investigation. In 2003, the French luxury group Louis Vuitton Moet
Hennessy (LVMH) sued Morgan Stanley for alleged unfair research from analyst Claire Kent that favored direct competitor
Gucci, with which the investment bank was involved at the time in an M&A deal. The star luxury goods analyst downgraded
LVMH in July 2002 from outperforming to neutral, while maintaining Gucci on outperforming. In January 2004 the bank was
ordered to pay $38 million, which it appealed. Finally, in a joint declaration in 2007, LVMH and Morgan Stanley agreed to
resume business relations and settled their five year court battle without any paid compensation to either side. Moreover, the
analyst’s reputation remained untarnished, since two years after the suit, she ranked second in the Thomson Extel survey of luxury
goods analysts. This case illustrates the difficulty to prove financial analysts’ wrongdoing, if any, before the court. See, for
instance, “Morgan Stanley, LVMH tango in Paris”, by Ackman D., Forbes, May 27, 2003; “LVMH battles against Morgan
Stanley in court”, by Tagliabue, J., New York Times, November 18, 2003.
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This paper takes the affiliation relationhip as the nexus of the analysis and treats the brokers’ positive
bias on affiliated firms with respect to their rivals as the basic building block of conflicts of interest. We
ask two questions. First, do brokers provide significantly lower ratings for rival than for affiliated firms?
Second, are investors aware of this form of conflicts? These questions are important since they refer to a
class of conflicts unaddressed by the current regulation. To the best of our knowledge, no study to date
addresses the question of whether affiliated brokers use different strategies to favor their clients, nor
whether these innovations involve sidestepping the current regulatory framework.
We investigate these issues by focusing on recommendations and price targets. Consistent with our
conjecture, we find that the proportion of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations of affiliated firms is
significantly higher (lower) that the one for rival firms both before and after SOX. In line with previous
studies, affiliated brokers became more pessimistic on average after the enactment of SOX. Strikingly,
after 2002, rival firms have the lowest (highest) proportion of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations.
Actually, the proportion of unfavorable recommendations before SOX was 3% for rival, 2% for affiliated
and 4% for neutral firms, while this proportion is 15%, 11% and 13% after SOX. A similar pattern is
revealed in price targets. This first set of results suggests that, while brokers comply with the regulation
and issue less optimistic ratings, they nevertheless continue to keep their clients on significantly higher
ratings than their clients’ rivals.
To shed more light on this issue, we run a difference-in-differences model and estimate the bias in
affiliated and rival ratings, as compared to neutral ones, before and after the enactment of SOX. The
relative recommendations for affiliated firms are higher than the ones for rival firms before SOX; this
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. When assessing the impact of SOX, we find that
brokers continue to issue significantly higher recommendations and price targets on affiliated firms
compared to rival ones after SOX. In fact, brokers switched to a downward scale for both affiliated and
rival firms, maintaining the rating gap.
We also check whether investors recognize this new form of bias by analyzing the short-term market
reaction to recommendations before, and after SOX.  We find that investors discounted the brokers’
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affiliation bias before SOX. Specifically, the market reaction for added-to-buy recommendations for
affiliated stocks was significantly lower, suggesting that the market recognized brokers’ positive bias for
their clients. To illustrate, the two-day cumulated market-adjusted abnormal return associated with added-
to-buy recommendations for affiliated stocks was 1.2% lower than the one for rival stocks (statistically
significant at the 5% level). At the same time, the brokers’ bias for rival firms was not recognized in the
short-run before SOX (i.e. we do not identify a difference in market reaction between rival and neutral
stocks). After 2002, the two-day abnormal return of affiliated firms is not significantly different from the
one of rival firms, suggesting that the market accounts for the passage of SOX and expects the conflicts of
interest to have disappeared. Nevertheless, investors continue to be unaware of brokers’ negative bias on
rival firms.
This paper contributes to three streams of research. First, it uncovers a form of conflicts of interest in
the investment banking industry that was not addressed so far. Second, similar to Kadan, Madureira,
Wang, and Zach (2009), Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder (2007) and Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and
Trueman (2006), we focus on the central question of whether the regulatory initiatives decreased the
positive bias for affiliated stocks. However, we differentiate from these studies by shedding light on the
unexpected effects of the recent regulations. To the extent that conflicts of interest were mitigated, we find
evidence that brokers continue to favor their clients by following an alternative strategy without breaching
the rules. Our analysis centers on the question raised by Mulherin (2007) of whether SOX had unintended
consequences. Finally, we explore the effects of the institutional and regulatory environment on analysts’
output.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the hypotheses development
in the context of the existing literature. In Section 3.3, we provide details on the sample construction and
methodology. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results. We extend the analysis to the short-term
market reaction in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
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Prior research and hypotheses development
3.2.1. Conflicts of interest in sell-side equity research
Financial analysts play a key role in the dissemination of information to investors. Their production
(i.e. earnings forecasts, price targets and stock recommendations) portends future stock performance and
reduces information asymmetry; see, e.g., Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001); Boni and
Womack (2006); Brav and Lehavy (2003); Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2013). Loh and Mian
(2006) emphasize the role of future earnings in predicting stock price movements and argue that more
accurate earnings forecasts are correlated with more profitable recommendations. Kecskés, Michaely and
Womack (2015) find that recommendation changes are more informative to investors when they are based
on earnings, instead of discount rate revisions. At the same time, analysts’ reports receive the most
attention from investors when they incorporate bad news; see, e.g., Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005).
From the perspective of accurately predicting market performance, analysts working for investment
banks are inherently subject to conflicts of interests. This bias was extensively investigated in prior
research. Central to this literature is the notion that the pernicious effects of conflicts of interest in
analysts’ output fall on investors and distort the market. 41F3 Lin and McNichols (1998) identify a positive
bias in the long-term growth forecasts from affiliated brokers. They find that investors react more
negatively to neutral recommendations, consistent with the conjecture that the market interprets neutral
ratings from affiliated brokers as downgrades. Likewise, Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000) argue that
long-term growth forecasts from affiliated brokers are systematically overoptimistic around equity
offerings, and the level of optimism is correlated with their fees. Not only equity offerings, but also M&A
deals, are prone to conflicts of interests. Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) note that affiliated brokers, both
with the acquirer and the target firm, upgrade their recommendations and publish optimistic reports on the
acquirer. Beyond financial analysts, Cain and Dennis (2013) provide evidence that, although valuations in
the fairness opinions of target firms issued by the acquirers’ advisors exhibit higher positive errors than
those provided by the targets’ advisors, they contain information useful to investors.
3 See Mehran and Stulz (2007) for a comprehensive survey on the literature of conflicts of interest in investment banking.
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Stock recommendations, by their relative nature, are the most exposed to optimistic bias from affiliated
brokers. Michaely and Womack (1999) find that stocks recommended by affiliated brokers perform more
poorly that the ones from unaffiliated brokers both before and after the recommendation announcement.
Moreover, the market does not recognize this bias. In the same vein, Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007)
show that the average daily abnormal return from independent research firms with favorable
recommendations exceeds the one from investment banks. Additionally, during the bear market of 2000s,
these brokers were highly reluctant to downgrade stocks.
Besides underwriting relations, other factors such as trading fees, clients’ sophistication and brokers’
reputation are important determinants of the analysts’ bias; see Bradshaw (2011). In particular, analysts
working for retail brokerage houses are more optimistic than analysts serving only institutional investors,
while the optimism is offset by the reputation of the bank and the presence of institutional investors; see,
e.g., Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006); Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan, (2007). Indeed,
analyst reputation is more effective than sole bank reputation in limiting conflicts of interests; see Fang
and Yasuda (2009). Finally, strong legal enforcement and sanctions mitigate the magnitude of conflicts of
interest; see, e.g., Dubois, Frésard, and Dumontier (2014).
3.2.2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related regulations
The evidence so far shows that brokers’ optimism bias towards their clients is not innocuous since
limited objectivity of securities research can hurt issuers and investors alike. This salient feature was
integrated into an extensive series of regulations meant to restore the public confidence in the U.S. stock
market.42F4
4 Adopted by the SEC in July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required public disclosure of conflicts of interest together with the
securities analysts’ protection from retaliation of their employers in the event of unfavorable research reports. Similarly, NASD
Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 were implemented to improve the objectivity and transparency in the sell-side research. On April
28, 2003 the Global Settlement was enforced as an agreement among the SEC, NASD, the NYSE, the New York State Attorney
General, and ten of the largest Wall Street investment banks to settle charges alleging misleading or fraudulent research; see
Kadan et al. (2009, pp. 4193-4194) for the detailed requirement of each regulation.
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A rich literature has emerged around the overarching question of the efficacy of these regulations.43F5
Ertimur et al. (2007) argue, among others, that the profitability of “buy” and “hold” recommendations of
affiliated analysts increased following this regulatory wave. Barber et al. (2006) show an increase in the
proportion of unfavorable stock recommendations in the aftermath of the NASD Rule 2711, which
requires brokers to release their ratings distribution. Likewise, after the passage of these regulations,
affiliated analysts are less likely to issue optimistic recommendations compared to independent analysts.
As such, optimistic (neutral and pessimistic) recommendations are more (less) informative; see Kadan et
al. (2009). On the flip side, Buslepp, Casey, and Huston (2014) argue that the independent research funded
by the Global Settlement is of lower quality than the one of investment banks in terms of future
performance and market reaction to recommendations.
From another perspective, little is known about the unintended consequences of the regulation on
brokers’ behavior. One fact that gained increased public attention is the orphaned stock effect, especially
for small firms. To the extent that brokers have to allocate high costs to comply with legal requirements,
and most importantly, since the funding of research is limited due to its separation from investment
banking, many stocks have lost immediate analysts coverage. To illustrate, Morgan Stanley and Merrill
Lynch cut the number of North American covered stocks by 26% and 30% respectively as of April 2004. 44F6
According to Mehran and Stulz (2007, p. 291), the increased costs of producing analyst services result
ultimately in a decrease in the efficiency of financial markets, because these costs can adversely affect
valuations and make it difficult for companies to finance their growth. However, since there is no legal
obligation to cover stocks, there is no wrongdoing in adopting this strategy.
3.2.3. Persistence of conflicts of interest
At the first glance, the aforementioned literature is consistent with a reduction of the optimism bias for
affiliated brokers. It is important to stress that conflicts of interests were inadvertently understood as
optimistic recommendations on affiliated firms. However, inflating affiliated stock recommendations is
5 See Mulherin (2007) for an extensive analysis of the costs and benefits of regulating financial markets.
6 See, for example, “Change comes slowly to Wall Street research”, by Lee, M. and Metaxas, J., CNBC, April 26, 2004.
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just one outcome of a bundle of possibilities relating to any other type of broker’s misbehavior in trying to
peddle their clients’ stocks and generate commissions. Consistent with this conjecture, Carapeto and
Gietzmann (2011) bring into light another type of affiliation relationship in the U.K. practice of the
“corporate broker”. According to the U.K. Listing Authority, every listed company on the London Stock
Exchange must have an appointed broker to advice communication with the stock market on an ongoing
basis. The corporate broker has unique access to private information and participates to board meetings.
The authors note that, although the Chinese walls were created between the brokerage and investment
bank activities, these brokers may easily know whether the management is considering a SEO and thus
provide the information to their affiliated underwriters.
More recently, Lee (2013) identifies a new source of conflicts in the parent-subsidiary relationship. Not
only analysts at the parent investment bank provide positively biased recommendations for the client
firms, but also those employed in the broker’s subsidiaries. Similar with extant literature, their
recommendations have worse, or no investment value. Malmendier and Shantikumar (2014) find that
affiliated analysts strategically distort recommendations since they are disseminated to small investors, as
opposed to earnings forecasts, which are more prone to the dissemination among large, sophisticated
investors. In fact, Guan, Lu and Wong (2012) document that the reforms targeting the conflicted research
decreased the optimism in recommendations of the sanctioned banks, but not in earnings forecasts.
We start from the premise that favoring the affiliated firms by boosting their ratings is only one of the
many forms to gain underwriting commissions. Specifically, we investigate whether brokers provide
higher ratings for affiliated firms as compared to their rivals. 45F7 To the extent that affiliated brokers provide
less-than-stellar ratings on their clients’ rivals, they continue to curry favor with their clients by means of
this strategy. Our objective is thus to explore the existence and to commensurate the magnitude of such
conflicts of interests that materialize through the brokers’ hostile attitude towards their client firms’ rivals.
We therefore state the first null hypothesis as follows.
7 Recent findings suggest that peer firms play a central role in a firm’s financing decisions through their characteristics and their
own financing policies; see Frésard (2010), Leary and Roberts (2014).
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Hypothesis 3.1a. Before SOX, affiliated brokers provided similar ratings for their clients and their
clients’ rivals.
To go further, we investigate whether SOX and the related regulations had an effect in mitigating the
potential rating gap between affiliated and rival firms. The objective of these laws was to limit the positive
bias towards client firms and no other form of conflicts was addressed. While these regulations ostensibly
reduced the optimistic bias for affiliated firms, we expect that they inadvertently created a de facto
situation in which other forms of the same conflict continue to exist.  The second null hypothesis is the
following.
Hypothesis 3.1b. The rating gap between affiliated and rival firms vanished after SOX.
The regulations aiming to decrease conflicts of interest made it apparent that, at the time, the markets
were devoid of adequate recognition of such conflicts. To investigate whether this was the case, we
ascertain the difference in the short-term market reaction between the affiliated and rival stocks. If the
brokers’ bias is recognized before SOX, then investors should discount (assign a premium to) the affiliated
(rivals) stocks that are added-to-buy accordingly. In the same vein, we should observe the most (least)
negative market reaction for added-to-sell recommendations for affiliated (rival) stocks. We therefore test
the following null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.2a. Before SOX, there is no difference in investors’ reaction to ratings between affiliated
and rival firms.
Investors’ reaction to biased recommendations ought a priori to be related with the passing of the
regulations. Since the regulations’ main objective is to limit such conflicts, we check whether the market
accounts accordingly for its effective implementation, i.e., whether investors recognize the limitation of
both types of bias. Hence, our fourth hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 3.2b. There is no difference in the short-term market reaction to ratings between affiliated
and rival firms after SOX.
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Data and methodology
3.3.1. Sample construction
We focus on both stock recommendations and price targets for several reasons. First, recommendations
were at the core of the scandals and the regulations put in place to curb these conflicts are mainly centered
on recommendations. The Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) translates on a single five-
point scale a multitude of specific rating scales, which opens the possibility that the relative nature of a
recommendation differs from one broker to another; see Kadan et al. (2009, 2013). We integrate price
targets to our analysis since recommendations have no mutually-agreed-upon interpretation. As such, price
targets allow us to identify the bias of affiliated brokers without a concern for misinterpretation. Moreover,
while some studies focus on the performance of price targets, they open the field for the question of
whether price targets are subject to conflicts of interest as well; see, e.g., Brav and Lehavy (2003);
Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2013); Gleason, Johnson and Li (2013).
The sample selection process is illustrated in Table 3.A.1. The initial sample consists of all outstanding
recommendations and price targets from the I/B/E/S U.S. Historical Detail files for the period January
1996 to December 2008. 46F8 I/B/E/S started collecting recommendations in October 1993 and the data is
scant for the first three years. Price targets enter the database as of February 1999. The data collection
stops in 2008 to provide a time balanced sample around the adoption of SOX in 2002.47F9
In May 2002, NASD 2711 Rule imposed the disclosure of the percentage of all securities rated by each
broker to whom they would assign a “buy”, “hold” or “sell” rating. Consequently, during this year many
brokers changed their rating scale and issued recommendations in bulk for the firms they were covering at
the moment.48F10 Following Loh and Stulz (2011), we count for this structural break for the top 100 largest
8 Following Ljungqvist, Malloy and Marston (2009a), a recommendation (price target) is outstanding if it has been confirmed by
the broker in the I/B/E/S review date field in the last twelve months and has not been stopped by the broker in the I/B/E/S Stopped
file.
9 Ljungqvist et al. (2009a) identify changes in recommendation archives from one I/B/E/S download to another during the 2000-
2007 period; subsequently Thomson Reuters had announced that it has solved the problem. We collect the data for both
recommendations and price targets as of December 2011 snapshot so that they are not subject to this issue.
10 We find no evidence of this structural break in price targets.
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brokers in terms of total number of recommendations issued during the entire period. 49F11 The
recommendations issued in bulk on the new rating scale are removed from the dataset since they do not
bring additional information. We identify 19 brokers that resumed coverage in 2002, with a change from
four- or five-point scale to three- or four-point scale. For eight brokers, these days are identical with the
ones in Kadan et al. (2009). Three of these brokers change again their rating scale in 2003, 2006 and 2008
respectively. We find additional changes in rating scales in 1997 (one broker), 2001 (one broker), and
between 2003 and 2008 (16 brokers). Finally, we reverse the I/B/E/S scale and code recommendations
from one (strong sell) to five (strong buy), so that higher values correspond to more positive
recommendations.
We perform several adjustments on the price targets sample. First, to preserve a common interpretation
across brokers, we keep only the one-year-ahead price targets. These observations count for 98% of the
initial sample. Second, we extract current stock prices from CRSP50F12 and work with unadjusted data in
both I/B/E/S and CRSP. Finally, we compute the price target to current price ratio and winsorize the
sample at 1% on both tails.
3.3.1.1. Identification of affiliated recommendations and price targets
Brokers’ conflicts of interest are determined with data on IPO, SEO, public debt issues and M&A deals
obtained from the Security Data Company Platinum (SDC) database and syndicated loans from LPC’s
DealScan (LPC). Following Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006), we construct corporate families so
that we give credit to a parent firm for any form of investment banking relationship of its subsidiaries. In
addition, since many banks were the product of mergers and acquisitions during the sample period, we
account for all the bank’s predecessors when identifying an investment banking relationship.
11 In total, these brokers count for 80% of the observations. We check for cases when the broker stopped the totality or the
majority of her coverage and resumed the coverage in the subsequent days on a different rating scale. One year post-resumption,
we check whether the broker continues to use the new rating scale. If this is the case, we assume that this broker uses the new
rating scale starting from the resumption day.
12 We check previously for any inconsistencies between the firm’s currencies reported in I/B/E/S and CRSP on the same day and
remove around 0.1% of the observations.
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To identify an affiliated recommendation or price target, we proceed as follows. First, we match the
firms in I/B/E/S with those from SDC (LPC) by the firm’s CUSIP parent (official ticker) at a given date.
Second, since each database provides a different form of the brokers’ name, we match by hand the
brokers’ names in SDC and LPC with those from the I/B/E/S Broker’s Translation file. When the
matching between two names is not unique, we search for additional information on the identity and the
type of the broker in the Internet and on Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research. 51F13 In April 2008,
I/B/E/S stopped providing the names of the brokers in the database. In our sample, we identify 99 out of
930 distinct brokers for which the names are not available. Though the majority of these I/B/E/S codes
could not be matched in SDC or LPC via the Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research, these brokers
count for less than 2% of the total observations. To assure a maximum consistency in the names matching,
we use a restrictive matching procedure, so that we create a link between two databases only when the two
names clearly depict the same broker.
Finally, a broker is identified as conflicted at the time of the recommendation or price target issue if she
is a lead or co-manager for at least one IPO, SEO, public debt issue, financial advisor for an M&A deal,
lender or co-lender in a syndicated loan with the given firm from one year prior to the recommendation or
price target announcement date. We impose this interval of time in line with the restrictions of SOX (Sect.
501-b3), which requires the disclosure of any existing conflicts between the issuer and the broker during
the one year period preceding the issue date. 52F14 Kadan et al. (2009) point to the fact that the interests of co-
managers are similar with those of lead managers. Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2009b) also show
that appointments for co-management allow banks to establish relationships with the issuers and gain
more mandates in the near future. For these reasons, we consider both lead managers and co-managers as
conflicted.
13 For example, Cantor Fritzgerald is identified as “Cantor Fritgera” in I/B/E/S, “Cantor Fritzgerald Inc” in SDC and “Cantor
Fritzgerald Securities” in LPC. Additionally, we identify cases in which, for the same name in I/B/E/S, there is more than one
entry in the Nelson’s Directory. For instance, Renaissance Capital in I/B/E/S can be linked to either Renaissance Capital LLC
(independent research firm) or Renaissance Capital Ltd (investment bank). In such cases, we go one step further and check the
analysts’ name employed at each house and link them to the analyst’s name in I/B/E/S to choose the correct matching firm.
14 We later use alternative time intervals for defining conflicts of interests from three months prior to the deal initiation to five
years after the deal initiation. The results, available upon request, do not change qualitatively.
104
3.3.1.2. Identification of rival recommendations and price targets
Our objective is to identify recommendations and price targets issued on direct competitors of the
affiliated firms. To do so, we use the text-based network industry classification (TNIC) from Hoberg and
Phillips data library; see Hoberg and Phillips (2010), Hoberg and Phillips (2015). 53F15 We proceed in two
steps. First, for each affiliated firm, we retain its TNIC competitors on which the affiliated broker issues
recommendations or price targets during the affiliation period. Second, we define as rival the firm with the
highest pairwise TNIC score with an affiliated firm during the calendar year. To avoid cases with weak
similarity scores, we retain TNIC pairwise scores that are above the annual average score of the entire set
of competitors.54F16 Following this definition, for each affiliated firm, we use a set of rivals that is updated
annually.
Two aspects of the baseline definition of rivals deserve attention. First, the set of competitors for a
given firm may be different from the broker’s perspective compared to the firm’s perspective. By
construction, the TNIC scores are based on the same level of coarseness as the three-digit SIC codes. We
form a set of potential rival firms by retaining all firms covered by the affiliated broker in the same three-
digit SIC code as the affiliated firm during the calendar year of the recommendation or price target issue.
Second, the playing field of competition may not imply the product market exclusively. From an
investor’ perspective, two firms compete in the stock market if they are close substitutes in her portfolio.
Consistent with this view, affiliated brokers rely on a set of highly substitutable firms for their customers
and only follow a subset of the entire panel of the client’s product market competitors. As such, for each
affiliated firm-year, we retain as rivals the competitor firms in the same three-digit SIC group with which
the affiliated firm has the highest weekly return correlation over the calendar year. 55F17 This definition allows
us to identify both the direct competitors in the product market and the closest substitutes in terms of
portfolio management. The choice for the firms with the highest correlation in returns is also based on the
15 We thank the authors for making this dataset available at http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata/.
16 The results are not sensitive to this filter. Similarly, the findings remain robust when we alternatively consider the first five
firms with the highest TNIC pairwise score with the affiliated firm (instead of the first one).
17 We use weekly return correlation to avoid lead/lag effects in stock returns (Lo and MacKinley, 1990). The findings are not
sensitive when using a daily frequency.
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affiliated brokers’ objective. Specifically, we conjecture that brokers indirectly favor affiliated firms by
issuing negative ratings on their rivals that an investor could easily replace in her portfolio with the client
firm.
3.3.1.3. Final sample
The sample of recommendations and price targets consists of affiliated, rival, neutral, and
simultaneously affiliated and rival firms. While a firm can enter in our sample as both affiliated and rival
for a certain broker and date, it is not clear to what extent the corresponding recommendations and price
targets are biased. Therefore, they are excluded from the sample. We eliminate 1.5% (1.4%) of total
recommendations (price targets) by applying this filter.
Finally, for each firm-broker we retain the most recent recommendation or price target during the
quarter. The final sample in Table 3.A.1 contains 6% (8%) affiliated firm-broker observations for
recommendations (price targets). Rival recommendations (price targets) count for 6% (5%) of the total
sample. The rest of the observations are neutral (88% for both samples).
3.3.2. Research design
To test hypotheses 3.1a and 3.1b, we examine the brokers’ bias on their relative ratings and estimate
the following difference-in-differences model.
, , 1 , , 2 , , 3 4 , ,
5 , , , , , ,δ'X
b i t b i t b i t t b i t t
b i t t b i t i b i t
Y AFFILIATED RIVAL SOX AFFILIATED SOX
RIVAL SOX
    
   
   
  
(1)
where subscripts b, i, t stand for broker, firm, and time respectively.
The dependent variable,
, ,b i tY , represents the recommendation , ,( )b i tRELREC or the price target to
current price ratio
, ,
( )b i tRELPT issued by broker b on firm i in quarter t minus the mean outstanding
recommendation (price target to current price ratio) from the rest of the brokers covering firm i. To ensure
the time matching of recommendations (price targets) among brokers, we follow Ljungqvist et al. (2007)
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and keep the most recent recommendations (price targets) per firm-broker over the last three months. 56F18
We also require at least two other brokers covering the stock when computing the consensus. 57F19 We focus
our analysis at the broker (and not at the analyst) level for two reasons. First, the issuer-bank relationship
is the first stage through which conflicts of interest materialize. Second, the financial regulations target
primarily the research at the investment banking level.
The magnitude of the conflicts of interest at the firm-broker level is estimated by the AFFILIATED
dummy. This variable equals one if the broker is a lead manager, co-manager, financial advisor, lender or
co-lender for the firm in a least one IPO, SEO, public debt offering, M&A deal or syndicated loan less
than one year prior to the recommendation or price target date. The dummy variable RIVAL counts for the
bias in rival recommendations or price targets. It takes the value of one if the firm has the highest TNIC
pairwise similarity score with an affiliated firm of the broker during the same period. Since our sample
consists of three groups, the AFFILIATED and RIVAL dummies capture the difference in the relative
rating with the neutral firms. To account for the influence of the U.S. regulations on brokers’ bias, we
introduce SOX, a dummy variable that equals one if the recommendation or price target is issued after the
adoption of SOX.
In line with prior studies, the additional variables (X) control for other sources of bias in brokers’
recommendations and price targets. Since large institutions have more resources to support research and,
supposedly, more access to private information, we follow Stickel (1995) and control for the size of the
broker based on the number of analysts employed over the past quarter (BROKERSIZE). We include the
number of brokers who issued at least one recommendation or price target on the stock over the past
quarter to capture the stock’s information environment (NBROKER). To account for the fact that brokers
may become optimistic about a stock because it is performing well or because of market-wide optimism,
we include the stock’s market-adjusted return (PASTFIRMPERF) and market return (PASTMKTPERF) for
the preceding six months; see Kadan et al. (2009), Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004). We also
18 We consider alternatively the prior six and twelve months in computing the recommendation and price target consensus and
obtain similar results.
19 One potential concern is that with a small number of ratings, the timing of their releases can substantially affect the relative
nature of our dependent variable. The results are not sensitive to this restriction.
107
include a dummy variable that equals one if the broker initiates the coverage for the firm (INITIATION).
Table 3.A.2 details the construction of the variables.
To account for the time-invariant firm heterogeneity, we use a vector of firm fixed effects ( i ) and
cluster standard errors by quarter; see Petersen (2009). 58F20 We use the above specification for the following
reasons. First, to identify the presence of a fixed effect, we compute the standard errors of the model by
clustering at each of the three dimensions. Additionally, we assess the magnitude of the correlation
between each group with the observed covariates. While we cannot reject the hypothesis of the presence of
each effect, the correlation between the broker specific effect and the observables is close to zero. This
suggests that the estimates from fitting a firm fixed effect model, i.e. a model which assumes that the
broker-error component and the variables of interest are uncorrelated, should be preferred to a broker fixed
effects model.F21
Empirical results
3.4.1. Descriptive evidence
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics on the recommendations and price targets. Panel A reports
the distribution of recommendations by year and by rating. Two notable features emerge from the data.
Firstly, the proportion of unfavorable recommendations is around 4% before 2002. Consistent with
previous findings, this low number corresponds to brokers’ general reluctance to issue unfavorable ratings
on the covered firms during that period; see, e.g., Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2003);
Jegadeesh and Kim (2006). Secondly, the distribution becomes more balanced after 2002 with a decrease
(an increase) in the proportion of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations. To illustrate, the percentage
20 While we use the most conservative method to account for the dependency in the data, our inferences are not sensitive to this
choice.
21 Although no standard methodology has been so far developed for estimating three-way error-component models, this topic has
started to gain some attention in recent years; see Andrews, Schank and Upward (2006); Gormley and Matsa (2014). We confirm
further the implication of using firm fixed effects by fitting a three-way fixed effects model, which groups all unique firm-broker
combinations (i.e. by defining a “spell”; see Andrews et al., 2006). This model eliminates both the unobserved firm- and broker-
error components, while clustering standard errors by quarter. The estimates from this model are close to those of the firm fixed
effects model with clustered standard errors by quarter, implying that the broker specific component and the covariates are
uncorrelated. The results are available upon request.
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of favorable (unfavorable) recommendations dropped (increased) from 71% (2%) in 2000 to 40% (14%)
in 2008. Simultaneously, the percentage of hold recommendations increased substantially from 27% in
2000 to 46% in 2008, suggesting that brokers became more pessimistic in the aftermath of the regulations
enacted around SOX. The distribution of recommendations by year is generally smooth, with a peak in
2002. The number of covered firms increases from 1,710 in 2001 to 2,003 in 2002, implying higher
coverage intensity for this year. The fact that we still depict a higher number of recommendations after
controlling for resumption in light of the change in rating scales is also directly related to the almost 25%
of the top 100 brokers, which did not resume their coverage (in the I/B/E/S Stopped file) when issuing
recommendations on different scales. Barber et al. (2006, p. 97) use data from FirstCall and identify a
similar peak in the number of recommendations.
[Insert Table 3.1 about here]
The distribution by year of the price target to current price ratio is depicted in Panel B. Brokers map the
recommendation ratings on their assessment of the stock’s expected return within twelve months; see
Kadan et al. (2013), Table 3.1. In other words, favorable and unfavorable recommendations derive from
favorable and unfavorable views on the stock’s future performance. We classify a price target as favorable
(unfavorable) if it belongs to the third (first) tercile of price target to current price ratio over the last three
months.60F22 This mapping allows us to mirror the price targets to each of the three recommendation
categories (i.e. favorable, hold and unfavorable).
The targeted one-year-ahead price increase lies between 0 and 50% in the 1st (3rd) tercile, whereas the
mean (median) of the ratio is 1.22 (1.07) for the entire period. Similar to recommendations, we identify a
drop in the price target to current price ratio subsequent to 2002. This ratio decreases from 1.76 (1.09) in
the 3rd (1st) tercile in 2000 to 1.38 (0.98) between 2003 and 2008. This decrease in price targets reinforces
the idea that affiliated brokers became more pessimistic in the post regulation period. Similar to Brav and
Lehavy (2003), price targets observations contain fewer covered firms (5,018 versus 5,445), fewer brokers
(546 versus 667), and are issued almost three times more frequently compared to recommendations.
22 We alternatively classify a price target as favorable (unfavorable) if it belongs to the third (first) tercile over the calendar year
and obtain similar results.
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We detail the distribution of each category of recommendation and price target in Table 3.2. Panel A
breaks down the distribution of recommendations for each type of rating. In line with prior studies, we
find that affiliated recommendations have the highest percentage of favorable views in all years before
2002; see, e.g., Kadan et al. (2009); Ljungqvist et al. (2007). They account for 71% in the pre-SOX period,
whilst rival and neutral firms count for 64% and 63% of favorable recommendations over the same period.
We observe a sharp change after 2002. While the proportion of favorable recommendations drops for
all three types of firms, rival firms now have the lowest proportion of favorable recommendations. To
illustrate, the proportion equals 40% for affiliated, 35% for rival, and 41% for neutral firms respectively
after SOX. This pattern is complemented by the evolution of unfavorable recommendations. As expected,
affiliated brokers are the most reluctant to issue negative views on their clients during the entire period.
Nevertheless, after 2002, the proportion of unfavorable ratings increases for all types of firms, and brokers
issue the highest proportion of unfavorable recommendations on rival firms. Actually, in the periods
before and after SOX, the proportion of unfavorable recommendations went from 3% (2%) to 15% (11%)
for rival (affiliated) firms.
At the first glance, affiliated brokers have complied with the regulations to come forth with less
optimistic research on their clients. Looking more closely, however, the downward switch in ratings for
clients went simultaneously with a greater downward switch for rivals. Thus, the fact that affiliated
brokers became more pessimistic had no effect on the existing rating gap between client and rival firms.
Panel B depicts the distribution of price targets in the 1st and 3rd tercile. Rival firms have the lowest
(highest) proportion of price targets in the 3rd (1st) tercile over the entire period. The proportion of price
targets in the 3rd tercile for rival (affiliated) firms decreases from 32% (37%) before SOX to 29% (32%)
after SOX. As with recommendations, there exists a constant gap between affiliated and rival price targets,
both before and after SOX. This finding suggests that although brokers appear to be mainly concerned
with applying the law on their recommendation scales, they nevertheless manifest a similar pattern in price
targets by favoring (disfavoring) the affiliated (rival) firms.
[Insert Table 3.2 about here]
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3.4.2. Negative ratings on rival stocks
We start by ascertaining the affiliated and rival bias from the baseline specification in Table 3.3. Panel
A reports the results for recommendations. In column (1), the coefficient on affiliated firms
(AFFILIATED) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is similar to what has
been documented in the literature; see, e.g., Ljungqvist et al. (2007); Kadan et al. (2009). The average
effect of rival firms (RIVAL) is positive and significant, suggesting that, prior to the enactment of SOX,
affiliated brokers issued higher recommendations also for their clients’ rivals compared to neutral firms.
This positive bias in recommendations for rival firms can be driven from the proximity and the common
business characteristics with the affiliated firms. However, the magnitude of the bias is almost half of the
one on affiliated firms. More importantly, the relative recommendations for affiliated firms are 0.07 (0.13
- 0.06) higher than the ones for rival firms before SOX. This difference (i.e. 1 2  ) is statistically
significant (p-value = 0.00). Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 3.1a.
After the adoption of SOX, we notice that the gap between affiliated (0.13 – 0.12 = 0.01) and rival
(0.07 – 0.14 = -0.07) recommendations persists. The difference between the two biases (i.e.
1 4 2 5( ) ( )      ) is positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.03). Within this setting, the
gap continues to exist in the aftermath of the regulation; therefore we reject Hypothesis 3.1b. In other
words, even if affiliated brokers comply with the regulation by reducing the over-optimism for their
clients, they continue to keep their clients on significant higher ratings compared to their rivals. Indeed,
the gap between affiliated and rival does not disappear with SOX, since the coefficients on AFFILIATED x
SOX and RIVAL x SOX are not significantly different (p-value = 0.76). Overall, the control variables
display signs that are in line with related studies; see, e.g., Ljungqvist et al. (2007); Kadan et al. (2009).
[Insert Table 3.3 about here]
To verify if our results are robust, we run several alternative specifications. In column (2), we require
at least one outstanding recommendation per firm-broker both before and after SOX. To reduce
heterogeneity among firms and brokers, in column (3) we consider the sample of brokers that
simultaneously cover rival, affiliated and neutral firms, and firms that appear at least once as rival,
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affiliated, and neutral over the sample period; see Malmendier and Shantikumar (2014). Although the
sample size reduces to almost half, the results are consistent with the baseline specification. In column (4),
RIVAL is defined as the firm in the same three-digit SIC code group as an affiliated that has the highest
weekly return correlation with the affiliated over the calendar year. Again, the results are similar to those
obtained with the baseline specification.
We run the same specifications on price targets and present the results in Panel B. The findings
correspond to our previous results on recommendations. It appears that conflicted research is not only first
and foremost present in recommendations, but also in price targets. To illustrate, the price targets on
affiliated firms are 2% higher than those on rival firms before SOX (the difference is statistically
significant at 1% level). We reject Hypothesis 3.1a over all four specifications. Similar to
recommendations, after the introduction of SOX, the gap between the relative price targets for affiliated
and rival firms continues to be significantly positive (p-value = 0.00). Therefore, we reject Hypothesis
3.1b.
Figure 3.1, Panel A (B) displays the affiliation bias in relative recommendations (price targets) for
affiliated and rival firms over the entire period. For each panel, we run quarterly regressions of the
baseline model and plot the evolution of the gap between affiliated and rival relative recommendations and
price targets. First, we remark that the bias drops just after the enactment of SOX, showing that affiliated
brokers became more pessimistic. Although less obvious for recommendations in the first years, the
parallel evolution of the two biases confirms our results so far. Shortly after 2002, this parallel trend
slowly diverges for as long as two years, showing that affiliated brokers downgraded the rival firms in the
short-run. Likewise, the bias for rival firms turns mostly negative in both recommendations and price
targets after SOX.
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here]
To provide a different perspective on our findings, we assess the effect of SOX on the over-optimism
bias for affiliated firms as compared separately with rival, and then with neutral firms. The results are
presented in Table 3.4. In columns (1) and (3), the coefficient on AFFILIATED x SOX is significantly
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negative (t-stat -4.63 and -4.85 respectively), so that affiliated brokers decreased their over-optimism
compared to neutral firms after SOX. When comparing this result with columns (2) and (4), we observe
that SOX had no impact in curbing the existing gap in ratings between affiliated and rival firms. Indeed,
the coefficient on AFFILIATED x SOX is not statistically different from zero in neither recommendations
nor price targets. These findings highlight a striking aspect of the consequences of regulations aiming to
curb conflicts of interest in investment banking. Although in all appearance necessary, this regulation left
the door open for the affiliated brokers to continue favoring their clients through another channel.
[Insert Table 3.4 about here]
3.4.3. Evaluating alternative hypotheses
3.4.3.1. Selection hypothesis
The issuer may select for underwriting or advisory mandates those brokers that have the most positive
views on their business. This process may therefore lead to more optimistic brokers for affiliated firms but
only because they were already more optimistic before (i.e. the selection hypothesis); see Lin and
McNichols (1998). We compare the coefficient on AFFILIATED in the baseline specification with the
corresponding one when considering the affiliation period over six months. When the affiliation
relationship is considered solely over the next six months from the deal date, the coefficient is 33% higher
compared to the one obtained with a one year window around the date at which the broker had the deal
with the covered firm.  In addition, compared to the baseline specification, the AFFILIATED coefficient is
12% (29%) lower in recommendations (price targets) when we extend the affiliation period over five
years. As such, brokers are the most aggressive in issuing over-positive ratings especially in the periods
following the recent deals.
Our results also demonstrate that brokers were significantly more positive on rival than on neutral firms
before SOX, and this was reversed subsequently.  According to the selection channel, we should observe a
significantly greater proportion of rival firms that became subsequently clients for the issuing broker
before SOX, and conversely after SOX. We check for future investment banking ties for each rival and
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neutral firm that became a client for the same broker in the next year (six to 18 months) or three years (six
to 42 months). We exclude the six month period before the deal since during that period the investment
bank is likely to have already access to private information related to the firm.
[Insert Table 3.5 about here]
Table 3.5, Panel A details the results. As the interpretation of recommendations and price targets
samples is similar, we restrict the comments to the former group. On average, 2.32% (4.67%) of all firms
that were rivals before SOX become clients for the same broker in the next year (three years), while the
corresponding percentage for neutral firms is 1.11% (2.09%). The difference between the two groups is
statistically significant at the 1% level. We observe  a similar pattern after SOX, with 1.65% (3.31%) of
rival, and 0.75% (1.29%) of neutral firms becoming clients in the next year (three years). Likewise, the
difference between the two groups is statistically significant at the 1% level, irrespective of the period for
future deals. Accordingly, the selection channel could at most explain the more positive views on rival
than neutral firms before the enactment of the law.  However, this hypothesis is unable to explain the
changing behavior of affiliated brokers after SOX, with no more positive views on rival than neutral firms.
3.4.3.2. Information hypothesis
Another potential explanation for the over-optimism in brokers’ ratings is that they have a privileged
access to the firm-specific information. If this information is incorporated into price targets and
recommendations, we could systematically observe over-optimism for affiliated firms even in the absence
of conflicts of interest (i.e. the information hypothesis); see, e.g., Michaely and Womack (1999). More
recently, Green, Jame, Markov and Subasi (2014) show that analysts’ access to management is one
important source of informational advantage. As such, their research is more informative and leads to
abnormal returns. If the information channel was at play, in both periods we should observe a significant
and a higher abnormal return when the broker issues a rating on an affiliated firm.
Following this conjecture, and the common characteristics of the business for affiliated and rival firms,
the positive information on affiliated firms should at least partially spread into positive information on
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rival firms - but to a lesser extent, since brokers do not have an equal access to these firms. This is in line
with what we find before SOX. After SOX, however, affiliated firms continue to enjoy the same positive
bias with respect to rival firms, while the gap between rival and neutral firms widens. As such, we extend
the information hypothesis to the possibility that affiliated brokers have additional information on the
long-term prospects of rival and neutral firms. If this was the case, we should observe that rival firms
perform significantly better (equal to, or significantly worse) than neutral firms before (after) SOX.
To examine whether our results reflect the information channel, in Table 3.5, Panel B we analyze the
abnormal returns of recommendations and price targets for affiliated, rival and neutral stocks before and
after SOX. We follow Womack (1996) and construct added-to-buy (i.e. initiations and upgrades to Buy or
Strong Buy) and added-to-sell (i.e. initiations and downgrades to Sell or Strong Sell) lists. The cumulated
market-adjusted abnormal returns over the next six months in added-to-buy recommendations are 6.7% for
rival, 2.7% for affiliated, and 2.8% for neutral stocks before SOX, and 0.7%, 1.4% and 2.1% respectively
after SOX.  Importantly, these differences are not statistically significant in either period. Before and after
SOX, the abnormal performance of affiliated stocks is not significantly different from the one of rival
stocks (p-value = 0.16 and 0.69 respectively). The weak performance of affiliated stocks before SOX
relates to similar prior findings suggesting that brokers do not rely on private information concerning the
firm’s prospects when issuing positive ratings. However, in light of the small number of observations we
obtain for these tests, the results should be interpreted with caution. For price targets, we find no
significant difference between the six-month performance of rival and affiliated stocks before SOX (p-
value = 0.50). After SOX, affiliated stocks exhibit the highest performance (statistically higher than both
rival and neutral stocks at the 1% level). However, rival and neutral stocks do not perform differently,
suggesting that brokers would have no motive to issue more negative price targets on rival, than on neutral
stocks. Overall, we conclude that our results do not support the information hypothesis.
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Short-term market reaction to affiliated and rival bias
In the previous section, we document that the conflicts of interest appear in two forms. First, brokers
issue higher ratings on affiliated firms over all periods, although this bias decreases after the adoption of
SOX; see Ertimur et al. (2007). Second, brokers issue significantly less favorable ratings on rival firms,
and this behavior is more prevalent after SOX.  When a broad swath of investors is unaware of such
conflicts, they are likely to hinder the market by distorting the perceptions of future stocks performance.
Consequently, we check whether the market recognizes the two forms of bias previously documented.
Specifically, we measure to what extent investors recognize the positive (negative) bias for affiliated
(rival) firms, and whether SOX had an impact in bringing more awareness of such conflicts.
To do so, we focus our analysis on added-to-buy and added-to-sell recommendations. The reason we
investigate these recommendations is that investors are most likely to react when brokers issue extreme
ratings; see Womack (1996). We start by reporting the average short-term market reaction in Table 3.6.
The variable of interest is the two-day cumulated abnormal return (CMAR), computed from the event
trading date to the next trading day following the recommendation. Daily excess returns are computed as
the difference between the stock’s return and the CRSP value-weighted daily index.
[Insert Table 3.6 about here]
We identify a positive (negative) two-day market reaction to added-to-buy (added-to-sell)
recommendations, significantly different from zero (at the 1% level). In line with previous studies,
investors react more strongly to unfavorable recommendations prior to SOX; see, e.g., Kadan et al. (2009).
To illustrate, the average two-day cumulated abnormal return for added-to-buy (added-to-sell)
recommendations is 1.52% (-3.96%) for affiliated firms, and 2.8% (-4.85%) for rival firms. After SOX,
there is no difference in the two-day cumulated abnormal return among affiliated, rival and neutral
recommendation in neither added-to-buy nor added-to-sell sample.
To test hypotheses 3.2a and 3.2b, we estimate the following model.
, , 0 1 , , 2 , , 3 4 , ,
5 , , 6 , , , , , ,'X
b i t b i t b i t t b i t t
b i t t b i t b i t b i t
CMAR AFFILIATED RIVAL SOX AFFILIATED SOX
RIVAL SOX ER
     
    
    
   
(2)
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As we document a bias in both recommendations and price targets, we control for cases when
recommendations and price target changes are released simultaneously. We introduce ∆ER (i.e., change in
expected return), an indicator variable that equals one when both recommendations and price targets are
released during the window. 61F23 If investors react to new information, then the simultaneous price targets
should absorb most of the short-term market reaction around recommendations.
In line with prior research, we iron out the remaining idiosyncrasies among recommendations by
controlling for several broker and firm characteristics. Since investors’ reaction may be associated with the
size of the broker issuing the rating, we control for the broker size in terms of the number of analysts
employed in the current quarter (BSIZE); see Ertimur et al.(2007); Salva and Sonney (2011); Stickel
(1995).  We also control for the number of years for which the broker covers the stock (EXPERIENCE);
see Kadan et al, (2009); Ertimur et al. (2007); Loh and Stulz (2011).  To account for momentum, we
control for firm past performance (PASTFIRMPERF) and market past performance (PASTMKTPERF); see
Kadan et al. (2009). Finally, prior findings suggest that the market reaction is partly captured by
concurrent earnings announcements; see, e.g., Salva and Sonney (2011); Asquith et al. (2005); Loh and
Stulz (2011); Michaely and Womack (1999). We control for such cases by introducing an indicator
variable that equals one if the recommendation is issued in the three-day window surrounding an earnings
announcement (EPSDATE).
According to Hypothesis 3.2a, if the market does not recognize the brokers’ bias before SOX, then
investors should not discount recommendations for affiliated stocks compared to rival ones.
[Insert Table 3.7 about here]
Table 3.7 reports the regression results of model (2). We observe that the short-term market reaction
for added-to-buy recommendations is significantly weaker for affiliated stocks before SOX. Compared to
rival stocks, the difference in the two-day market-adjusted abnormal return (i.e. 1 2  ) is significantly
negative at the 1% level. For example, in specification (1), the two-day cumulated market-adjusted
23 The results are qualitatively equivalent if we do not impose this constraint, nor if we define ∆ER as the difference between
current price target scaled by price and the most recent price target scaled by price issued by the same broker on the same stock.
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abnormal return for affiliated stocks is 1.29% smaller than that of rival stocks (statistically different from
zero at the 1% level). This difference holds after adding the vector of control variables in specifications (2)
and (3).62F24 Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 3.2a.
The above results suggest that investors are skeptical to favorable recommendations for brokers’
clients. At the same time, in all specifications, the estimated coefficient on RIVAL is not statistically
different from zero, consistent with the conjecture that, before SOX, market participants did not recognize
the brokers’ negative bias for rival stocks.
Following Hypothesis 3.2b, if investors consider that SOX was effective in limiting the affiliation bias,
then we should observe no difference in the short-term market reaction to recommendations between
affiliated and rival stocks after SOX. We identify no difference in the two-day performance of rival,
affiliated and neutral stocks in all specifications for both added-to-buy and added-to-sell
recommendations. Specifically, the p-value associated with the difference in abnormal returns between
affiliated and rival stocks after SOX (i.e. 1 4 2 5( ) ( )      ) lies between 0.35 and 0.61. Therefore,
we do not reject Hypothesis 3.2b. This finding shows that investors translated the current regulation as an
ex-post decrease in brokers’ positive bias on affiliated firms, despite the persistence of the conflicts.
Taken together, these results illustrate that the sophistication of investors in correctly depicting biased
recommendations for the brokers’ clients before SOX has not insulated them from recognizing the
persistence of such conflicts after the passage of SOX. Consequently, investors expect the conflicts of
interest to have disappeared and remain unaware of brokers’ negative bias on rival firms in the aftermath
of the regulations.
24 We cannot reject that the difference in the market reaction before SOX between affiliated and rival firms is zero for the sample
of added-to-sell recommendations.  However, this result is driven by the small sample size in this panel (i.e., the power of the test
is  less than 0.10 compared to 0.86 in the panel of added-to-buy recommendations).
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Conclusions
The main message of this paper is that the inherently subjective nature of affiliated research continues
to exist in spite of the amount of regulatory initiatives aiming to curb conflicts of interest in the investment
banking industry. More specifically, we find that affiliated brokers issue persistently higher
recommendations and price targets on their client firms compared to their clients’ rivals. To the best of our
knowledge, this form of conflict was not investigated previously in the literature. While affiliated brokers
become, on average, more pessimistic after the enactment of SOX, they nevertheless continue to favor
their clients by keeping their rivals on significantly lower ratings. Our findings are robust to several
alternative specifications and definitions of the variables of interest. Additionally, we find no consistent
support for other hypotheses (selection bias and positive information) that could mislead the interpretation
of our results. As such, we document that brokers’ alternatives for hyping their clients’ stocks were all but
dismal after the passage of SOX. We further show that, while investors discount to some extent the
positive recommendations bias for affiliated stocks before SOX, the downward bias for rival firms is not
recognized in the short-run. Furthermore, the brokers’ biases (i.e. positive for affiliated and negative for
rivals) remain unperceived by investors in the post-regulation period.
This study contributes to the ongoing debate on the effects of the current regulations. It is now a
befitting question to ask whether regulators are able to account in the future for the various innovations
that can sidestep regulatory restrictions, and more importantly, at what costs. While we attempt to show
that conflicts of interest persist in spite of regulatory efforts, identifying the channels through which
financial analysts’ incentives change after the regulations is out of the scope of this paper. We look
forward to research clarifying whether shaping efficient regulations is indeed achievable, or the conflicts
of interests in the investment banking industry are stronger and bound to prevail.
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Appendix
Table 3.A.1: Sample selection
This table presents the sample construction for recommendations (Panel A) and price targets (Panel B) respectively.
Affiliated firms have at least one business deal (IPO, SEO, public debt offering, M&A, syndicated loan) with the
broker one year or less prior to the recommendation or price target issue. Rival represent the competitor firm of an
affiliated with the highest pairwise TNIC score, and above the yearly average, during the current year. Neutral firms
are defined as neither Affiliated nor Rival.
Panel A: Recommendations
IBES outstanding recommendations, 1996-2008 311,769
Less
Recommendations issued on multiple times during the day per firm-broker (keep the most recent) (633)
Recommendations issued in bulk around rating scale changes (12,765)
Recommendations with no corresponding data in CRSP/COMPUSTAT (10,987)
Simultaneous affiliated and rival recommendations (4,262)
Recommendations issued on multiple times during the quarter per firm-broker (keep the most recent) (27,719)
Recommendations with no corresponding data for control variables (10,026)
Recommendations with less than two outstanding brokers to compute consensus (129,721)
Final sample 115,656
Affiliated 6,711
Rival 6,603
Neutral 102,342
Panel B. Price targets
IBES outstanding price targets, 1999-2008 633,732
Less
Price targets with horizon different from 12 months (13,102)
Price targets issued on multiple times during the day per firm-broker (keep the most recent) (2,142)
Price targets with no corresponding data in CRSP/COMPUSTAT (31,185)
Simultaneous affiliated and rival price targets (8,201)
Price targets issued on multiple times during the quarter per firm-broker (keep the most recent) (131,389)
Price targets with no corresponding data for control variables (6,982)
Price targets with less than two outstanding brokers to compute consensus (96,716)
Final sample 334,015
Affiliated 26,680
Rival 15,019
Neutral 292,316
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Table 3.A.2: Variables definition and source
Variable Definition Source
, ,
RELRECb i t
The recommendation for firm i issued by broker b at time t minus the mean
recommendation of the rest of the brokers covering the same firm during the
last three months.
I/B/E/S
, ,
RELPTb i t
The price target for firm i issued by broker b scaled by the current stock price
minus the consensus price target. Consensus price target is computed as the
mean price target scaled by the current stock price of the rest of the brokers
covering the same firm during the last three months.
I/B/E/S,
CRSP
, ,
AFFILIATEDb i t
Dummy variable equal to one if broker b had at least one business deal (IPO,
SEO, debt raising, M&A, syndicated loan) with firm i less than one year prior
to the recommendation or price target date, zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S,
SDC,LPC
DealScan
, ,
RIVALb i t
Dummy variable equal to one if, during the year of the recommendation or
price target issue, firm i is classified as a competitor for at least one of the
broker b’s affiliates with the highest TNIC pairwise score (and above the
annual average score of the affiliated), and zero otherwise.
CRSP,
I/B/E/S,
SDC,LPC
DealScan
SOX t
Dummy variable equal to one if the recommendation or price target is issued
after July 31th 2002, zero otherwise.
,
BSIZEb t
Number of analysts working for broker b during the current quarter. I/B/E/S
, ,
ERb i t Dummy variable equal to one if the recommendation issued by broker b onfirm i is accompanied by a price target revision in the two-day event window,
and zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
, ,
EPSDATEb i t
Dummy variable equal to one if broker b issues a recommendation in the three-
day window surrounding an earnings announcement of firm i, zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
, ,
EXPERIENCEb i t
Number of years for which the broker covers the stock. I/B/E/S
, ,
INITIATIONb i t
Dummy variable equal to one if broker b initiates the coverage for firm i at
time t, zero otherwise.
I/B/E/S
,
NBROKERi t
Logarithm of the number of brokers covering firm i during the current quarter. I/B/E/S
,i tPASTFIRMPERF Cumulative market-adjusted return over the preceding six months (months -6through -1) for firm i.
CRSP
PASTMKTPERFt
Cumulative market return over the preceding six months (months -6 through -
1).
CRSP
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
This table reports the proportion of stock recommendations by rating (Panel A), the average price target to current
price ratio by tercile over the last three months (Panel B), and the number of recommendations (price target to current
price ratio), brokers, and firms covered by year. Favorable (unfavorable) recommendations are defined as Buy and
Strong Buy (Sell and Strong Sell) recommendations.
Panel A: Recommendations
Year Favorable (%) Hold (%) Unfavorable (%) # Rec # Firms # Brokers
1996 59.60 34.47 5.94 5,492 1,187 184
1997 62.25 33.20 4.55 6,156 1,375 219
1998 63.75 33.06 3.19 8,143 1,602 233
1999 67.44 29.70 2.85 8,696 1,656 223
2000 70.84 27.13 2.03 8,978 1,557 224
2001 61.12 35.88 3.00 11,453 1,710 203
2002 51.00 40.94 8.05 16,813 2,003 216
2003 40.88 46.55 12.57 11,678 1,744 261
2004 41.63 46.10 12.27 8,606 1,483 276
2005 42.05 46.26 11.69 6,965 1,487 270
2006 39.69 47.68 12.62 6,996 1,509 255
2007 39.05 49.24 11.71 7,217 1,601 243
2008 39.68 46.39 13.93 8,463 1,597 242
Total 52.17 39.84 7.99 115,656 5,445 667
Panel B: Price targets
Year 3rd tercile 2nd tercile 1st tercile # PT/P # Firms # Brokers
1999 1.563 1.246 1.082 12,898 1,779 141
2000 1.757 1.279 1.088 23,025 2,102 173
2001 1.745 1.252 1.059 27,701 2,179 160
2002 1.635 1.222 1.040 33,173 2,225 173
2003 1.367 1.144 0.968 32,500 2,254 245
2004 1.347 1.136 0.977 36,240 2,462 278
2005 1.327 1.133 0.984 37,663 2,652 279
2006 1.339 1.134 0.985 39,946 2,774 271
2007 1.322 1.129 0.987 42,728 2,840 265
2008 1.597 1.195 0.991 48,141 2,765 267
Total 1.496 1.168 0.999 334,015 5,018 546
127
Table 3.2: Percentage distribution of recommendations and price targets by affiliation
This table reports the percentage of favorable (Buy and Strong Buy) and unfavorable (Sell and Strong Sell) recommendations (Panel A) and 3rd and 1st tercile of
price targets (Panel B) for rival, affiliated and neutral firms. Affiliated firms have at least one business deal (IPO, SEO, public debt offering, M&A, syndicated loan)
with the broker one year or less prior to the recommendation or price target issue. Rival represents the competitor firm of an affiliated with the highest pairwise
TNIC score, and above the yearly average, during the current year. Neutral firms are defined as neither Affiliated nor Rival.
Panel A: Recommendations
Favorable (%) Unfavorable (%)
Year Affiliated (i) Rival (ii) Neutral (iii) p-val.(i) - (ii)
p-val.
(ii) - (iii)
p-val.
(i) -
(iii)
Affiliated (i) Rival (ii) Neutral (iii) p-val.(i) - (ii)
p-val.
(ii) - (iii)
p-val.
(i) - (iii)
Before (a) 70.48 63.89 62.82 0.00 0.22 0.00 2.14 2.71 3.78 0.13 0.00 0.00
After (b) 39.86 35.32 40.65 0.00 0.00 0.37 11.14 15.46 12.54 0.00 0.00 0.02
p-val. (b) - (a) 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - -
1996 68.13 58.72 59.18 0.02 0.87 0.00 3.30 4.07 6.22 0.61 0.11 0.05
1997 75.74 63.25 61.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 2.30 2.56 4.80 0.82 0.05 0.04
1998 69.20 65.67 63.27 0.25 0.28 0.01 2.01 1.80 3.36 0.81 0.06 0.12
1999 71.37 70.33 67.02 0.72 0.13 0.05 2.11 2.28 2.93 0.85 0.41 0.30
2000 77.41 69.59 70.45 0.00 0.68 0.00 1.23 2.14 2.08 0.24 0.92 0.16
2001 67.59 61.64 60.71 0.04 0.67 0.00 1.30 2.29 3.14 0.20 0.27 0.01
2002 58.70 48.01 50.59 0.00 0.13 0.00 5.71 9.29 8.16 0.00 0.23 0.00
2003 41.80 34.38 41.16 0.01 0.00 0.74 10.78 18.48 12.38 0.00 0.00 0.22
2004 43.07 35.85 41.92 0.02 0.01 0.62 9.17 14.26 12.33 0.01 0.21 0.04
2005 35.83 37.74 42.70 0.58 0.05 0.01 10.83 14.18 11.57 0.16 0.11 0.67
2006 37.99 30.46 40.49 0.02 0.00 0.32 11.76 15.89 12.44 0.08 0.03 0.69
2007 38.91 37.47 39.18 0.64 0.46 0.90 12.06 12.63 11.61 0.79 0.50 0.76
2008 37.28 37.50 40.00 0.94 0.23 0.25 12.50 15.17 13.92 0.22 0.40 0.39
Total 55.61 49.51 52.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.51 9.13 8.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(continued)
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Table 3.2
(continued)
Panel B: Price targets
3rd tercile (%) 1st tercile (%)
Year Affiliated (i) Rival (ii) Neutral (iii) p-val.(i) - (ii)
p-val.
(ii) - (iii)
p-val.
(i) -
(iii)
Affiliated (i) Rival (ii) Neutral (iii) p-val.(i) - (ii)
p-val.
(ii) - (iii)
p-val.
(i) - (iii)
Before (a) 37.16 32.21 34.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.00 33.39 33.19 0.00 0.79 0.00
After (b) 32.24 28.78 35.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.47 37.80 32.89 0.00 0.00 0.23
p-val. (b) - (a) 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - -
1999 39.35 32.40 34.06 0.00 0.33 0.00 27.60 33.74 33.28 0.00 0.79 0.00
2000 37.86 33.71 35.91 0.02 0.13 0.09 27.98 31.89 33.02 0.02 0.43 0.00
2001 32.76 30.46 31.35 0.18 0.52 0.18 30.32 34.68 35.01 0.01 0.82 0.00
2002 37.38 29.95 34.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.63 35.98 34.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
2003 32.19 24.25 32.56 0.00 0.00 0.70 32.39 40.32 34.27 0.00 0.00 0.05
2004 31.66 28.29 34.31 0.02 0.00 0.00 31.96 38.17 32.77 0.00 0.00 0.35
2005 31.27 28.18 35.38 0.03 0.00 0.00 33.29 37.24 32.21 0.01 0.00 0.24
2006 30.47 28.24 34.30 0.09 0.00 0.00 34.20 37.13 33.32 0.03 0.00 0.29
2007 32.79 29.68 36.40 0.02 0.00 0.00 31.07 37.58 31.71 0.00 0.00 0.43
2008 35.15 32.50 37.91 0.04 0.00 0.00 32.49 36.52 31.65 0.00 0.00 0.34
Total 33.50 29.70 34.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.33 36.61 32.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 3.3: Brokers’ bias and SOX
This table presents the results of regressions examining the brokers’ bias in recommendations and price targets by
affiliation. In column (1), the dependent variable is the relative recommendation (price target/current price), defined
as the difference between the current recommendation (price target/current price) and the consensus. In column (2),
we require each broker-stock pair to appear at least once in the sample both before and after the enactment of SOX.
In column (3), we limit the heterogeneity of firms and brokers by reducing the sample to firms that are
simultaneously affiliated rival and neutral for different brokers and to brokers that cover simultaneously affiliated,
rival and neutral firms. In column (4) we define Rival as the same three-digit SIC stock with which the affiliated firm
had the highest weekly return correlation during the current year. Affiliated firms have at least one business deal
(IPO, SEO, public debt offering, M&A, syndicated loan) with the broker one year or less prior to the
recommendation or price target issue. Rival represents the competitor firm of an affiliated with the highest pairwise
TNIC score, and above the yearly average, during the current year. All specifications include firm fixed effects.
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the quarter level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The control variables are defined in Table 3.A.2.
Panel A: Recommendations Baseline Pre/Post SOX Reduced sample Rivals SIC3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AFFILIATED 1( ) 0.1332*** 0.1386*** 0.1539*** 0.1306***
(0.0182) (0.0238) (0.0199) (0.0207)
RIVAL  2( ) 0.0671*** 0.0776*** 0.0701*** 0.0767***
(0.0162) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0143)
SOX 0.0212 0.0062 0.0108 0.0173
(0.0232) (0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0233)
AFFILIATED x SOX  4( ) -0.1243*** -0.1314*** -0.1519*** -0.0972***
(0.0274) (0.0327) (0.0300) (0.0264)
RIVAL x SOX  5( ) -0.1359*** -0.1551*** -0.1499*** -0.1091***
(0.0281) (0.0306) (0.0350) (0.0261)
BSIZE -0.0010*** -0.0012*** -0.0010*** -0.0010***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
NBROKER -0.0746*** -0.0766*** -0.0676*** -0.0745***
(0.0097) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0097)
PASTFIRMPERF -0.0255** -0.0344** -0.0105 -0.0252**
(0.0119) (0.0141) (0.0131) (0.0116)
PASTMKTPERF 0.2724*** 0.2895** 0.2987*** 0.2663***
(0.0895) (0.1156) (0.0948) (0.0889)
INITIATION 0.1223*** 0.0903*** 0.0581*** 0.1240***
(0.0143) (0.0177) (0.0194) (0.0145)
Constant 0.0762*** 0.1274*** 0.1104*** 0.0780***
(0.0223) (0.0261) (0.0245) (0.0220)
Obs. 115,656 74,744 49,265 114,000
Adj. R-sq. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Hypothesis (p-val.)
1 2β  - β  = 0 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
1 4 2 5(β  + β ) - (β  + β ) = 0 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02
(continued)
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Table 3.3
(continued)
Panel B: Price targets Baseline Pre/Post SOX Reduced sample Rivals SIC3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AFFILIATED 1( ) 0.0460*** 0.0415*** 0.0440*** 0.0469***
(0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0061)
RIVAL  2( ) 0.0252*** 0.0274*** 0.0275*** 0.0271***
(0.0080) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0068)
SOX -0.0095 -0.0130 -0.0082 -0.0085
(0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0109) (0.0117)
AFFILIATED x SOX  4( ) -0.0351*** -0.0289*** -0.0322*** -0.0367***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0066) (0.0076)
RIVAL x SOX  5( ) -0.0246*** -0.0252*** -0.0289*** -0.0290***
(0.0091) (0.0079) (0.0091) (0.0079)
BSIZE -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
NBROKER 0.0132** 0.0122** 0.0129** 0.0133**
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0050)
PASTFIRMPERF 0.0176** 0.0169** 0.0184** 0.0179**
(0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0070)
PASTMKTPERF -0.0335 -0.0095 -0.0241 -0.0338
(0.0383) (0.0349) (0.0322) (0.0381)
INITIATION -0.0120* -0.0130** -0.0118* -0.0114*
(0.0064) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0064)
Constant 0.0088 0.0086 0.0045 0.0077
(0.0115) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0112)
Obs. 334,015 251,111 198,393 331,962
Adj. R-sq. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Hypothesis (p-val.)
1 2β  - β  = 0 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.00
1 4 2 5(β  + β ) - (β  + β ) = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 3.4: The affiliation bias relative to rival and neutral recommendations and price targets
This table presents the results of the baseline model examining the brokers’ affiliation bias for their clients in two
distinct samples. In column (1) and (3) the sample is restricted to affiliated and rival recommendations and price
targets. In column (2) and (4) the sample is restricted to affiliated and neutral recommendations and price targets.
The dependent variable is the relative recommendation (price target/current price), defined as the distance between
the current recommendation (price target/current price) and the consensus. Affiliated firms have at least one business
deal (IPO, SEO, public debt offering, M&A, syndicated loan) with the broker one year or less prior to the
recommendation or price target issue. Rival represents the competitor firm of an affiliated with the highest pairwise
TNIC score, and above the yearly average, during the current year. All specifications include firm fixed effects.
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the quarter level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The control variables are defined in Table 3.A.2.
Recommendations Price targets
Affiliated+Neutral Affiliated+Rival Affiliated+Neutral Affiliated+Rival
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AFFILIATED 1( ) 0.1336*** 0.0653** 0.0460*** 0.0143*
(0.0181) (0.0278) (0.0055) (0.0074)
SOX 0.0216 -0.1489*** -0.0096 -0.0348***
(0.0234) (0.0331) (0.0117) (0.0104)
AFFILIATED x SOX  4( ) -0.1241*** -0.0064 -0.0352*** -0.0003
(0.0268) (0.0421) (0.0073) (0.0080)
BSIZE -0.0010*** -0.0005 -0.0005*** -0.0003***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
NBROKER -0.0738*** -0.0774*** 0.0130** 0.0123**
(0.0098) (0.0232) (0.0051) (0.0055)
PASTFIRMPERF -0.0257** -0.0035 0.0175** 0.0139*
(0.0113) (0.0244) (0.0069) (0.0075)
PASTMKTPERF 0.2732*** 0.4130*** -0.0332 -0.0344
(0.0903) (0.0968) (0.0403) (0.0275)
INITIATION 0.1253*** 0.0173 -0.0115* -0.0166**
(0.0145) (0.0271) (0.0065) (0.0068)
Constant 0.0722*** 0.1483*** 0.0093 0.0241
(0.0229) (0.0459) (0.0113) (0.0144)
Obs. 109,053 13,314 318,996 41,699
Adj. R-sq. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Hypothesis (p-val.)
1 4β  + β  = 0 0.69 0.13 0.01 0.00
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Table 3.5: Alternative explanations to conflicts of interests
This table reports the results of evaluating the alternative explanations for the affiliation bias. In Panel A, we test whether the current bias is associated with future
potential deals. We report the percentage of rival and neutral firms that became clients for the issuing broker in the future. In Panel B, we test whether the current
rating is associated with the brokers’ private information on the stock’s prospects. We report the monthly excess return over the next six months computed as the
difference between stock’s return and the CRSP value-weighted index. Affiliated firms have at least one business deal (IPO, SEO, public debt offering, M&A,
syndicated loan) with the broker one year or less prior to the recommendation or price target issue. Rival represents the competitor firm of an affiliated with the
highest pairwise TNIC score, and above the yearly average, during the current year. Neutral firms are defined as neither Affiliated nor Rival. Added-to-buy
(added-to-sell) recommendations consist of upgrades (downgrades) from the previous recommendation (issued by the same broker on the same stock) and
initiations to Buy or Strong Buy (Sell or Strong Sell).
Panel A: Selection hypothesis
Affiliated in the next year Affiliated in the next three years
Rival (i) Neutral (ii) p-val. (i) - (ii) Rival (i) Neutral (ii) p-val. (i) - (ii)
Recommendations
Before SOX 2.32% 1.11% 0.00 4.67% 2.09% 0.00
After SOX 1.65% 0.75% 0.00 3.31% 1.29% 0.00
Price targets
Before SOX 8.07% 3.60% 0.00 16.61% 7.83% 0.00
After SOX 7.98% 3.31% 0.00 13.50% 5.47% 0.00
Panel B: Information hypothesis
Affiliated
(i)
Rival
(ii)
Neutral
(iii)
p-val.
(i) - (ii)
p-val.
(ii) - (iii)
p-val.
(i) - (iii)
Affiliated
(i)
Rival
(ii)
Neutral
(iii)
p-val.
(i) - (ii)
p-val.
(ii) - (iii)
p-val.
(i) - (iii)
Recommendations Added-to-buy Added-to-sell
Before SOX 2.69% 6.71% 2.82% 0.16 0.07 0.95 -3.36% -4.04% 0.59% 0.93 0.40 0.45
N (236) (226) (4,247) (38) (35) (809)
After SOX 1.42% 0.67% 2.13% 0.69 0.25 0.60 3.59% 4.88% 5.46% 0.59 0.71 0.32
N (349) (396) (5,845) (216) (315) (3,205)
Price targets
Affiliated (i) Rival (ii) Neutral (iii) p-val. (i) - (ii) p-val. (ii) - (iii) p-val. (i) - (iii)
Before SOX 0.56% 0.91% -0.15% 0.50 0.01 0.03
N (9,334) (5,559) (104,302)
After SOX 3.60% 2.14% 2.45% 0.00 0.14 0.00
N (24,926) (13,454) (280,494)
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Table 3.6: Short-term abnormal returns by affiliation
This table reports the average two-day cumulative abnormal returns (in percentage) and the breakdown of
recommendations by type of firm relative to added-to-buy (Panel A) and added-to-sell recommendations (Panel B).
The short-term abnormal return is the two-day excess return, computed as the difference between stock’s return and
the CRSP value-weighted index. Added-to-buy (added-to-sell) recommendations consist of upgrades (downgrades)
from the previous recommendation and initiations to Buy or Strong Buy (Sell or Strong Sell). Affiliated firms have at
least one business deal (IPO, SEO, public debt offering, M&A, syndicated loan) with the broker one year or less
prior to the recommendation or price target issue. Rival represents the competitor firm of an affiliated with the
highest pairwise TNIC score, and above the yearly average, during the current year. Neutral firms are defined as
neither Affiliated nor Rival.
Affiliated (i) Rival (ii) Neutral (iii) p-val. (i) - (ii) p-val. (i) - (iii) p-val. (ii) - (iii)
Panel A. Added-to-buy
Before SOX 1.52 2.80 2.08 0.00 0.12 0.04
After SOX 2.95 3.36 3.12 0.15 0.46 0.28
Panel B. Added-to-sell
Before SOX -3.96 -4.85 -3.82 0.71 0.93 0.44
After SOX -3.50 -4.03 -3.95 0.38 0.37 0.85
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Table 3.7: Multivariate tests on short-term market reaction to biased recommendations
This table presents the two-day cumulative abnormal returns (in percentage) relative to added-to-buy (Panel A) and
added-to-sell recommendations (Panel B). Daily excess return is computed as the difference between stock’s return
and the CRSP value-weighted index. Added-to-buy (added-to-sell) recommendations consist of upgrades
(downgrades) from the previous recommendation (issued by the same broker on the same stock) and initiations to
Buy or Strong Buy (Sell or Strong Sell). Affiliated firms have at least one business deal (IPO, SEO, public debt
offering, M&A, syndicated loan) with the broker one year or less prior to the recommendation or price target issue.
Rival represents the competitor firm of an affiliated with the highest pairwise TNIC score, and above the yearly
average, during the current year. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the quarter level. ***, ** and
* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The control variables are defined in Table 3.A.2.
Panel A. Added-to-buy Panel B. Added-to-sell
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
AFFILIATED 1( ) -0.5968** -0.6849** -0.6820** -0.0798 -0.1685 -0.2049
(0.2580) (0.2666) (0.2651) (2.6312) (2.5065) (2.5455)
RIVAL  2( ) 0.6891 0.5232 0.5262 -0.9145 -0.9075 -0.8080
(0.4349) (0.4416) (0.4362) (1.9285) (1.9273) (1.9622)
SOX 0.8988*** 1.0785*** 1.0489*** 0.3288 -0.1394 -0.0177
(0.1994) (0.1935) (0.1906) (0.5542) (0.5328) (0.5345)
AFFILIATED x SOX  4( ) 0.3923 0.5475 0.5942 0.5804 0.4087 0.4312
(0.3723) (0.3743) (0.3729) (2.6706) (2.5680) (2.6098)
RIVAL x SOX  5( ) -0.4644 -0.2612 -0.2119 0.9144 0.8000 0.7055
(0.5306) (0.5291) (0.5230) (2.0848) (2.0798) (2.1123)
∆ER 0.4443*** 0.5104*** 0.4285** -1.0313*** -1.2083*** -1.1153***
(0.1623) (0.1807) (0.1805) (0.3010) (0.2924) (0.2916)
PASTMKTPERF -1.2418 -1.3114 -1.3430 -1.0141
(0.9430) (0.9503) (1.6868) (1.6904)
PASTFIRMPERF -0.7356*** -0.7452*** 2.6476*** 2.5284***
(0.2488) (0.2482) (0.5744) (0.5585)
EXPERIENCE -0.1561*** -0.1487*** 0.2320*** 0.2190***
(0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0476) (0.0471)
BSIZE 0.0083*** 0.0090*** -0.0092* -0.0099**
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0049) (0.0048)
EPSDATE -1.2107*** 2.1829***
(0.1840) (0.3115)
Constant 1.8740*** 2.2125*** 3.1257*** -3.5238*** -3.6209*** -5.3984***
(0.1957) (0.2086) (0.2402) (0.4861) (0.4799) (0.5614)
Obs. 28,315 28,315 28,315 9,995 9,995 9,995
Adj. R-sq. 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
Hypothesis (p-val.)
1 2β  - β  = 0 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.81 0.83 0.86
1 4 2 5(β  + β ) - (β  + β ) = 0 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.57 0.61
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Figure 3.1: The affiliation bias over time
This figure displays the affiliation bias for recommendations (Panel A) and price target (Panel B). The affiliation bias
is obtained from quarterly regressions on the effect of brokers’ affiliation (Affiliated and Rival) on their relative
recommendation or price target. Affiliated firms have at least one business deal (IPO, SEO, public debt offering,
M&A, syndicated loan) with the broker one year or less prior to the recommendation or price target issue. Rival
represents the competitor firm of an affiliated with the highest pairwise TNIC score, and above the yearly average,
during the current year. All specifications include the set of variables defined in Table 3.A.2 as well as firm fixed
effects.
Panel A. Recommendations
Panel B. Price targets
